Fwd: AID POLICY: UN Integration under the spotlight

January 13, 2012

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--- AID POLICY: UN Integration under the spotlight

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AID POLICY: UN Integration under the spotlight

<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94647>

lead photo<http://www.irinnews.org/images/2011/201107270916070449.jpg>

LONDON, 13 January 2012 (IRIN) - Putting all UN operations in a country

under a single management structure is not as simple as it might sound.

In some countries, different parts of the UN may be negotiating with

rebels to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, while their

colleagues might be involved in planning military assaults against the

very same groups.

Neutrality, impartiality and independence are regarded as humanitarian

principles, but are not the priorities of UN political or peacekeeping

missions, and many humanitarian staff believe integration helps to

erode them, hampering their ability to help people in need.

Given ongoing tensions between UN agencies, the UK's Overseas

Development Institute <http://www.odi.org.uk/> and US-based public

policy group The Stimson Center <http://www.stimson.org/> have carried

out an independent study

<http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=6205> exploring the

impact of integration on humanitarian response, finding that the new

coordination model has drawbacks and some surprising benefits.

Coordination, or the lack of it, became an issue in the 1990s, as UN

peacekeepers, political missions and humanitarian agencies found

themselves working side-by-side in conflict-affected countries. (See

Box I) The report's authors detail UN operations in three countries -

Afghanistan, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) - as

they struggled to comply with a policy of greater integration in

various forms. (See Box II).

Afghanistan, Somalia and DRC

In all three countries a UN peacekeeping force was trying to stop armed

groups threatening a peace process, while a UN political mission was

trying to build capacity and support a recognized national government,

and humanitarian agencies were trying to provide non-partisan help to

all who needed it, regardless of their political affiliation. All three

wings of the UN found it difficult when they were told to integrate

their operations.

Leadership in integrated missions - timeline

1997: UN Secretary-General Kofi n commissions `Renewing the United

Nations - A Programme for Reform

<http://www.undp.se/assets/Ovriga.../Renewing-the-United-Nations.pdf> '

in a bid to improve UN coordination. This notes that 'separate UN

entities. pursue their activities separately, without regard to or

benefiting from each other's presence.' It rules that 'all UN entities..

at country level will operate in common premises under a single UN

flag.'

2000: The Brahimi Report

<http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/> on UN Peace

Operations proposes that Integrated Mission Task Forces should become

the standard for planning and supporting UN missions.

2000: Secretary-General issues a guidance note on relations between the

key leaders in integrated missions - the Special Representative (SRSG),

and the Humanitarian and Resident Coordinators. It puts the SRSG in

charge, but stipulates that the RC/HC should " where feasible " also

serve as Deputy SRSG (DSRSG). Each retains their own reporting line to

HQ, while copying all substantive communication to each other.

2001: The " triple-hatted " position of DSRSG/HC/RC is established in

Sierra Leone. Other similar appointments follow.

2006: A further guidance note establishes that the DSRSG reports

primarily to the SRSG and through him or her to the

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, although with a

secondary reporting line to the UN Development Project. But it also

says the SRSG will uphold humanitarian principles and support the

creation of an effective operating environment.

Although the information is presented anonymously, the rawness of

interviewees' emotions shines through the ODI/Stimson report. When it

comes to engaging with non-state armed actors

<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94095> researchers found

no evidence that the UN barred contact with such groups, but in some

cases individual UN mission leaders created obstacles to contact. In

Somalia, where the UN political mission tried to discourage

humanitarian agencies from engaging with the Al-Shabab militant group,

the overall UN mission head at the time went so far as to say: " Those

who claim neutrality can also be complicit. The Somali government needs

support - moral and financial - and Somalis as well as the

international community have an obligation to provide both. "

Even where the local UN leadership accepted that the humanitarian

agencies had to work with both sides in order to reach people in need,

the relationship could be uncomfortable.

In DRC agencies could and did work in rebel controlled areas, but one

interviewee told the authors: " It's difficult to create a relationship

with the FDLR [anti government forces] when MONUSCO [the UN

peacekeeping force] is partnering with the Congolese army to hit them

on the same day! "

One of the report's authors, Alison Giffen from the Stimson Center,

told IRIN they found the issue raised strong emotions among all

stakeholders. " We found that despite quite a few reforms in the last

five or six years, the debate remains very polarized, " she said. " The

challenges and risks facing humanitarian actors are very considerable

and this raises the stakes. "

Access and security

The report addresses the issue of whether a closer relationship with

military and political operations puts aid workers in greater danger of

attack. Encouragingly - and to the surprise of some - the authors

concluded: " There is no evidence to suggest that attacks against

humanitarian workers are more likely to occur in a UN integrated

mission context. " Even in Afghanistan, they say, they could identify no

case where there was a clear link between a security incident affecting

an NGO and UN integration arrangements.

