Guest guest Posted April 22, 2008 Report Share Posted April 22, 2008 Within a few years of the American pullout of Vietnam, my friends started going there on bicycle trips. Within a few more years, they were leading tours of others there on bikes as well. Now, Vietnam is a major tourist attraction, with some of the finest beaches and friendliest people in the world.Vietnam achieved around 8% annual GDP growth from 1990 to 1997 and continued at around 7% from 2000 to 2005, making it the world's second-fastest growing economy. Simultaneously, foreign investment grew threefold and domestic savings quintupled. Vietnam is a relative new-comer to the oil business, but today it is the third-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia with output of 400,000 barrels per day. Vietnam is one of Asia's most open economies: two-way trade is around 160% of GDP, more than twice the ratio for China and over four times India's.[10]Vietnam was accepted into the WTO on November 7, 2006. Vietnam's chief trading partners include Japan, Australia, ASEAN countries, the U.S. and Western European countries.More at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam#EconomyApparently the domino theory is just a kid's game, and not a strategy for foreign policy. What was the cost of our intervention into Vietnam, in terms of human life?http://members.aol.com/warlibrary/vwc0.htm Sears, DCNW PDX On Apr 21, 2008, at 5:24 PM, Abrahamson wrote:A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnamby SorleyThis book cracked open Soviet military archives now available to learn how close we came to winning the Vietnam war and why we failed to do so.We learned from our mistakes and taught the South how to protect themselves; we then set about bombing the chokepoints of the supply line thus starving the North’s armies. It shows that we had the north on the ropes and could have at least forced a strong and viable truce with the country divided like Korea.Had we done so, South Vietnam may have become a thriving economy and safe haven for Cambodians rather than the horrible killing field it became after the fall of the south. Germaine to the frighteningly similar situation in Iraq where we seem to be fighting a proxy war against a larger enemy.Those who don’t examine history are doomed to repeat it.See below. ( E. Abrahamson, D.C.)Chiropractic physicianLake Oswego Chiropractic Clinic315 Second StreetLake Oswego, OR 97034503-635-6246Website: http://www.lakeoswegochiro.comA Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedies of America's Last Years in VietnamBy: SorleyReviews Amazon.comThere was a moment when the United States had the Vietnam War wrapped up, writes military historian Sorley (biographer of two Vietnam-era U.S. Army generals, Creighton Abrams and Harold ). "The fighting wasn't over, but the war was won," he says in this convention-shaking book. "This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970." South Vietnam was ready to carry on the battle without American ground troops and only logistical and financial support. Sorley says that replacing General Westmoreland with Abrams in 1968 was the key. "The tactics changed within fifteen minutes of Abrams's taking command," remarked one officer. Abrams switched the war aims from destruction to control; he was less interested in counting enemy body bags than in securing South Vietnam's villages.A Better War is unique among histories of the VietnamWar in that it focuses on the second half of the conflict, roughly from Abrams's arrival to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Other volumes, such as Stanley Karnow's Vietnamand Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, tend to give short shrift to this period. Sorley shows how the often-overlooked Abrams strategy nearly succeeded--indeed, Sorley says it did succeed, at least until political leadership in the United States let victory slip away. Sorley cites other problems, too, such as low morale among troops in the field, plus the harmful effects of drug abuse, racial disharmony, and poor discipline. In the end, the mighty willpower of Abrams and diplomatic allies Ellsworth Bunker and Colby was not enough. But, with its strong case that they came pretty close to win! ning, A Better War is sure to spark controversy. -- J. The New York Times Book Review, Record...a comprehensive and long-overdue examination of the immediate post-Tet offensive years .... [sorley is a] first-rate historian.From Booklist , May 15, 1999The debate continues. Was the Vietnam War "lost" because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA official, leans toward the latter explanation. Sorley points out the considerable successes in prosecuting the ground war and "nation building" in the hamlets and cities. The triumvirate responsible for those successes was General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and the director of the pacification program, Colby. Sorley convincingly portrays them as both dedicated and wise, and he passionately argues that, given time and support, they could have achieved America's goal of a viable, non-Communist South Vie! tnam. Unfortunately, Sorley gives short shrift to counter arguments. Still, his points are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument. Jay FreemanCopyright© 1999, American Library Association. All rights reserved Jay Freeman, Booklist, 5/15/99the debate continues. Was the Vietnam War "lost" because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost due because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the Field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA Official, leans toward the latter explanation...His pints are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument.From Kirkus ReviewsA fawning paean to General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and former CIA chief Colby and their stewardship of the Vietnam Warfrom 1968 to 1975. The stab-in-the-back theory is alive and well in Sorleys (Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, 1992, etc.) heavily footnoted but biased and flawed analysis of the post-1968 Vietnam War. Sorley's heroes are Abrams, Bunker, Colby, and others who worked to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese. His villains are those he claims subverted that effort: Congress (especially Ted Kennedy), the antiwar movement (especially Jane Fonda), and the American media. In making this weak argument, Sorley lionizes virtually every action taken by his heroes and demonizes the actions of those he considers villains. His sections on Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media are brief, facile, and one-si! ded. His analyses of Abrams, Bunker, et al., are long, worshipful, and one-sided. Sorley contends that by late 1970 the Americans and South Vietnamese had won thewar, a victory snatched away by a defeatist Congress and abetted by the antiwar movement and the media, particularly Walter Cronkite. In focusing on the war's last eight years, Sorley sets out to right a wrong: Most of thebetter-known treatments of the Vietnam War, he says, as a whole have given relatively little consideration to these later years. But he sabotages his own argument by providing almost no background on the war, even though the US became involved in the area in 1950. He assesses the post-1968 period virtually in a vacuum. And what came before had a great deal to do with how thewar was prosecuted afterward, including the actions of those in Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media. A partisan, wholly! unconvincing attempt to explain the Communist victo ry in Vietnam. (16 pages b & w photos, not seen; 5 maps) -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. Book DescriptionWith exclusive access to highly classified material, an award-winning historian illuminates the Vietnam War. Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing on authoritative materials not previously available, including thousands of hours of tape-recorded allied councils of war, award-winning military historian Sorley has given us what has long been needed-an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these important years. Among his findings is that the war was being won on the ground even as it was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress. The story is a great human drama of purposeful and principled service in the face of an agonizing succession of lost opportunities, told with uncommon understanding and compass! ion. Sorley documents the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and-at least for a time-results between the early and the later war. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War is sure to stimulate controversy as it sheds brilliant new light on the war in Vietnam.SynopsisAn award-winning historian and former Army commander and CIA official illustrates the dramatic successes and final tragedy of the Vietnam War. 28 pages of photos. 