Fwd: Africa: HIV/Aids and the Continent's Military

December 4, 2008

Africa: HIV/Aids and the Continent's Military - Are We Winning This

War?

Azad Essa

4 December 2008

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opinion

In this paper, Azad Essa explores the extent to which Africa's

military has been affected by HIV/AIDS. He outlines the varied

responses from Africa's armed forces, with a specific focus on

recruitment, care and precarious human rights issues pertaining to

HIV-positive personnel. While the scarcity of statistical data forces

analysts to continue speculating the challenges, effects and extent

of the crisis, it is crucial that African militaries finally assume

more responsibility in addressing the pandemic, if not for their own

self preservation, then at the very least, towards eliminating the

spread of the disease in communities itself.

That HIV/AIDS has become a humanitarian and security crisis across

the Africa is an indisputable fact.

Statistics aren't likely to change overnight, and Africa remains the

most affected continent with Sub-Saharan Africa accounting for more

than 67% of 33 million HIV positive people across the globe. It is

therefore no coincidence that HIV/AIDS is considered to be an

incessant mode of destabilization on the African continent; an

inherent security risk that threatens to disrupt gains in health,

development, infrastructure and human development. In fact, while 25%

of the continent remains engaged in conflict, in some quarters,

HIV/AIDS is considered to be " more destabilizing than the wars

currently raging on the continent " [1]

While debates continue - mandatory testing versus human rights;

condoms versus abstinence and medical science versus traditional

medicine - little is known regarding the extent to which African

militaries, responsible for much of the rebuilding and maintenance of

peace in post-conflict African states are being affected by HIV/AIDS.

While concern over how HIV/AIDS affects Africa's armed forces has

increased since the late nineties, there seems to a plethora of gaps

in the mainstream understanding of where African armies really stand,

as a high risk population group.

HIV is a multifaceted virus, emerging and spread in varying contexts.

Some of these include reasons include: socio-economic strife, mobile

employment and high risk employment, high incidence of transactional

sex and gender imbalances. Military personnel face all of these

challenges, which inadvertently place them at the top end of high

risk populations, together with truckers, miners and sex workers.

What makes military personnel especially at risk is the amount of

time spent away from home, stressful and difficult conditions and

believe it or not, boredom and lack of entertainment that

inadvertently provide military personnel, armed with financial

resources, to wander off for sexual escapades. However, the

difference between military personnel and the other high risk

populations is essentially the crucial factor of secrecy that comes

with being part of the military.

In fact, not only is the debate stunted by a lack of statistical

data - the very nature of the military as instruments of public and

yet national interest - make unearthing an issue like HIV in the

military a rather complex affair. Both the military and HIV/AIDS are

themes characterized with incessant concealment. HIV/AIDS is

permanently surrounded by a cloud of Human Rights sensitivities;

confidentiality clauses that serve to protect victims of HIV. This

culture of concealment associated with HIV - good intentions granted -

mixed with the culture of machismo-protection of military

intelligence makes dealing with the crisis of HIV in the military

even more intricate.

Without the right treatment, diet, living conditions and attitude,

the virus is difficult to manage and affects the mental and physical

capacities of HIV positive people. Living and working as a soldier

requires the maximum capacities of reflex, concentration and patience

that HIV easily undermines without the necessary treatment and

counseling.

By implication, knowing the extent to which African forces are

affected by the HI-virus is crucial for the continued development of

the continent; the maintenance of peace and vanguard of rebuilding

societies in post-conflict zones and for the very real containment of

the virus in an ever shrinking world.

This paper seeks to make sense of the conundrum of opinion concerning

the affect of HIV on Africa's military and highlights how particular

defense forces have, contrary to popular belief, responded to the

crisis.

African militaries = HIV time bombs?