But Marit Glad of NGO Norwegian Refugee Council, who has written a

paper on the implications of integration for the UN's relationship with

other NGOs <http://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9608308.pdf> does not find

this particularly reassuring.

" Tying a single incident to integration is very difficult, " she told

IRIN. " In some cases, as many as 10-15 different factors could

potentially have contributed to a security incident, and it is in many

cases impossible to pin down one single reason which caused it. "

Afghanistan has posed some of the starkest dilemmas, with UN agency

staff having to relocate to military bases belonging to the NATO-led

ISAF force during major security incidents. Some NGOs then stopped

coming to meetings in their offices, because they felt that being seen

going to the bases would compromise them. Glad says: " Integration

brings a clear risk of jeopardizing cooperation between the UN and the

NGO community. You have to ask what the benefits are. Is forcing

integration worth the risk? "

Pragmatism

In DRC things seem to have been less fraught; a good working

relationship with MONUSCO brought benefits to both sides in terms of

information sharing, and aid workers benefited from MONUSCO's help with

security and transport arrangements.

Three models for integrated missions

" Strategic Integration " - working together towards shared goals - does

not always have to entail " Structural Integration " - actual changes in

the organizational structure of the mission, where a single UN official

will wear three hats: as the UN's highest-ranking humanitarian

representative (Humanitarian Coordinator), chief development official

(Resident Coordinator) and deputy head of the peacekeeping or political

mission (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General).

Having ruled that " form follows function " , the UN has developed three

main models for integrated missions:

" Both Feet In " : The Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) serves as

DSRSG and OCHA is located inside the integrated mission. This model is

recommended for stable post-conflict settings where the presence of the

UN's political/military mission is well accepted. This was used in East

Timor.

" One Foot In, One Foot Out " : The HC/RC serves as DSRSG, but OCHA

retains an independent presence, outside the main mission. Recommended

for situations where the political/military mission is more

controversial. The model used in DRC and Afghanistan.

" Both Feet Out " : The Humanitarian Coordinator and the OCHA office are

not integrated with the political or military aspects of the mission.

Recommended for what OCHA calls " situations of persistent widespread

conflict or lacking a credible peace process " . Adopted in Somalia.

Even so, some humanitarian workers worried about the two sides'

different attitude to risk - the military's only concern was safety,

and they felt this tended to make the whole operation too risk-averse,

hampering their ability to access populations in need.

Ross Mountain wore the " triple hat " as humanitarian and resident

coordinator, and deputy representative of the Secretary-General in DRC.

He says his way of working was to try to be pragmatic, and focus on the

needs of the victims of the conflict. " There were problems of

perception, " he told IRIN, " but we tried to minimize the downside. For

instance, as the DSRSG [Deputy Special Representative of the

Secretary-General], I was never personally directly involved in

negotiations with rebel groups. We got OCHA [Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs] to do that directly.

" On the plus side, I was very concerned about civilian protection, and

being inside the mission, I was able to work closely with the Force

Commander, placing the military in areas where the humanitarians had

identified concentrations of displaced people so that the peacekeepers'

presence dissuaded militias and other armed groups from attacking them.

" Over time I think integrated missions have become more concerned with

the humanitarian dimension... Civilian protection eventually became the

number one priority for the UN force in the Congo. What started off at

the beginning as an add-on has become the raison d'Ãªtre of peacekeeping

missions.

While the report includes instances where humanitarian advocacy is

undermined by integration, Mountain says in DRC in some cases it

smoothed his advocacy role with the government. " When linked to the

peacekeeping mission, one tended to be rather better listened to by

those who didn't always like what one was saying. "

Clearer guidance needed

The report says it found the reasons for more integration to be poorly

understood, and the policy inconsistently implemented. On the whole the

political/military side were happier with the outcomes than the

humanitarian agencies, but the authors remark that the

political/military wings of the mission often did not really understand

humanitarian principles

<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=85752> or the imperative

need for neutral humanitarian space in which to work.

Clearer guidance, they conclude, is needed from headquarters, including

advice on how potential disagreements can be resolved, as well as

better planning and training of staff before they take up their posts.

And, says Giffen, " confidence-building really needs to happen across

all stakeholders, for shared goals to be reached, but also for specific

goals to be reached. "

For better or worse, integration is here to stay, and UN humanitarian

agency heads understand they must try to make it work, if possible. As

UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Amos said at the study launch

<http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/humanitarian-issues-integ

rating-peacekeeping-and-humanitarian-work-%E2%80%93-how-mak> :

" Integration is a UN-mandated policy. Withdrawing from (it) is not an

option. At the same time, we cannot allow integration to impede the

effective provision of humanitarian assistance to people in need. "

But form must follow function, stresses Mountain - with mission

objectives leading the way: " You have to ask yourself, `Integration for

what?' It is vital to focus on what you are trying to do, and never to

confuse the tools with the objective. "

eb/aj/bp/cb

Read report online <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=94647>

_____

[This report does not necessarily reflect the views of the United

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January 13, 2012