7 maps.From the AuthorHow A Better War Came to Be Written: When General Creighton W. Abrams returned in 1972 to become Army Chief of Staff, he brought with him certain highly classified materials relating to his service in Vietnam. Then when, in the autumn of 1974, Abrams died while still in office, his successor, General Frederick C. Weyand, ordered that these materials be sequestered, with both their existence and location treated as classified information. Eventually, however, I learned of these materials from sources in the Army hierarchy who were friendly to my work. With the invaluable help of the Army's Chief of Military History, I was granted access to the "Abrams Special Collection" by the Army Chief of Staff (coincidentally the only Armor officer other than General Abrams to have held that post). After certain other agencies sharing a security interest in the materials concurred, I comme! nced research in these holdings. Thus began what turned out to be a year-long endeavor. The collection was housed in a secure facility at Carlisle Barracks, some two hours from where I resided. Beginning in May 1994 I departed home at 5:30 a.m. each Monday morning, getting to Carlisle Barracks by the time the vault opened for the day's business. There I typically spent a ten-hour day working with the materials until the vault closed in late afternoon. In the evenings I used the fine library of the U.S. Army WarCollege, also located at Carlisle Barracks. My home away from home for each week was a modest but friendly motel frequented primarily by drivers of eighteen-wheeler trucking rigs. Friday evenings I would, after the day's work, make my way back home. This routine continued for an entire year of weekdays, interrupted only by holidays and other occasions on which the vault was not open, and by a on! e-week respite for our family's annual beach outing. The heart of the collection turned out to be 455 tape recordings made at Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, during the four years General Abrams was in command. Of the old reel-to-reel variety, these tapes ran two to six hours in length, and I used up or wore out three ancient machines in the process of screening them all. Keeping these machines limping along or finding successors when they finally collapsed was no small part of the process. In the final weeks the last machine was kept going only through use of a wooden jig, inserted to hold the worn-out play lever in place. Listening to these tapes and making handwritten single-spaced notes that eventually ran to nearly 3,200 pages was a laborious and time-consuming process, but also a fascinating one, for I never knew what the next tape would reveal. What emerged was a portrait of a senior commander and his closest associates-something like Napoleon and his marshals-working together to prosecute a complex and challenging military campaign in an equally complex and difficult political context. The interchanges were candid, spirited, often funny, and included not only what were called the Weekly Intelligence Estimate Updates-Saturday morning sessions held at MACV Headquarters-but also many sessions conducted for such visitors as the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and consultant Sir . In May 1995, almost exactly a year after I began, my screening of these materials was complete. It took most of another year to get the notes through the mandatory declassification review process by the Army, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Even so I needed the absolutely invaluable assistance of three senior officers who are also v! alued and long-time friends to reach a favorable outcome.< BR> Once the cleared notes had been returned to me, it took over two months of more or less non-stop work to enter them-nearly 835,000 words in all-in a computer. Many other public records and private recollections yielded valuable research material. Over the past decade and a half I have interviewed about 500 people, many of them repeatedly, for this book and the two preceding biographies of Generals Creighton Abrams and Harold K. , some of them repeatedly, and worked my way through the papers of both men. Now, however, I was privileged to be the first researcher ever granted access to the fascinating, authentic, and extensive collection of materials on these tapes. Each day brought something new, and in the aggregate the story that emerged provided many new insights and much significant evidence concerning conduct of the war during the later years by Abrams, Bunker and Colby. It was a treasure trov! e indeed, so much so that it is my intention to publish an extensive volume of excerpts from the notes I compiled, thereby making available to other researchers the most interesting and historically significant portions of this rich historical record.The publisher, Harcourt Brace & Company , April 21, 1999 Praise for Sorley's A BETTER WAR"The story of how Creighton Abrams moved toward hisbetter war is one that must be told if ever we are to understand what happened to us as a nation in those tragic years. It will be a long time indeed before anyone tells that story better than it is set forth by Sorley in this magnificent book." -General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army (Retired)"The research supporting A BETTER WAR is the best I have seen on the conflict in Vietnam, [and] Sorley's insight and analysis far surpass other books about the war. He makes clear that, had we stayed the course, a different story would have evolved, but the brutal fact is that at the critical point we abandoned our ally."-General Bruce A. Palmer, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired)"A masterful treatment of military realities and court intrigue; of strategic competence and political betrayal. Carefully researched and exactingly detailed, there are revelations on every page." - M. Del Vecchio"Bob Sorley, working with newly discovered documentation, has illuminated in this fine book the historically neglected final four years of the Vietnam conflict. In the process he has found a number of surprises, and he's done a great service to history and to all those who fought in this tragic episode. This book fills a gap among the half-dozen key volumes essential for understanding the Vietnam War."-General R. Galvin, Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe"A compelling narrative and a powerful antidote to the self-justifying myth that the Vietnam War was "unwinnable." By 1972, when Creighton Abrams departed from Vietnam, the Viet Cong had been decimated and the North Vietnamese military effectively neutralized. That advantageous position was subsequently squandered in large part through our own actions-for by then too many had developed a vested interest in seeing South Vietnam defeated."- Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense"A BETTER WAR is a revelation, and too often a heartbreaking one."-Rob Cowley, Editor MHQ: Military History Quarterly"In his illuminating narrative of Creighton Abram's war, Sorley has deployed all his talents as historian and storyteller. A BETTER WAR reaffirms the strength of Abram's spirit and vision as well as his undeniable accomplishments in the face of enormous obstacles."-W.E.B. " Sorley has done a great job making sense out of a complex piece of history. I'd classify it "compulsory reading" for anyone who wants to understand the American involvement in Vietnam."-General W. Vessey, U.S. Army (Retired)"[A BETTER WAR] does much to fill an important gap, and does so on the basis of authentic, primary source material. As a result it provides a far truer understanding of the "second half" of the Vietnam War than we have seen before, and brings out with clarity how it was ultimately caused to end in defeat. The author is to be commended for his initiative in opening up the records of the MACV weekly updates, and for a work of unique value with information well beyond anything previously available."-General J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army (Retired) Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted April 23, 2008 Report Share Posted April 23, 2008 Nicely put . Lindekugel, DC Concordia Chiropractic Center Portland Re: OT: Vietnam revisited Within a few years of the American pullout of Vietnam, my friends started going there on bicycle trips. Within a few more years, they were leading tours of others there on bikes as well. Now, Vietnam is a major tourist attraction, with some of the finest beaches and friendliest people in the world. Vietnam achieved around 8% annual GDP growth from 1990 to 1997 and continued at around 7% from 2000 to 2005, making it the world's second-fastest growing economy. Simultaneously, foreign investment grew threefold and domestic savings quintupled. Vietnam is a relative new-comer to the oil business, but today it is the third-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia with output of 400,000 barrels per day. Vietnam is one of Asia's most open economies: two-way trade is around 160% of GDP, more than twice the ratio for China and over four times India's.