Even though statistics are difficult to collate, it was generally

accepted that in peace time, defense forces across Africa have a HIV

prevalence rate of 2 to 5 times the rate of their civilian

populations. These statistics, from studies conducted in the late

nineties provided the impetus for extreme blanket analyses that

predicted the undermining of Africa's security. This is now being

widely contested as a generalization, with evidence suggesting that

in South Africa, the rate amongst soldiers is marginally higher than

civilians, while in the Ethiopian defense force, the rate is actually

lower than the general population. But in Cameroon and Ghana - both

with generally low prevalence levels - their respective armies had

prevalence rates were one and half times, and two and a half times

the general population[2] The general consensus therefore, is that

African armed forces have a higher prevalence rate than civilian

populations, but not necessarily 2 to 5 times their civilian

prevalence rates.

And whilst these studies have been regarded as reliable data, there

still remains significant confusion over the extent to which defense

forces are affected. A clear example of this is the South African

Defense Force (SANDF). It has been often suggested that HIV

prevalence in the SANDF was abnormally high, between 50% and 70%,

when official figures relay an estimate of 23%. Another prime example

is Angola's Defense Force, with initial estimates suggesting around

55%, when official reports indicate that rate is not more than 11%

[3]. This is by no means an attempt to delegitimise largely accurate

analyses or to subvert attention away from a crisis. In fact,

according to the CHG Report [4], HIV prevalence of over 5% is already

considered a significant erosion of operational capability, for ill-

health does mean armies cannot operate at full capacity or be

available for peacekeeping activities at the scale needed. Instead,

the focus here is merely a reminder that statistics merely tell half

the story, and need to be consumed critically.

In 2002 alone, the Malawian Defense force lost 131 personnel mainly

to AIDS related illnesses. UNAIDS reported in 2003 that HIV was

threatening to decimate more Malawians than any conflict the small

nation has ever been involved in[5]. It was estimated in 2005 that

HIV positive personnel in the Zambian Defense Force (ZDF) numbered

more than the 16.5% that would be found in Zambia's civilian

population. As a result the medical service was said to be battling

to provide the necessary HIV/AIDS related care to military personnel

in need of medication, counseling and other types of support[6] that

were crucial to keep personnel healthy, functional and in good

spirits.

Likewise, it was revealed in early 2008 that approximately 55% of

Zimbabwe's troops were HIV positive, and up to 75% of these troops

would succumb to the disease within the year. While reports indicate

that the rate of HIV in Zimbabwe has reduced over the past couple of

years, the Zimbabwe Human Development report indicates that

infections in the military far outweighed the general population rate

of 24.6%. According to the Pan-African Treatment Access Movement

(PATAM), the situation was compounded by a lack of HIV/AIDS

intervention programmes in the army[7]. This is hardly surprising,

considering Zimbabwe's current economic crisis. The World Food

Programme announced in October 2008 that unless rapid supplies would

arrive, Zimbabwe would run out of food by January 2009. The report

further noted that the young soldiers recruited were trained to be

fearless and aggressive, qualities they often carried into their

personal, civilian and sexual lives.

As may be easily deduced, the situation in Southern African nations

is far from ordinary or functional, with the impact on particular

defense forces in the region highly suggestive of a crisis in these

states. At the same time, the case of Southern Africa is hardly

surprising, considering the incidence of HIV in the region itself,

which is said to be a staggering seventeen times higher than the

global average[8]. In 2007, 75% of all AIDS related deaths were

located in sub-Saharan Africa, while according to 2002 South African

government statistics; seven out of ten military deaths were AIDS

related.

A study of returning Nigerian soldiers, conducted by the Civil

Military Alliance to combat HIV/AIDS (CMA), found that rates of

infection were double than that of Nigeria's civilian population.

Statistics in Cameroon point similarly to a clear difference between

infection rates between civilian and armed forces. Here it is claimed

that the civilian HIV rate in 2004 was around 5.6%, while armed

forces were close to 15%. However, police recruits were 16.4% and

truckers were found to be 18%[9]. As these statistics demonstrate

once more, an uncritical approach towards statistics could easily

conclude, in this case, that joining the army means a high

probability of contracting HIV.

