THE TRUTH BEHIND AIDS PT6

[Guest guest]

The Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare labs were under heavy pressures to produce deadly new weapons. With the Vietnam War raging, relations between the two great superpowers had deteriorated to

worse than ever. There was real paranoia in both governments about the other's intentions and capabilities. So in 1969, it came as a terrible shock for those in the know when British and U.S. intelligence discovered alarming evidence that a team of Soviet virologists, working under Victor

Zhdanov—then the top virologist in the Soviet Union—had successfully isolated a retrovirus from human leukemia cells contaminated with "fetal calf serum." That put the Soviets ahead in this weapons race! It took a while longer for the Western labs to demonstrate how human leukemic cells could host the growth of bovine visna virus. This would explain why veterinarians participated in the Fort Detrick "trials," and why the U.S. government subsequently gave Dr. O. W. Judd, a leading

veterinarian, $8.5 million to study leukemia when human leukemia does not occur in animals. Why was a leukemia study conducted at a Harvard

veterinarian college? Intelligence reports shed some light. Researchers at Fort Detrick were in possession of all of the documentation on the unsuccessful forty-year search for a vaccine to counter maedi-visna in

sheep and eight-year search for a vaccine to counter infectious anemia in horses. The experiments included infectious anemia of horses, a lentivirus and a cousin of leukemia in humans. The tests were to see whether the new "cocktail" could be carried to humans by horseflies (its normal methods of transmission; it is not a sexually transmitted disease in horses) and by other stinging insects.In frequency of infection and efficiency of "contact," the tests using human tissue were successful in

establishing infection.The significance of this lies in the fact that elements of all three viruses—horse and sheep and bovine—appear in humans infected with the AIDS virus. It is also significant that these are "retroviruses."When they penetrate a cell, they actually alter its genetic content. Which is exactly what happens when a person becomes infected with the HIV virus. The sheep maedi-visna retrovirus closely resembles the HIV virus. The bovine visna so closely resembles the HIV virus that it was actually called, at the time,BIV—bovine immunodeficiency-like virus. The race was on. Congress was quietly notified on July 1, 1969 of the new biogenetic weaponry that was coming. A Department of Defense expert on biological warfare, Dr. McArthur, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee actually described what we now know as the AIDS virus: "Within the

next five-to-ten years," he said, "it probably will be possible to make a new infective microorganism

which would differ in certain important aspects from any known disease-causing organism. Most important of these is that it might be refractory to the immunological and therapeutic process upon which we depend to maintain our relative freedom from infectious disease. The total cost of such a program, which we could complete in five years, is in the region of $10 million." He made these statements more than a decade before the first reported AIDS case in America! On October 2, 1970, former Secretary of Defense S. McNamara—famous for his "body count" strategy in Vietnam—explained to a group of international bankers the dangerous situation they faced. "We can begin with the most critical problem of all," he said. "Population growth. It is the gravest issue that the world faces

over the decades immediately head." At present trends, he announced, the world's population would not stabilize until about the year 2020—at a population of about ten billion, more than double the population of 1970. "We can assume that the levels of poverty, stress, hunger, crowding and frustration that such a situation

could cause in the developing nations—which by then would contain nine out of ten human beings on earth—would be unlikely to assure social stability, or political stability. Or, for that matter, military

stability." Clearly, McNamara was letting the "haves" of the world know of the chaos they faced if they took no action. "It is not a world that any of us would want to live in," he said. "Is such a world inevitable? It is

not sure, but there are two possible ways in which a world of ten billion people can be averted. Either the current birth rates must come down more quickly. Or the current death rates must go up. There is no other

way. "There are, of course, many ways in which the death rates can go up. In a thermonuclear age, we can accomplish it very quickly. Famine and disease are nature's ancient checks on population growth, and

neither one has disappeared from the scene." One intelligence source informed me that McNamara was alluding to the development of new bacteriological warfare methods—and that he actually discussed them

with certain carefully selected delegates after the conference.

