Washington Post slams NIGHTLINE Biowar series

[Guest guest]

-- my comments: It's no surprise that this program has come under such

intense criticism, considering the Nightline Biowar series scenario

designer, Olsen, works for a DoD contractor named Research

Planning, Inc.-- and is associated with their new Weapons of Mass

Destruction division, under the Emergency Management branch. It's his

job to whip up public hysteria as long as the alarm translates into

landing some of that new biowarfare funding for his company-- see their

web site (and check the WMD link to see just how new this division is)

at

http://www.rpihq.com/Products_and_Services1/Principal_Business_Areas/Emergency_M\

anagement/emergency_management.htm

" RPI performs a broad range of emergency management services for the

following clients....

American Red Cross

Chase Manhattan Bank

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Department of Energy

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Justice

Department of State

Environmental Protection Agency

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Federal Emergency Management Agency

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Rockefeller Center

Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (and the 120 cities under the

Domestic Preparedness Program)

State of South Carolina "

Jeff J.

Memphis

----

from

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1999-11/08/013l-110899-idx.html

Dangerous Fictions About Bioterrorism

By A.

Monday, November 8, 1999; Page A21

Biological terrorism is a hot media topic these days, but by confusing

fact and fiction, coverage could cause more harm than good. While

national security and public health experts become increasingly

concerned about bioterrorism, misleading stories are appearing --

including the recent anthrax scenario on ABC's " Nightline. "

In a five-part series that aired between Oct. 1 and Oct. 8, " Nightline "

presented " Biowar, " a fictitious scenario of a bioterrorist attack in

which an epidemic was unleashed when unknown terrorists broke glass

bottles containing anthrax spores in a city subway. Panelists on the

show, who in real life hold elected office or serve as governmental or

public health authorities, represented the beleaguered professionals

trying to cope with the fictional attack.

The " Nightline " series endeavored to call attention to a serious

national security problem. It did succeed in illustrating how poorly

informed and unprepared the country is at this time. In so doing, it

also presented several inaccuracies.

First, " Nightline " incorrectly portrayed medical and public health

intervention as ineffectual. In fact, an epidemic caused by bioterrorism

would benefit from the application of expertise similar to that required

in responding to a naturally occurring disease outbreak. These efforts

include clinical recognition of cases, confirmation by laboratory

testing, epidemiological investigation by public health staff, and the

initiation of treatment and control measures. Medical and public health

professionals would bear the primary responsibility for designing and

executing such a response. Thus far, however, health professionals have

been little involved inbioterrorism response planning sponsored by the

federal government and were not much in evidence on " Nightline " either.

In " Nightline's " scenario, inhalation anthrax was depicted as having a

three- to seven-day incubation period. What this means is essentially

that all those infected in the scenario became ill within a week after

exposure. By the close of the scenario, 65,000 had fallen sick, and 80

percent were expected to die. In the " Nightline " story, antibiotics were

erroneously depicted as being of little value, and vaccines, arriving by

airlift by Day Six, were too late to be beneficial.

The truth is, the incubation period for anthrax would extend far longer

than the seven days portrayed. So too would the window of opportunity

for carrying out life-saving medical interventions extend beyond a week.

The only known epidemic of inhalation anthrax occurred in Sverdlovsk,

Russia, in 1979 when anthrax spores were accidentally released from a

bioweapons factory. About 80 cases followed, some occurring as early as

two days after exposure and some as late as 47 days later

Why does this matter? " Nightline's " story ended at Day Seven, implying

-- incorrectly -- that no further interventions would be useful. In the

real world, an anthrax epidemic is unlikely to be recognized any sooner

than three or four days after the attack. It would take another 24 to 48

hours to obtain and distribute large quantities of antibiotics and

vaccines. By Day Seven in the real-life epidemic at Sverdlovsk, 75

percent of cases had yet to show the first signs of illness; antibiotics

and vaccines given at this point still could have saved many lives.

Other misleading scenes showed emergency health personnel wearing space

suits and helmets; it was suggested that persons bringing in food or

essential supplies might have to be similarly garbed. This is curious

because, as the scenario correctly notes, anthrax does not spread from

person to person, and workers run no risk of becoming infected after the

event.

It is hoped that a terrorist attack using biological weapons will remain

in the realm of fictional scenarios. But should such an event occur,

professionals and the public need to be accurately informed and

appropriate measures need to be taken to mitigate the effects. The

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and others have begun to

raise awareness of the need for coherent medical and public health

responses to potential bioterrorism. These efforts should be improved by

increasing public understanding of the true threat of bioterrorism -- a

result that can only come from careful media coverage of this easily

sensationalized topic

The writer, a public health physician, is director of the s Hopkins

Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies.

© Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company