While evidence suggests this to be the largely the case, the case of

Ethiopia's HIV testing and prevention programme suggests that if

emphatically addressed, this would remain but a generalization. But

the Ethiopian case is a unique one, with even the nature of the war

different to " normal " African conflicts which include violence

spilling onto the general population.

Fresh evidence suggests that not only are African military forces in

many other parts of Africa most definitely not in self-destruct mode

as a result of HIV, but the rate of HIV does not compromise their

effectiveness as a defense force nor does it spell the possibility of

being invaded by an opportunistic warring nation[10]. Moreover, there

are armies with effective but unpublicized HIV/AIDS programmes that

are making a difference, defense forces that recruit rural youth with

low HIV prevalence and conflict-affected populations with low HIV

rates[11].

HIV/AIDS expert Alan Whiteside along with other authors drive home

this point in a 2004 report in which they argue further that these

alarmist views ignore the diversified nature of the HIV levels at

different ranks, which are invariably differentiated by social

context, demographics, patterns of deployment, amongst other factors

[12]. This only serves as to provide an unsustainable concoction of

realities on the ground. While rape and transactional sex are

indictments to rising HIV rates across the continent, analysts would

be hard pressed to disagree that HIV/AIDS has also been pinned as a

justification for continued failure in the economy or political

performance. At the same time, the evidence does exist (even if in

sporadic accounts) that young men at war will indulge in unsafe

sexual activities, increasing the chance of contracting HIV.

Recruitment, Care & Human Rights

The Inter-states Defense and security committee of the military

health services working group (ISDC-MHS) was formed in 1999 to

specifically but not limited to, addressing HIV/AIDS in the defense

forces of the region but also towards managing malaria, diarrhea and

stress management[13]. In January 2000, the UN Security council

adopted Resolution 1308 (2000), indicating that the affect of HIV on

the defense forces could be a threat to international peace. This

resolution further indicated a shift from traditional understandings

of security as absence of conflict to a more extensive understanding

of human security. This resolution further obliged the UN to ensure

that peacekeepers were trained and that countries supplying troops

were given testing and treatment.[14] Commitment from the UN advanced

a further level in 2001 when the General Assembly called on countries

to integrate programmes and activities related to HIV for emergency

contexts.

Between 2003/4, the African Union initiated the concept of an African

standby force (ASF) as a means of organizing peacekeeping missions

and launching the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) towards

developing a common defense and security guidelines. HIV/AIDS formed

an important part of this policy and the initial guidelines for the

ASF and its sub-regional brigades[15]. Of the more crucial aspects of

this charter was the commitment that the adoption of the African

Union's standards for HIV and AIDS in peace support operations should

equal or surpass those principals set by the UN. This naturally meant

that all contributing or troops supplying countries had to develop

HIV/AIDS policies and practices that reflected the standards of the

UN and AU. The African union, acting on the advice of Lt-Gen. Tsdkan

Gebretensae designed a " command centered approach " that focused on

developing a set of seven policies.

AU'Command-centred approach[16]

1. Mandatory and voluntary testing

2. Admin & Management of treatment & the rights of HIV positive people

3. Human Resource Management & development

4. Budgeting

5. Rights of soldiers' dependents & associated civilian population

6. Developing toolkits & to collate the fight against HIV/AIDS with

core military

activities.

7. Create monitoring structure

Indeed, since 2000, more African defense forces have advanced on more

serious HIV programmes and policies, sobering up alarmist analyses to

a large extent. There was a shift and a refocus from the blanket

approach to African militaries adopted by many analysts and the

mainstream media in the nineties and even in the early turn of the

21st Century, where it was continuously bellied that all African

forces were on the literal meltdown.

Ethiopia, South Africa, Senegal, Namibia and Zambia's defense forces,

amongst other countries, have all displayed an adeptness to respond

to the AIDS pandemic, some, even before national government and even

in contradiction to[17]. However, while certain African defense

forces reacted positively towards the impending crisis, the vast

majority of African defense force has reluctantly trotted along,

paying the now mandatory attention to the virus.