[10] Vietnam was accepted into the WTO on November 7, 2006. Vietnam's chief trading partners include Japan, Australia, ASEAN countries, the U.S. and Western European countries. More at: http://en.wikipedia .org/wiki/ Vietnam#Economy Apparently the domino theory is just a kid's game, and not a strategy for foreign policy. What was the cost of our intervention into Vietnam, in terms of human life? http://members. aol.com/warlibra ry/vwc0.htm Sears, DC NW PDX On Apr 21, 2008, at 5:24 PM, Abrahamson wrote: A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnamby SorleyThis book cracked open Soviet military archives now available to learn how close we came to winning the Vietnam war and why we failed to do so.We learned from our mistakes and taught the South how to protect themselves; we then set about bombing the chokepoints of the supply line thus starving the North¢s armies. It shows that we had the north on the ropes and could have at least forced a strong and viable truce with the country divided like Korea.Had we done so, South Vietnam may have become a thriving economy and safe haven for Cambodians rather than the horrible killing field it became after the fall of the south. Germaine to the frighteningly similar situation in Iraq where we seem to be fighting a proxy war against a larger enemy.Those who don¢t examine history are doomed to repeat it.See below. ( E. Abrahamson, D.C.)Chiropractic physicianLake Oswego Chiropractic Clinic315 Second StreetLake Oswego, OR 97034503-635-6246Website: http://www.lakeoswe gochiro.comA Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedies of America's Last Years in VietnamBy: SorleyReviews Amazon.comThere was a moment when the United States had the Vietnam War wrapped up, writes military historian Sorley (biographer of two Vietnam-era U.S. Army generals, Creighton Abrams and Harold ). "The fighting wasn't over, but the war was won," he says in this convention-shaking book. "This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970." South Vietnam was ready to carry on the battle without American ground troops and only logistical and financial support. Sorley says that replacing General Westmoreland with Abrams in 1968 was the key. "The tactics changed within fifteen minutes of Abrams's taking command," remarked one officer. Abrams switched the war aims from destruction to control; he was less interested in counting enemy body bags than in securing South Vietnam's villages.A Better War is unique among histories of the VietnamWar in that it focuses on the second half of the conflict, roughly from Abrams's arrival to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Other volumes, such as Stanley Karnow's Vietnamand Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, tend to give short shrift to this period. Sorley shows how the often-overlooked Abrams strategy nearly succeeded--indeed, Sorley says it did succeed, at least until political leadership in the United States let victory slip away. Sorley cites other problems, too, such as low morale among troops in the field, plus the harmful effects of drug abuse, racial disharmony, and poor discipline. In the end, the mighty willpower of Abrams and diplomatic allies Ellsworth Bunker and Colby was not enough. But, with its strong case that they came pretty close to win! ning, A Better War is sure to spark controversy. -- J. The New York Times Book Review, Record...a comprehensive and long-overdue examination of the immediate post-Tet offensive years .... [sorley is a] first-rate historian.From Booklist , May 15, 1999The debate continues. Was the Vietnam War "lost" because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA official, leans toward the latter explanation. Sorley points out the considerable successes in prosecuting the ground war and "nation building" in the hamlets and cities. The triumvirate responsible for those successes was General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and the director of the pacification program, Colby. Sorley convincingly portrays them as both dedicated and wise, and he passionately argues that, given time and support, they could have achieved America's goal of a viable, non-Communist South Vie! tnam. Unfortunately, Sorley gives short shrift to counter arguments. Still, his points are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument. Jay FreemanCopyright© 1999, American Library Association. All rights reserved Jay Freeman, Booklist, 5/15/99the debate continues. Was the Vietnam War "lost" because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost due because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the Field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA Official, leans toward the latter explanation. ..His pints are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument.From Kirkus ReviewsA fawning paean to General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and former CIA chief Colby and their stewardship of the Vietnam Warfrom 1968 to 1975. The stab-in-the- back theory is alive and well in Sorleys (Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, 1992, etc.) heavily footnoted but biased and flawed analysis of the post-1968 Vietnam War. Sorley's heroes are Abrams, Bunker, Colby, and others who worked to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese. His villains are those he claims subverted that effort: Congress (especially Ted Kennedy), the antiwar movement (especially Jane Fonda), and the American media. In making this weak argument, Sorley lionizes virtually every action taken by his heroes and demonizes the actions of those he considers villains. His sections on Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media are brief, facile, and one-si! ded. His analyses of Abrams, Bunker, et al., are long, worshipful, and one-sided. Sorley contends that by late 1970 the Americans and South Vietnamese had won thewar, a victory snatched away by a defeatist Congress and abetted by the antiwar movement and the media, particularly Walter Cronkite. In focusing on the war's last eight years, Sorley sets out to right a wrong: Most of thebetter-known treatments of the Vietnam War, he says, as a whole have given relatively little consideration to these later years. But he sabotages his own argument by providing almost no background on the war, even though the US became involved in the area in 1950. He assesses the post-1968 period virtually in a vacuum. And what came before had a great deal to do with how thewar was prosecuted afterward, including the actions of those in Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media. A partisan, wholly! unconvincing attempt to explain the Communist victo ry in Vietnam. (16 pages b & w photos, not seen; 5 maps) -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. Book DescriptionWith exclusive access to highly classified material, an award-winning historian illuminates the Vietnam War. Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing on authoritative materials not previously available, including thousands of hours of tape-recorded allied councils of war, award-winning military historian Sorley has given us what has long been needed-an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these important years. Among his findings is that the war was being won on the ground even as it was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress. The story is a great human drama of purposeful and principled service in the face of an agonizing succession of lost opportunities, told with uncommon understanding and compass! ion. Sorley documents the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and-at least for a time-results between the early and the later war. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War is sure to stimulate controversy as it sheds brilliant new light on the war in Vietnam.SynopsisAn award-winning historian and former Army commander and CIA official illustrates the dramatic successes and final tragedy of the Vietnam War. 28 pages of photos. 