Bostam

[Guest guest]

The Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare labs were under heavy pressures to produce deadly new weapons. With the Vietnam War raging, relations between the two great superpowers had deteriorated to

worse than ever. There was real paranoia in both governments about the other's intentions and capabilities. So in 1969, it came as a terrible shock for those in the know when British and U.S. intelligence discovered alarming evidence that a team of Soviet virologists, working under Victor

Zhdanov—then the top virologist in the Soviet Union—had successfully isolated a retrovirus from human leukemia cells contaminated with "fetal calf serum." That put the Soviets ahead in this weapons race! It took a while longer for the Western labs to demonstrate how human leukemic cells could host the growth of bovine visna virus. This would explain why veterinarians participated in the Fort Detrick "trials," and why the U.S. government subsequently gave Dr. O. W. Judd, a leading

veterinarian, $8.5 million to study leukemia when human leukemia does not occur in animals. Why was a leukemia study conducted at a Harvard

veterinarian college? Intelligence reports shed some light. Researchers at Fort Detrick were in possession of all of the documentation on the unsuccessful forty-year search for a vaccine to counter maedi-visna in

sheep and eight-year search for a vaccine to counter infectious anemia in horses. The experiments included infectious anemia of horses, a lentivirus and a cousin of leukemia in humans. The tests were to see whether the new "cocktail" could be carried to humans by horseflies (its normal methods of transmission; it is not a sexually transmitted disease in horses) and by other stinging insects.In frequency of infection and efficiency of "contact," the tests using human tissue were successful in

establishing infection.The significance of this lies in the fact that elements of all three viruses—horse and sheep and bovine—appear in humans infected with the AIDS virus. It is also significant that these are "retroviruses."When they penetrate a cell, they actually alter its genetic content. Which is exactly what happens when a person becomes infected with the HIV virus. The sheep maedi-visna retrovirus closely resembles the HIV virus. The bovine visna so closely resembles the HIV virus that it was actually called, at the time,BIV—bovine immunodeficiency-like virus. The race was on. Congress was quietly notified on July 1, 1969 of the new biogenetic weaponry that was coming. A Department of Defense expert on biological warfare, Dr. McArthur, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee actually described what we now know as the AIDS virus: "Within the

next five-to-ten years," he said, "it probably will be possible to make a new infective microorganism

which would differ in certain important aspects from any known disease-causing organism. Most important of these is that it might be refractory to the immunological and therapeutic process upon which we depend to maintain our relative freedom from infectious disease. The total cost of such a program, which we could complete in five years, is in the region of $10 million." He made these statements more than a decade before the first reported AIDS case in America! On October 2, 1970, former Secretary of Defense S. McNamara—famous for his "body count" strategy in Vietnam—explained to a group of international bankers the dangerous situation they faced. "We can begin with the most critical problem of all," he said. "Population growth. It is the gravest issue that the world faces

over the decades immediately head." At present trends, he announced, the world's population would not stabilize until about the year 2020—at a population of about ten billion, more than double the population of 1970. "We can assume that the levels of poverty, stress, hunger, crowding and frustration that such a situation

could cause in the developing nations—which by then would contain nine out of ten human beings on earth—would be unlikely to assure social stability, or political stability. Or, for that matter, military

stability." Clearly, McNamara was letting the "haves" of the world know of the chaos they faced if they took no action. "It is not a world that any of us would want to live in," he said. "Is such a world inevitable? It is

not sure, but there are two possible ways in which a world of ten billion people can be averted. Either the current birth rates must come down more quickly. Or the current death rates must go up. There is no other

way. "There are, of course, many ways in which the death rates can go up. In a thermonuclear age, we can accomplish it very quickly. Famine and disease are nature's ancient checks on population growth, and

neither one has disappeared from the scene." One intelligence source informed me that McNamara was alluding to the development of new bacteriological warfare methods—and that he actually discussed them

with certain carefully selected delegates after the conference.

Bostam