The SANDF have run education and knowledge courses such as the

Masibambisane " beyond awareness " campaign and Phidisa project

outlined a 2004-2009 plan which sought to research and create health

programmes to prolong the lives of HIV positive personnel. The

Phidisa programme is specifically " focused on improved clinical

management, psychosocial support, and the development of effective

family-oriented care for HIV-affected military families " [18]. Phidisa

set up six research locations to provide treatment to HIV positive

personnel, as well as conduct research into other critical diseases

affecting the military. According to Professor Lindy

Heineckin, " military personnel also have to undergo a yearly

comprehensive health assessment, and this includes an HIV test "

Certain defense forces, like the Namibian Defense Force developed a

HIV/AIDS strategic plan 2004-2009 which focuses on prevention all the

while aiming to the force's ability to provide care, treatment and

support services. Within two years of the programme, voluntary

counseling and testing points were set up at all NDF sites and 40

unit coordinators had been trained. While the Namibian case showcases

a proactive approach, there have been implementation and financial

hassles.

According to Colonel Dr. Lawson Simapuka of the Zambian Defense Force

(ZDF), HIV positive personnel are offered counseling and treatment,

including ARVs to manage their health. While these soldiers are still

deployed, their activities are confined to non-combat tasks.[19] But

whilst these structures exist in the ZDF's advanced HIV/AIDS

programme, stigma and discrimination still endure, high levels of

hospital admission remain debilitating and if a HIV positive soldier

dies of an AIDS related illness, the family of the deceases does not

receive full benefits.

In contrast, the Mozambican Military's response to HIV/AIDS has been

largely underdeveloped, with partnerships between local and

international bodies only recently emerging. With the armed forces

estimated at around 39%, AIDS is typically overburdening a health

system that simply does not have a military specific health service

[20] . However, what is specifically important to note is that the

Mozambican response has failed precisely because of the nature of its

generality, and lack of poignant attention to a specific population

group.

Botswana's Defense Force's HIV/AIDS programme is reportedly a model

of best practice and recommended, while the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense

force's (USDF) HIV/AIDS programme is also considered an example of

good practice in managing the pandemic. Characterized by a strong

focus on leadership, research and collaboration between state and non-

state actors, the USDF policy seeks to address the entire cycle of

human resource management, from recruitment to induction to mentoring

[21]. But while the programme is said to be multisectoral, HIV/AIDS

prevalence in the little Southern African kingdom hardly appears on

the decline. Accessing the necessary data to showcase a possible

improvement is problematic, hinting to the same syndrome most AIDS

policies and initiatives suffer on the continent: the disease of

rhetoric and inaction.

Unsurprisingly, with the effects of the disease in central and North

African countries significantly lower than Sub-Saharan countries,

defense forces, barring exceptions, of these regions have not

approached HIV with the vigor it deserves. One of the more notable

exceptions was the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (MRAF), who had

implemented a prevention programme as early as 1996. The MRAF's peer

advocacy programmes had reached over 60,000 soldiers, but a lack of

funding ended the programme in 2001. Another positive case was the

UN's partnership with the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ECDF),

which identified HIV/AIDS as a command issue in 1996 as well[22], and

created a thorough prevention programme in 2001, which focused on

testing. Similarly, the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDP) have

run a HIV programme since the late eighties, focusing on prevention

through health education, voluntary counseling and testing, homecare

and aimed at strengthening the military's ability to run programmes

[23]. Burkina Faso began an education programme in 2001, which fitted

within the national anti-AIDS programme.

While the programmes have displayed political commitment in parts,

the human rights dimension remains largely unresolved. The facts

remain that African militaries are more likely to recruit and promote

HIV negative personnel at the expense of HIV positive personnel.

Human Right activists are vehemently in opposition to such practices,

but the general conception is verily the notion of 'fair'

discrimination, of which, most are willing apply in this case.