7 maps.From the AuthorHow A Better War Came to Be Written: When General Creighton W. Abrams returned in 1972 to become Army Chief of Staff, he brought with him certain highly classified materials relating to his service in Vietnam. Then when, in the autumn of 1974, Abrams died while still in office, his successor, General Frederick C. Weyand, ordered that these materials be sequestered, with both their existence and location treated as classified information. Eventually, however, I learned of these materials from sources in the Army hierarchy who were friendly to my work. With the invaluable help of the Army's Chief of Military History, I was granted access to the "Abrams Special Collection" by the Army Chief of Staff (coincidentally the only Armor officer other than General Abrams to have held that post). After certain other agencies sharing a security interest in the materials concurred, I comme! nced research in these holdings. Thus began what turned out to be a year-long endeavor. The collection was housed in a secure facility at Carlisle Barracks, some two hours from where I resided. Beginning in May 1994 I departed home at 5:30 a.m. each Monday morning, getting to Carlisle Barracks by the time the vault opened for the day's business. There I typically spent a ten-hour day working with the materials until the vault closed in late afternoon. In the evenings I used the fine library of the U.S. Army WarCollege, also located at Carlisle Barracks. My home away from home for each week was a modest but friendly motel frequented primarily by drivers of eighteen-wheeler trucking rigs. Friday evenings I would, after the day's work, make my way back home. This routine continued for an entire year of weekdays, interrupted only by holidays and other occasions on which the vault was not open, and by a on! e-week respite for our family's annual beach outing. The heart of the collection turned out to be 455 tape recordings made at Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, during the four years General Abrams was in command. Of the old reel-to-reel variety, these tapes ran two to six hours in length, and I used up or wore out three ancient machines in the process of screening them all. Keeping these machines limping along or finding successors when they finally collapsed was no small part of the process. In the final weeks the last machine was kept going only through use of a wooden jig, inserted to hold the worn-out play lever in place. Listening to these tapes and making handwritten single-spaced notes that eventually ran to nearly 3,200 pages was a laborious and time-consuming process, but also a fascinating one, for I never knew what the next tape would reveal. What emerged was a portrait of a senior commander and his closest associates-somethin g like Napoleon and his marshals-working together to prosecute a complex and challenging military campaign in an equally complex and difficult political context. The interchanges were candid, spirited, often funny, and included not only what were called the Weekly Intelligence Estimate Updates-Saturday morning sessions held at MACV Headquarters- but also many sessions conducted for such visitors as the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-in- Chief, Pacific, and consultant Sir . In May 1995, almost exactly a year after I began, my screening of these materials was complete. It took most of another year to get the notes through the mandatory declassification review process by the Army, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Even so I needed the absolutely invaluable assistance of three senior officers who are also v! alued and long-time friends to reach a favorable outcome.< BR> Once the cleared notes had been returned to me, it took over two months of more or less non-stop work to enter them-nearly 835,000 words in all-in a computer. Many other public records and private recollections yielded valuable research material. Over the past decade and a half I have interviewed about 500 people, many of them repeatedly, for this book and the two preceding biographies of Generals Creighton Abrams and Harold K. , some of them repeatedly, and worked my way through the papers of both men. Now, however, I was privileged to be the first researcher ever granted access to the fascinating, authentic, and extensive collection of materials on these tapes. Each day brought something new, and in the aggregate the story that emerged provided many new insights and much significant evidence concerning conduct of the war during the later years by Abrams, Bunker and Colby. It was a treasure trov! e indeed, so much so that it is my intention to publish an extensive volume of excerpts from the notes I compiled, thereby making available to other researchers the most interesting and historically significant portions of this rich historical record.The publisher, Harcourt Brace & Company , April 21, 1999 Praise for Sorley's A BETTER WAR"The story of how Creighton Abrams moved toward hisbetter war is one that must be told if ever we are to understand what happened to us as a nation in those tragic years. It will be a long time indeed before anyone tells that story better than it is set forth by Sorley in this magnificent book." -General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army (Retired)"The research supporting A BETTER WAR is the best I have seen on the conflict in Vietnam, [and] Sorley's insight and analysis far surpass other books about the war. He makes clear that, had we stayed the course, a different story would have evolved, but the brutal fact is that at the critical point we abandoned our ally."-General Bruce A. Palmer, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired)"A masterful treatment of military realities and court intrigue; of strategic competence and political betrayal. Carefully researched and exactingly detailed, there are revelations on every page." - M. Del Vecchio"Bob Sorley, working with newly discovered documentation, has illuminated in this fine book the historically neglected final four years of the Vietnam conflict. In the process he has found a number of surprises, and he's done a great service to history and to all those who fought in this tragic episode. This book fills a gap among the half-dozen key volumes essential for understanding the Vietnam War."-General R. Galvin, Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe"A compelling narrative and a powerful antidote to the self-justifying myth that the Vietnam War was "unwinnable. " By 1972, when Creighton Abrams departed from Vietnam, the Viet Cong had been decimated and the North Vietnamese military effectively neutralized. That advantageous position was subsequently squandered in large part through our own actions-for by then too many had developed a vested interest in seeing South Vietnam defeated."- Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense"A BETTER WAR is a revelation, and too often a heartbreaking one."-Rob Cowley, Editor MHQ: Military History Quarterly"In his illuminating narrative of Creighton Abram's war, Sorley has deployed all his talents as historian and storyteller. A BETTER WAR reaffirms the strength of Abram's spirit and vision as well as his undeniable accomplishments in the face of enormous obstacles."- W.E.B. " Sorley has done a great job making sense out of a complex piece of history. I'd classify it "compulsory reading" for anyone who wants to understand the American involvement in Vietnam."-General W. Vessey, U.S. Army (Retired)"[A BETTER WAR] does much to fill an important gap, and does so on the basis of authentic, primary source material. As a result it provides a far truer understanding of the "second half" of the Vietnam War than we have seen before, and brings out with clarity how it was ultimately caused to end in defeat. The author is to be commended for his initiative in opening up the records of the MACV weekly updates, and for a work of unique value with information well beyond anything previously available."- General J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army (Retired) Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Mobile. Try it now. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted April 23, 2008 Report Share Posted April 23, 2008 You’re kidding right? Vietnam a great place after America pulled out and failed to honor the Paris Peace Accords? Aside from the deaths, reeducation camps, and repression of the communist regime, it was probably a great place to live. I guess all the thousands of “Boat People” who drowned in the Pacific escaping the People’s Paradise of Vietnam were just a bunch of worry warts. If you can handle the fact that it is a conservative website, there is an excellent treatment of the failure of media to acknowledge the horror of post-America Vietnam. The article could be considered biased as the author excoriates Newsweek as being biased itself. Interesting read. Newsweek's Hirsh Ignores 'Killing Fields' as He Mocks 'Harsh' Vietnam Aftermath http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/brent-baker/2007/08/26/newsweeks-hirsh-ignores-killing-fields-he-mocks-harsh-vietnam-aftermath ....and another book reviewed here: http://newamerica.net/publications/books/vietnam_the_necessary_war ( E. Abrahamson, D.C.) Chiropractic physician Lake Oswego Chiropractic Clinic 315 Second Street Lake Oswego, OR 97034 503-635-6246 Website: http://www.lakeoswegochiro.com From: Sears <dm.bones@...> Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2008 13:13:29 -0700 Abrahamson <drscott@...> Cc: ChiroListServe Chiropractors <Oregondcs > Subject: Re: OT: Vietnam revisited Within a few years of the American pullout of Vietnam, my friends started going there on bicycle trips. Within a few more years, they were leading tours of others there on bikes as well. Now, Vietnam is a major tourist attraction, with some of the finest beaches and friendliest people in the world. Vietnam achieved around 8% annual GDP <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product> growth from 1990 to 1997 and continued at around 7% from 2000 to 2005, making it the world's second-fastest growing economy. Simultaneously, foreign investment <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_investment> grew threefold and domestic savings <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savings> quintupled. Vietnam is a relative new-comer to the oil business, but today it is the third-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia with output of 400,000 barrels per day. Vietnam is one of Asia's most open economies: two-way trade is around 160% of GDP, more than twice the ratio for China and over four times India's.[10] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam#cite_note-9> Vietnam was accepted into the WTO <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Organization> on November 7, 2006. Vietnam's chief trading partners include Japan, Australia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia> , ASEAN countries, the U.S. and Western European countries. More at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam#Economy Apparently the domino theory is just a kid's game, and not a strategy for foreign policy. What was the cost of our intervention into Vietnam, in terms of human life? http://members.aol.com/warlibrary/vwc0.htm Sears, DC NW PDX On Apr 21, 2008, at 5:24 PM, Abrahamson wrote: A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam by Sorley This book cracked open Soviet military archives now available to learn how close we came to winning the Vietnam war and why we failed to do so. We learned from our mistakes and taught the South how to protect themselves; we then set about bombing the chokepoints of the supply line thus starving the North’s armies. It shows that we had the north on the ropes and could have at least forced a strong and viable truce with the country divided like Korea. Had we done so, South Vietnam may have become a thriving economy and safe haven for Cambodians rather than the horrible killing field it became after the fall of the south. Germaine to the frighteningly similar situation in Iraq where we seem to be fighting a proxy war against a larger enemy. Those who don’t examine history are doomed to repeat it. See below. ( E. Abrahamson, D.C.) Chiropractic physician Lake Oswego Chiropractic Clinic 315 Second Street Lake Oswego, OR 97034 503-635-6246 Website: http://www.lakeoswegochiro.com A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedies of America's Last Years in Vietnam By: Sorley Reviews Amazon.com There was a moment when the United States had the Vietnam War wrapped up, writes military historian Sorley (biographer of two Vietnam-era U.S. Army generals, Creighton Abrams and Harold ). " The fighting wasn't over, but the war was won, " he says in this convention-shaking book. " This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970. " South Vietnam was ready to carry on the battle without American ground troops and only logistical and financial support. Sorley says that replacing General Westmoreland with Abrams in 1968 was the key. " The tactics changed within fifteen minutes of Abrams's taking command, " remarked one officer. Abrams switched the war aims from destruction to control; he was less interested in counting enemy body bags than in securing South Vietnam's villages. A Better War is unique among histories of the VietnamWar in that it focuses on the second half of the conflict, roughly from Abrams's arrival to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Other volumes, such as Stanley Karnow's Vietnamand Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, tend to give short shrift to this period. Sorley shows how the often-overlooked Abrams strategy nearly succeeded--indeed, Sorley says it did succeed, at least until political leadership in the United States let victory slip away. Sorley cites other problems, too, such as low morale among troops in the field, plus the harmful effects of drug abuse, racial disharmony, and poor discipline. In the end, the mighty willpower of Abrams and diplomatic allies Ellsworth Bunker and Colby was not enough. But, with its strong case that they came pretty close to win! ning, A Better War is sure to spark controversy. -- J. The New York Times Book Review, Record ....a comprehensive and long-overdue examination of the immediate post-Tet offensive years .... [sorley is a] first-rate historian. From Booklist , May 15, 1999 The debate continues. Was the Vietnam War " lost " because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA official, leans toward the latter explanation. Sorley points out the considerable successes in prosecuting the ground war and " nation building " in the hamlets and cities. The triumvirate responsible for those successes was General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and the director of the pacification program, Colby. Sorley convincingly portrays them as both dedicated and wise, and he passionately argues that, given time and support, they could have achieved America's goal of a viable, non-Communist South Vie! tnam. Unfortunately, Sorley gives short shrift to counter arguments. Still, his points are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument. Jay Freeman Copyright© 1999, American Library Association. All rights reserved Jay Freeman, Booklist, 5/15/99 the debate continues. Was the Vietnam War " lost " because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost due because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the Field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA Official, leans toward the latter explanation...His pints are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument. From Kirkus Reviews A fawning paean to General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and former CIA chief Colby and their stewardship of the Vietnam Warfrom 1968 to 1975. The stab-in-the-back theory is alive and well in Sorleys (Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, 1992, etc.) heavily footnoted but biased and flawed analysis of the post-1968 Vietnam War. Sorley's heroes are Abrams, Bunker, Colby, and others who worked to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese. His villains are those he claims subverted that effort: Congress (especially Ted Kennedy), the antiwar movement (especially Jane Fonda), and the American media. In making this weak argument, Sorley lionizes virtually every action taken by his heroes and demonizes the actions of those he considers villains. His sections on Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media are brief, facile, and one-si! ded. His analyses of Abrams, Bunker, et al., are long, worshipful, and one-sided. Sorley contends that by late 1970 the Americans and South Vietnamese had won thewar, a victory snatched away by a defeatist Congress and abetted by the antiwar movement and the media, particularly Walter Cronkite. In focusing on the war's last eight years, Sorley sets out to right a wrong: Most of thebetter-known treatments of the Vietnam War, he says, as a whole have given relatively little consideration to these later years. But he sabotages his own argument by providing almost no background on the war, even though the US became involved in the area in 1950. He assesses the post-1968 period virtually in a vacuum. And what came before had a great deal to do with how thewar was prosecuted afterward, including the actions of those in Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media. A partisan, wholly! unconvincing attempt to explain the Communist victo ry in Vietnam. (16 pages b & w photos, not seen; 5 maps) -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. Book Description With exclusive access to highly classified material, an award-winning historian illuminates the Vietnam War. Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing on authoritative materials not previously available, including thousands of hours of tape-recorded allied councils of war, award-winning military historian Sorley has given us what has long been needed-an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these important years. Among his findings is that the war was being won on the ground even as it was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress. The story is a great human drama of purposeful and principled service in the face of an agonizing succession of lost opportunities, told with uncommon understanding and compass! ion. Sorley documents the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and-at least for a time-results between the early and the later war. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War is sure to stimulate controversy as it sheds brilliant new light on the war in Vietnam. Synopsis An award-winning historian and former Army commander and CIA official illustrates the dramatic successes and final tragedy of the Vietnam War. 28 pages of photos. 7 maps. From the Author How A Better War Came to Be Written: When General Creighton W. Abrams returned in 1972 to become Army Chief of Staff, he brought with him certain highly classified materials relating to his service in Vietnam. Then when, in the autumn of 1974, Abrams died while still in office, his successor, General Frederick C. Weyand, ordered that these materials be sequestered, with both their existence and location treated as classified information. Eventually, however, I learned of these materials from sources in the Army hierarchy who were friendly to my work. With the invaluable help of the Army's Chief of Military History, I was granted access to the " Abrams Special Collection " by the Army Chief of Staff (coincidentally the only Armor officer other than General Abrams to have held that post). After certain other agencies sharing a security interest in the materials concurred, I comme! nced research in these holdings. Thus began what turned out to be a year-long endeavor. The collection was housed in a secure facility at Carlisle Barracks, some two hours from where I resided. Beginning in May 1994 I departed home at 5:30 a.m. each Monday morning, getting to Carlisle Barracks by the time the vault opened for the day's business. There I typically spent a ten-hour day working with the materials until the vault closed in late afternoon. In the evenings I used the fine library of the U.S. Army WarCollege, also located at Carlisle Barracks. My home away from home for each week was a modest but friendly motel frequented primarily by drivers of eighteen-wheeler trucking rigs. Friday evenings I would, after the day's work, make my way back home. This routine continued for an entire year of weekdays, interrupted only by holidays and other occasions on which the vault was not open, and by a on! e-week respite for our family's annual beach outing. The heart of the collection turned out to be 455 tape recordings made at Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, during the four years General Abrams was in command. Of the old reel-to-reel variety, these tapes ran two to six hours in length, and I used up or wore out three ancient machines in the process of screening them all. Keeping these machines limping along or finding successors when they finally collapsed was no small part of the process. In the final weeks the last machine was kept going only through use of a wooden jig, inserted to hold the worn-out play lever in place. Listening to these tapes and making handwritten single-spaced notes that eventually ran to nearly 3,200 pages was a laborious and time-consuming process, but also a fascinating one, for I never knew what the next tape would reveal. What emerged was a portrait of a senior commander and his closest associates-something like Napoleon and his marshals-working together to prosecute a complex and challenging military campaign in an equally complex and difficult political context. The interchanges were candid, spirited, often funny, and included not only what were called the Weekly Intelligence Estimate Updates-Saturday morning sessions held at MACV Headquarters-but also many sessions conducted for such visitors as the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and consultant Sir . In May 1995, almost exactly a year after I began, my screening of these materials was complete. It took most of another year to get the notes through the mandatory declassification review process by the Army, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Even so I needed the absolutely invaluable assistance of three senior officers who are also v! alued and long-time friends to reach a favorable outcome.< BR> Once the cleared notes had been returned to me, it took over two months of more or less non-stop work to enter them-nearly 835,000 words in all-in a computer. Many other public records and private recollections yielded valuable research material. Over the past decade and a half I have interviewed about 500 people, many of them repeatedly, for this book and the two preceding biographies of Generals Creighton Abrams and Harold K. , some of them repeatedly, and worked my way through the papers of both men. Now, however, I was privileged to be the first researcher ever granted access to the fascinating, authentic, and extensive collection of materials on these tapes. Each day brought something new, and in the aggregate the story that emerged provided many new insights and much significant evidence concerning conduct of the war during the later years by Abrams, Bunker and Colby. It was a treasure trov! e indeed, so much so that it is my intention to publish an extensive volume of excerpts from the notes I compiled, thereby making available to other researchers the most interesting and historically significant portions of this rich historical record. The publisher, Harcourt Brace & Company , April 21, 1999 Praise for Sorley's A BETTER WAR " The story of how Creighton Abrams moved toward hisbetter war is one that must be told if ever we are to understand what happened to us as a nation in those tragic years. It will be a long time indeed before anyone tells that story better than it is set forth by Sorley in this magnificent book. " -General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army (Retired) " The research supporting A BETTER WAR is the best I have seen on the conflict in Vietnam, [and] Sorley's insight and analysis far surpass other books about the war. He makes clear that, had we stayed the course, a different story would have evolved, but the brutal fact is that at the critical point we abandoned our ally. " -General Bruce A. Palmer, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired) " A masterful treatment of military realities and court intrigue; of strategic competence and political betrayal. Carefully researched and exactingly detailed, there are revelations on every page. " - M. Del Vecchio " Bob Sorley, working with newly discovered documentation, has illuminated in this fine book the historically neglected final four years of the Vietnam conflict. In the process he has found a number of surprises, and he's done a great service to history and to all those who fought in this tragic episode. This book fills a gap among the half-dozen key volumes essential for understanding the Vietnam War. " -General R. Galvin, Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe " A compelling narrative and a powerful antidote to the self-justifying myth that the Vietnam War was " unwinnable. " By 1972, when Creighton Abrams departed from Vietnam, the Viet Cong had been decimated and the North Vietnamese military effectively neutralized. That advantageous position was subsequently squandered in large part through our own actions-for by then too many had developed a vested interest in seeing South Vietnam defeated. " - Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense " A BETTER WAR is a revelation, and too often a heartbreaking one. " -Rob Cowley, Editor MHQ: Military History Quarterly " In his illuminating narrative of Creighton Abram's war, Sorley has deployed all his talents as historian and storyteller. A BETTER WAR reaffirms the strength of Abram's spirit and vision as well as his undeniable accomplishments in the face of enormous obstacles. " -W.E.B. " Sorley has done a great job making sense out of a complex piece of history. I'd classify it " compulsory reading " for anyone who wants to understand the American involvement in Vietnam. " -General W. Vessey, U.S. Army (Retired) " [A BETTER WAR] does much to fill an important gap, and does so on the basis of authentic, primary source material. As a result it provides a far truer understanding of the " second half " of the Vietnam War than we have seen before, and brings out with clarity how it was ultimately caused to end in defeat. The author is to be commended for his initiative in opening up the records of the MACV weekly updates, and for a work