Five years later, and few answers in anthrax probe

[Guest guest]

This article and its timing is very interesting. Within the last 4 days, 12

hits (possibly higher) have come through on google alerts regarding

" Bioshield Woes " , (etc...)

http://www.fredericknewspost.com/sections/news/display.htm?storyid=52814

Five years later, and few answers in anthrax probe

Published on October 4, 2006

By Alison

News-Post Staff

FREDERICK -- Five years after anthrax was used in lethal mail attacks, the

federal government still has few answers and considerable work to prepare

for a similar attack.

Letters containing powdered anthrax spores were mailed to media outlets in

New York and Florida and to Sens. Tom Daschle, D-S.D., and Leahy,

D-Vt.

The attacks resulted in five deaths and 17 anthrax infections. Officials

first announced a confirmed case of inhalation anthrax Oct. 4, 2001, in a

Florida photo editor who died the next day.

Dubbing the case " Amerithrax, " the FBI investigation placed a Fort Detrick

lab under national scrutiny.

The case remains unsolved.

Delays

The source of the anthrax has eluded investigators, and experts say the

perpetrator may never be found.

Luciana Borio, an infectious disease expert, said anthrax is more difficult

to trace than many bacterial agents. Ms. Borio is a senior associate at the

University of Pittsburgh Medical Center's Center for Biosecurity.

" The difficulty we have with biothreats is there is no return address, there

is no signature, " she said. " It's almost impossible to identify who did it. "

The genetic makeup of anthrax is not unique to its geographic origin, said

Hinrichs, who directs the University of Nebraska's Center for

Biosecurity in Omaha. Finding such a geographic correlation would allow

investigators to link an anthrax sample to its place of origin.

" Identifying genetic differences (among samples) has been difficult, and

they may not even exist, " he said.

Col. Franz is the former commander of the Army's biodefense laboratory

at Fort Detrick, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious

Diseases, or USAMRIID.

While bullets from a gun can be traced to the gun that fired them, he said,

similar techniques don't exist in biology.

Suspect pool

Reports that the anthrax used in the 2001 attacks was less sophisticated

than once thought could extend the pool of suspects beyond the U.S.

biodefense community, and could further complicate the FBI investigation.

Beecher is a scientist in the FBI's Hazardous Materials Response

Unit. The theory that the spores were manufactured military-style was a

misconception, he said in an August scientific journal.

These revelations may indicate the perpetrator wasn't a member of the U.S.

biodefense community, The Washington Post reported in late September.

Media reports after the attacks said the anthrax was made with additives and

complex engineering, a combination known as weaponizing. Investigators

looked for a biodefense insider with the ability to produce such a product.

Col. Franz, the former USAMRIID commander, told The Frederick News-Post on

Monday the anthrax mailed to Sen. Daschle was probably not weaponized, but

it was still high quality.

" Whoever purified it and dried it had to know

what they were doing, " he said.

The anthrax was clean, with little debris, Col. Franz said. The sample

contained individual spores, which would take significant skill to produce,

he said.

Mr. Hinrichs, the Nebraska biosecurity expert, said inhalation anthrax that

isn't weaponized is still a serious infectious threat.

" (The anthrax used in 2001) was certainly effective enough, " he said,

referring to the five people who died from exposure to the agent.

It is possible that weaponized anthrax would have infected or killed more

people than in 2001, Dr. Hinrichs said.

Investigators are also widening the scope of the anthrax case to outside the

United States because the strain of anthrax used in the attacks has been

found in labs around the world.

Fort Detrick

The FBI's investigation initially focused on USAMRIID, the Army's biodefense

laboratory at Fort Detrick.

USAMRIID was strongly linked to Ames strain anthrax. The lab was the first

to use the Ames anthrax strain for research -- and gave the strain its

name -- in the 1980s.

In June 2002, the FBI named former USAMRIID researcher J. Hatfill " a

person of interest. "

Agents searched Mr. Hatfill's apartment across the street from Fort Detrick.