The fact remains that most African military forces screen for HIV as

part of the recruitment process, whether secretly or not. For

example, the Malawian army had recommended to government in 2001 to

recruit only HIV negative soldiers, and while this hadn't been passed

by government, there were indications screenings were taking place

with HIV being a key criteria. While the Malawian defense force has

denied conducting these secret evaluations, they did admit that

soldiers were put through a rigorous selection process with only

those who were strong and healthy enough chosen. Similarly, while the

Ethiopian programme has been lauded by many experts, human rights

activists have expressed serious concern with the procedures,

incentives and processes regarding promotions in the Ethiopian

defense force. It was reported that the army uses HIV test results to

sensitize personnel by suggesting in manuals and procedure documents

that those who remain HIV negative would be regularly promoted while

HIV positive personnel would lose such rights.[24] Interestingly,

while the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDP) has posited a non-

discriminatory approach to HIV positive soldiers, this programme

still manages to direct less strenuous jobs for HIV positive

soldiers, which effectively means HIV positive soldiers are

discriminated - fairly or unfairly - dependent on your take on the

human rights dynamics involved. But while the Ugandan programme aimed

to reduce the rate of infections in the army, it aimed to do reduce

the prevalence rater by also only recruiting HIV-negative soldiers,

which, together with the existing plan of action of voluntary,

anonymous and confidential HIV testing, is categorically

unsustainable and contradictory.

Analysts argue that soldiers are more likely to contract HIV after

years in the army and the issue should not be reduced to merely the

time of recruitment. Therefore recruiting HIV negative personnel

without enough processes, educative practices and capacity for

treatment is short sighted and farcical. Following this line of

thought, the All African Congress of Armed forces and Police Medical

services found that Nigerian personnel have double the possibility of

contracting HIV within three years of joining the army[25]. As an

extension to this line of logic, if military personnel have a larger

chance of contracting HIV during their time in service, surely it is

an occupational hazard that the military cannot deny responsibility

from?

Interestingly, the scenario becomes a tad more complex if one

considers that the UN pressures the host country to conduct testing

on troops before deployment for peacekeeping operations. While this

is not a mandatory requirement, the UN highly recommends testing of

peacekeepers before and after deployment, and while there has not

been adequate post-deployment research conducted, evidence exists to

suggest that even peacekeepers are responsible for the spread of HIV.

Such practices continue largely uninterrupted, as debates still ensue

regarding the military as a special case, especially with the type,

cost and importance of the military to national interest.

The year 2008 did include a watershed event in the history of

HIV/AIDS and the military. The SANDF, like most African defense

forces, exclude HIV positive people from recruitment, foreign

deployment and promotion. However, two HIV positive soldiers who

suffered discrimination as a result of their HIV status took the

SANDF to court in early 2008, to contest the SANDF's policy on HIV-

positive recruits. The South African High Court's ruling affectively

meant that the SANDF could no longer simply discriminate on the

grounds of HIV. Moreover, within six months, the SANDF was tasked to

amend its health classification policy that would allow

for " individualized health assessments of recruits and current

members of the armed forces " [26]. The end of this blanket approach to

those with HIV is especially significant for Africa's military;

however, with six months already passed, the SANDF has yet to release

their reviewed policy.

While human rights activists have lauded the ruling, the debate on

the logic of such a ruling continues, especially with regards to the

impact HIV could have on the readiness on a defense force with HIV

positive soldiers and peacekeepers potentially weakened through

HIV/AIDS and the related affects on the larger community. This might

be so, but what this ruling serves to accomplish, is a shifting of

mental models in the military to HIV. Whereas the military was able

to reject and dispose of HIV positive people, this ruling forces the

military to assume more leadership and responsibility to managing the

pandemic within their ranks, rather than attempt to quarantine those

with HIV in less strenuous positions or by refusing to recruit or

promote HIV positive people within the military.