of unique value with information well beyond anything previously available. " -General J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army (Retired) Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted April 24, 2008 Report Share Posted April 24, 2008 "the horror of post-America Vietnam. " Enough said. Our prolonged intervention exacerbated the north's atrocities and spurned a more virulent hate for their southern brethren. The fact is that we did NOT win the war and our intervention would mean the end of countless Americans and Vietnamese. The country has certainly been successful in recent years which is a testament to the unflappable spirit of the people. There certainly was a time period following the war where a mass flight from the country took place. For many this was fear,uncertainty and lack of stability. This is not simply because the U.S withdrew. It is also not correct to believe that upon the American withdraw, the country immediately resumed it's nature of peace, freedom and enterprise. It was an absolutely destitute country. Poor. At least for the people living there who were Vietnamese. It does beg the question of what would have happened without American military troops actively participating in the war. Parallels between Iraq and Vietnam are few. Justification for continuing our reckless and nebulous occupation cannot be found in Vietnam. On the contrary the enemy in Viet was a government and Vietnamese. The enemy in Iraq isn't even Iraqi and actually evolved because of our occupation. Iraq is much less complicated than Vietnam in trying to decide whether to stay or leave. Our history in Vietnam shows that prolonged occupation doesn't necessarily lead to a win, and a win does not necessarily correlate to the future success of the country. History does indicate that Vietnam learned to be a thriving country. Lets hope that with an American withdraw, the Iraqi people will rise to do the same. An Awareness of our history should influence our leaders to not repeat the mistake of continuing a sacrifice of American (and others) lives for a winless endeavor with an uncertain outcome. ph Medlin DCSpine Tree Chiropracticwww.spinetreepdx.com Re: OT: Vietnam revisited Within a few years of the American pullout of Vietnam, my friends started going there on bicycle trips. Within a few more years, they were leading tours of others there on bikes as well. Now, Vietnam is a major tourist attraction, with some of the finest beaches and friendliest people in the world.Vietnam achieved around 8% annual GDP <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product> growth from 1990 to 1997 and continued at around 7% from 2000 to 2005, making it the world's second-fastest growing economy. Simultaneously, foreign investment <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_investment> grew threefold and domestic savings <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savings> quintupled. Vietnam is a relative new-comer to the oil business, but today it is the third-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia with output of 400,000 barrels per day. Vietnam is one of Asia's most open economies: two-way trade is around 160% of GDP, more than twice the ratio for China and over four times India's.[10] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam#cite_note-9> Vietnam was accepted into the WTO <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Organization> on November 7, 2006. Vietnam's chief trading partners include Japan, Australia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia> , ASEAN countries, the U.S. and Western European countries.More at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam#EconomyApparently the domino theory is just a kid's game, and not a strategy for foreign policy. What was the cost of our intervention into Vietnam, in terms of human life?http://members.aol.com/warlibrary/vwc0.htm Sears, DCNW PDX On Apr 21, 2008, at 5:24 PM, Abrahamson wrote: A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnamby SorleyThis book cracked open Soviet military archives now available to learn how close we came to winning the Vietnam war and why we failed to do so.We learned from our mistakes and taught the South how to protect themselves; we then set about bombing the chokepoints of the supply line thus starving the North’s armies. It shows that we had the north on the ropes and could have at least forced a strong and viable truce with the country divided like Korea.Had we done so, South Vietnam may have become a thriving economy and safe haven for Cambodians rather than the horrible killing field it became after the fall of the south. Germaine to the frighteningly similar situation in Iraq where we seem to be fighting a proxy war against a larger enemy.Those who don’t examine history are doomed to repeat it.See below. ( E. Abrahamson, D.C.)Chiropractic physicianLake Oswego Chiropractic Clinic315 Second StreetLake Oswego, OR 97034503-635-6246Website: http://www.lakeoswegochiro.comA Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedies of America's Last Years in VietnamBy: SorleyReviews Amazon.comThere was a moment when the United States had the Vietnam War wrapped up, writes military historian Sorley (biographer of two Vietnam-era U.S. Army generals, Creighton Abrams and Harold ). "The fighting wasn't over, but the war was won," he says in this convention-shaking book. "This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970." South Vietnam was ready to carry on the battle without American ground troops and only logistical and financial support. Sorley says that replacing General Westmoreland with Abrams in 1968 was the key. "The tactics changed within fifteen minutes of Abrams's taking command," remarked one officer. Abrams switched the war aims from destruction to control; he was less interested in counting enemy body bags than in securing South Vietnam's villages.A Better War is unique among histories of the VietnamWar in that it focuses on the second half of the conflict, roughly from Abrams's arrival to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Other volumes, such as Stanley Karnow's Vietnamand Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, tend to give short shrift to this period. Sorley shows how the often-overlooked Abrams strategy nearly succeeded--indeed, Sorley says it did succeed, at least until political leadership in the United States let victory slip away. Sorley cites other problems, too, such as low morale among troops in the field, plus the harmful effects of drug abuse, racial disharmony, and poor discipline. In the end, the mighty willpower of Abrams and diplomatic allies Ellsworth Bunker and Colby was not enough. But, with its strong case that they came pretty close to win! ning, A Better War is sure to spark controversy. -- J. The New York Times Book Review, Record...a comprehensive and long-overdue examination of the immediate post-Tet offensive years .... [sorley is a] first-rate historian.From Booklist , May 15, 1999The debate continues. Was the Vietnam War "lost" because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA official, leans toward the latter explanation. Sorley points out the considerable successes in prosecuting the ground war and "nation building" in the hamlets and cities. The triumvirate responsible for those successes was General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and the director of the pacification program, Colby. Sorley convincingly portrays them as both dedicated and wise, and he passionately argues that, given time and support, they could have achieved America's goal of a viable, non-Communist South Vie! tnam. Unfortunately, Sorley gives short shrift to counter arguments. Still, his points are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument. Jay FreemanCopyright© 1999, American Library Association. All rights reserved Jay Freeman, Booklist, 5/15/99the debate continues. Was the Vietnam War "lost" because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost due because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the Field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA Official, leans toward the latter explanation...His pints are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument.From Kirkus ReviewsA fawning paean to General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and former CIA chief Colby and their stewardship of the Vietnam Warfrom 1968 to 1975. The stab-in-the-back theory is alive and well in Sorleys (Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, 1992, etc.) heavily footnoted but biased and flawed analysis of the post-1968 Vietnam War. Sorley's heroes are Abrams, Bunker, Colby, and others who worked to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese. His villains are those he claims subverted that