They searched a frozen pond in the Frederick watershed in late 2002 for

evidence used in the 2001 attacks, and drained the pond in June 2003.

Mr. Hatfill has pursued a lawsuit against the government, trying to find

employees at the FBI and the Justice Department who leaked his name to

reporters during the anthrax investigation. He is also suing several news

organizations for libel.

Preventing threats

Anthrax remains the most probable agent of bioterrorism today, but

government officials still have work ahead of them to prepare for another

attack, said Ms. Borio of the UPMC Center for Biosecurity.

" Even though (anthrax) is a top threat, and even with a tremendous amount of

resources to deal with it, we still haven't done as much as we can as a

government to diminish the threat, " she said.

Ms. Borio stressed the need for improvements in public health response

preparedness.

Even with stockpiled antibiotics and vaccines, state and local action would

be critical during threats, she said.

Delivering medical care, distributing treatments and educating physicians to

recognize exposure is a local responsibility, Ms. Borio said.

States must also be prepared to request, transport and distribute vaccines

and antibiotics within a few days.

Mr. Hinrichs said bioterrorism preparedness would be better if federal

health agencies created uniform rules for reporting disease. Detecting

outbreaks might require standardization of reportable conditions or

diseases.

States report different information about different disease incidences to

national health agencies, impeding federal officials from recognizing

outbreaks and responding, he said.

Mr. Hinrichs worked with Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., to introduce the National

Reportable Conditions Act to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.

The legislation would create an advisory board to update a list of emerging

diseases and establish uniform reporting standards, as well as create an

automated electronic reporting system.

Strides since 2001

The UPMC biosecurity center issued a report in September on the nation's

positive steps and failures in preparedness since the anthrax attacks.

The report stated that since 2001 the government has improved bioterrorism

awareness and training, funding for state and local preparedness and

biodefense research and development.

Since the 2001 attacks, federal spending on biodefense research has

increased from about $675 million in 2001 to an estimated $3.4 billion in

fiscal 2006, according to the Centers for Arms Control and Nonproliferation

in Washington.

At Fort Detrick, the Department of Homeland Security is building a $128

million biodefense laboratory, as part of the planned National Interagency

Biodefense Campus on post.

The NBACC is scheduled to begin operating in 2008. Also under construction

on the campus is a $105 million National Institute of Allergy and Infectious

Diseases laboratory, expected to open in early 2008.

Stockpiles

Stockpiling adequate supplies of anthrax vaccine -- a process expected to

take three more years -- will be critical to coping with another attack, Ms.

Borio said.

The Strategic National Stockpile has 40 million doses of anthrax antibiotics

on hand to treat people who have been potentially exposed.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has contracted for 85

million doses of anthrax vaccine, which would vaccinate about 10 percent of

the U.S. population.

Five million doses of anthrax vaccine are stockpiled, with another 5 million

doses on the way. Production of the remaining 75 million doses, a second

generation vaccine, has taken longer than expected.

The DHHS awarded California-based company VaxGen Inc. an $877.5 million

contract in 2004 to produce for the national stockpile.

Because of many delays, the government gave London company Avecia a $71

million contract to develop a vaccine using the same approach.

Avecia said in late September clinical trials for the vaccine's safety and

effectiveness in people were promising.

USAMRIID senior scientist Arthur Friedlander and a team of scientists at the

laboratory discovered a key component of the vaccine that has shown

promising results in human testing.

Randi Airola

517-819-5926

When Good People do Nothing....

" Today Americans would be outraged if U. N. troops entered Los Angeles to

restore order; tomorrow they will be grateful! This is especially true if

they were told there was an outside threat from beyond, whether real or

promulgated, that threatened our very existence. It is then that all people

of the world will plead with world leaders to deliver them from this evil.

The one thing every man fears is the unknown. When presented with this

scenario, individual rights will be willingly relinquished for the guarantee

of their well being granted to them by their world government. "

~ Henry Kissinger

They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety

deserve neither liberty nor safety - lin