Conclusion

At the 2006 AIDS Conference in Toronto, the military was identified

as both an important player in the fight against HIV/AIDS in conflict

and post-conflict zones and if not managed, a serious violator in

perpetuating the spread of HIV/AIDS, given the high-risk factors of

military personnel[27]. At the same time, while HIV/AIDS was being

taken more seriously by the Military, it was unanimously agreed upon

that HIV prevalence rates had indeed increased in the military and

peacekeeping forces and there was often complete denial of an urgent

need to respond from certain military institutions[28].

The focus of the military towards HIV/AIDS has predictably leaned

towards prevention rather than palliative, labour-intensive care. It

is a no-brainer that Defense forces have and would look towards

recruiting HIV negative soldiers and attempt to prevent a HIV

positive soldier from completing rigorous tasks in the line of duty.

ARV treatment is expensive and HIV/AIDS requires labour intensive

care even if modern medication might allow HIV positive people live

an ordinary, healthy life. However, the reality for many African

armed forces as summed up by Prof Heinecken is that " the costs of

managing this disease is beyond their administrative and financial

capacity " , and the verdict is still out, regarding the normality of

soldiers' life in adequately dealing with the stress of managing HIV

in a conflict zone.

HIV/AIDS is most certainly not a standard virus that is aggravated

under predictable conditions. Thus while older and longer serving

soldiers are more vulnerable to contracting the virus through unsafe

practices, this is most definitely cannot be a standard conclusion.

The conditions of deployment, quality and insistence of HIV

prevention programmes and demographics of the army are therefore

incumbent to understanding the intensity of HIV in the army[29].

In the developing world, HIV/AIDS is already acknowledged as an

expression of socio-economic strife and the nexus between rising

cases of HIV prevalence and poverty is not due to discontinue with

the onset of the current worldwide recession and generally poorer

socio-economic conditions, only serving as to make prevention and

treatment programmes even more difficult to administer.

Addressing the issue requires out of the ordinary HIV/AIDS prevention

and Human resource strategies campaigns. Since the military operates

on a totally different set of rules, that are nonetheless governed by

the national constitutions, African defense forces will need to

specify what functional health ought to be, so that only HIV positive

personnel in a latter phase of AIDS, with a rapidly depreciating CD4

count is sidelined from major army responsibility. A blanket approach

perpetuates low self esteem, denigrates human rights and advances the

notion of stigma.

Over and above the human rights implications, the tendency to isolate

HIV positive personnel from core aspects of the army is most

definitely not a solution. African militaries need to confront the

pandemic with a multifaceted perspective that seeks to improve health

care standards in conflict zones, while taking care to pay attention

to finer details of providing contraceptives, sterile equipment and

facilities that do not exacerbate the crisis[30]. Moreover, there

needs to be shift in the manner in which HIV positive personnel are

treated, in that African militaries must aim to address HIV

sustainably and not through stop-start measures of blockading or

denying entry to HIV positive recruits. This is also crucial in the

larger struggle against stigmatization towards creating avenues for

education and counseling to thrive.

As Piot noted, " conflict and HIV are entangled as twin

evils " [31], the advent of the AIDS has not only shifted weapons of

war into new domains, the syndrome has also beckoned a rethinking and

a challenging of preset ideas of war and impact on local space, both

during and post-conflicts[32]. HIV/AIDS has shifted crucial

components of armed conflicts: combatants, manner of conflict and

social consequence[33]. It is an indisputable fact that HIV/AIDS has

been used as weapon of war in Africa and this furthers a vicious

cycle in which conflict and HIV/AIDS are accountable for affecting

the effectiveness of national defense forces; negates economic

development; stunts human and social development and leaves an

implant on the local population.

Notes:

1. Heinecken (2001)

2. CHG Report 2008

3. Department of Defense online (2006)

4. CHG (2008)

5. Banda (2003)

6. Twinng Centre online (2005)

7. New Zimbabwe (2008)

8. Pharaoh et al (2003)

9. Forkum (2007)

10. Whiteside et al (2004)

11. CHG Report (2008)

12. Whiteside et al (2004)

13. Sassman (2008)

14. CHG (2008)

15. CHG Report

16. Adapted from CHGA (2008: 39)

17. Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae, 2006).

18. Phidisa online

19. Simapuka (2007

20. Massinga (2007)

21. Gumede (2007)

22. CHG Report (2008)

23. CCR (2007) HIV/AIDS, Militaries and peacekeeping in Central and

Eastern Africa

24. CCR (2007)

25. Fleshman (2001)

26. Skills Portal (2008)

27. AIDS 2006 online

28. AIDS 2006 online

29. (Whiteside, De Waal and Gebre-Tensae, 2006).

30. Elbe, S (2001)

31. Piot, P (2000)

32. Elbe (2002)

33. Elbe (2002)

References

1. AIDS 2006 online " Security and the Spread of HIV/AIDS: Challenging

Military Leaders to Fight the Response " online under:

http://www.aids2006.org/pag/PSession.aspx?s=159

2. Avert online (2008) " HIV and AIDS in Africa " online under:

http://www.avert.org/aafrica.htm

3. Banda, C (2003) " Military losing war on HIV/AIDS " online under:

http://www.newsfromafrica.org

4. BBC online (2004) Aids 'killing Africa's soldiers' online under:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3824875.stm

5. CHG Report (2008) Report of the Commission on HIV/AIDS and

governance in Africa, UN Economic Commission for Africa

6. Department of Defense online (2006) " Winning battles in the war

against HIV/AIDS " online under:

http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nhrc/dhapp/countryreports/Documents/year

ly06/angola06.pdf

7. Elbe, S (2002). " HIV/AIDS and the changing landscape of war in

Africa " , in International Security 27:2

8. Forkum, P. (2007). " The police and the fight against HIV/AIDS:

Cameroon Case Study " , Trends, impact and policy development on

HIV/AIDS and African armed forces Conference Proceedings (2007)

9. Gumede, N. (2007) " The case of the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense

Force, HIV/AIDS and society: a perspective " , Trends, impact and

policy development on HIV/AIDS and African armed forces Conference

Proceedings (2007)

10. Heinecken, L (2003) " Aids: the new security frontier " , African

Security Review, Institute for Security Studies online under:

http://www.iss.org.za

11. Massinga, E. (2007) A perspective on HIV/AIDS and the Mozambican

Armed forces, Trends, impact and policy development on HIV/AIDS and

African armed forces Conference Proceedings (2007)

12. New Zimbabwe online (2008) " Over half Zimbabwe soldiers HIV

positive " online under: http://www.newzimbabwe.com

13. Phidisa online " Media Release " online under:

http://www.phidisa.org [Accessed: 22 November 2008]

14. Piot, (2000) " The situation in Africa: the impact of AIDS

on peace and security " , New York, Jan 10 2000

15. Reuters online (2008) SOUTH AFRICA: Military's HIV ban unlawful,

online under:

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/aa507d4b6ab23a4aecafbb9c

da458555.htm

16. Sassman, C (2008) " Defence Health discussed by military forum " ,

online under: http://newera.com.na (19 November 2008)

17. Skills portal online (2008) " AIDS law project hails victory

against SANDF " , online under: http://www.skillsportal.co.za (18 May

2008)

18. Twinning Centre online (2005) Providing HIV/AIDS Care to Zambia's

National Defense Force, online under:

http://www.twinningagainstaids.org/providing-hivaids-care.html

19. Whiteside, A; de Waal, A and Gebre-Tensae, T (2006) " Aids,

security and military in Africa: A sober appraisal " , in African

Affairs, Oxford University Press

* Azad Essa is a freelance journalist and researcher based at IOLS-

Research, UKZN.

* Please send comments to editor@... or comment online at

http://www.pambazuka.org/

--- End forwarded message ---

December 4, 2008