effort: Congress (especially Ted Kennedy), the antiwar movement (especially Jane Fonda), and the American media. In making this weak argument, Sorley lionizes virtually every action taken by his heroes and demonizes the actions of those he considers villains. His sections on Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media are brief, facile, and one-si! ded. His analyses of Abrams, Bunker, et al., are long, worshipful, and one-sided. Sorley contends that by late 1970 the Americans and South Vietnamese had won thewar, a victory snatched away by a defeatist Congress and abetted by the antiwar movement and the media, particularly Walter Cronkite. In focusing on the war's last eight years, Sorley sets out to right a wrong: Most of thebetter-known treatments of the Vietnam War, he says, as a whole have given relatively little consideration to these later years. But he sabotages his own argument by providing almost no background on the war, even though the US became involved in the area in 1950. He assesses the post-1968 period virtually in a vacuum. And what came before had a great deal to do with how thewar was prosecuted afterward, including the actions of those in Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media. A partisan, wholly! unconvincing attempt to explain the Communist victo ry in Vietnam. (16 pages b & w photos, not seen; 5 maps) -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. Book DescriptionWith exclusive access to highly classified material, an award-winning historian illuminates the Vietnam War. Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing on authoritative materials not previously available, including thousands of hours of tape-recorded allied councils of war, award-winning military historian Sorley has given us what has long been needed-an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these important years. Among his findings is that the war was being won on the ground even as it was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress. The story is a great human drama of purposeful and principled service in the face of an agonizing succession of lost opportunities, told with uncommon understanding and compass! ion. Sorley documents the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and-at least for a time-results between the early and the later war. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War is sure to stimulate controversy as it sheds brilliant new light on the war in Vietnam.SynopsisAn award-winning historian and former Army commander and CIA official illustrates the dramatic successes and final tragedy of the Vietnam War. 28 pages of photos. 7 maps.From the AuthorHow A Better War Came to Be Written: When General Creighton W. Abrams returned in 1972 to become Army Chief of Staff, he brought with him certain highly classified materials relating to his service in Vietnam. Then when, in the autumn of 1974, Abrams died while still in office, his successor, General Frederick C. Weyand, ordered that these materials be sequestered, with both their existence and location treated as classified information. Eventually, however, I learned of these materials from sources in the Army hierarchy who were friendly to my work. With the invaluable help of the Army's Chief of Military History, I was granted access to the "Abrams Special Collection" by the Army Chief of Staff (coincidentally the only Armor officer other than General Abrams to have held that post). After certain other agencies sharing a security interest in the materials concurred, I comme! nced research in these holdings. Thus began what turned out to be a year-long endeavor. The collection was housed in a secure facility at Carlisle Barracks, some two hours from where I resided. Beginning in May 1994 I departed home at 5:30 a.m. each Monday morning, getting to Carlisle Barracks by the time the vault opened for the day's business. There I typically spent a ten-hour day working with the materials until the vault closed in late afternoon. In the evenings I used the fine library of the U.S. Army WarCollege, also located at Carlisle Barracks. My home away from home for each week was a modest but friendly motel frequented primarily by drivers of eighteen-wheeler trucking rigs. Friday evenings I would, after the day's work, make my way back home. This routine continued for an entire year of weekdays, interrupted only by holidays and other occasions on which the vault was not open, and by a on! e-week respite for our family's annual beach outing. The heart of the collection turned out to be 455 tape recordings made at Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, during the four years General Abrams was in command. Of the old reel-to-reel variety, these tapes ran two to six hours in length, and I used up or wore out three ancient machines in the process of screening them all. Keeping these machines limping along or finding successors when they finally collapsed was no small part of the process. In the final weeks the last machine was kept going only through use of a wooden jig, inserted to hold the worn-out play lever in place. Listening to these tapes and making handwritten single-spaced notes that eventually ran to nearly 3,200 pages was a laborious and time-consuming process, but also a fascinating one, for I never knew what the next tape would reveal. What emerged was a portrait of a senior commander and his closest associates-something like Napoleon and his marshals-working together to prosecute a complex and challenging military campaign in an equally complex and difficult political context. The interchanges were candid, spirited, often funny, and included not only what were called the Weekly Intelligence Estimate Updates-Saturday morning sessions held at MACV Headquarters-but also many sessions conducted for such visitors as the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and consultant Sir . In May 1995, almost exactly a year after I began, my screening of these materials was complete. It took most of another year to get the notes through the mandatory declassification review process by the Army, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Even so I needed the absolutely invaluable assistance of three senior officers who are also v! alued and long-time friends to reach a favorable outcome.< BR> Once the cleared notes had been returned to me, it took over two months of more or less non-stop work to enter them-nearly 835,000 words in all-in a computer. Many other public records and private recollections yielded valuable research material. Over the past decade and a half I have interviewed about 500 people, many of them repeatedly, for this book and the two preceding biographies of Generals Creighton Abrams and Harold K. , some of them repeatedly, and worked my way through the papers of both men. Now, however, I was privileged to be the first researcher ever granted access to the fascinating, authentic, and extensive collection of materials on these tapes. Each day brought something new, and in the aggregate the story that emerged provided many new insights and much significant evidence concerning conduct of the war during the later years by Abrams, Bunker and Colby. It was a treasure trov! e indeed, so much so that it is my intention to publish an extensive volume of excerpts from the notes I compiled, thereby making available to other researchers the most interesting and historically significant portions of this rich historical record.The publisher, Harcourt Brace & Company , April 21, 1999 Praise for Sorley's A BETTER WAR"The story of how Creighton Abrams moved toward hisbetter war is one that must be told if ever we are to understand what happened to us as a nation in those tragic years. It will be a long time indeed before anyone tells that story better than it is set forth by Sorley in this magnificent book." -General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army (Retired)"The research supporting A BETTER WAR is the best I have seen on the conflict in Vietnam, [and] Sorley's insight and analysis far surpass other books about the war. He makes clear that, had we stayed the course, a different story would have evolved, but the brutal fact is that at the critical point we abandoned our ally."-General Bruce A. Palmer, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired)"A masterful treatment of military realities and court intrigue; of strategic competence and political betrayal. Carefully researched and exactingly detailed, there are revelations on every page." - M. Del Vecchio"Bob Sorley, working with newly discovered documentation, has illuminated in this fine book the historically neglected final four years of the Vietnam conflict. In the process he has found a number of surprises, and he's done a great service to history and to all those who fought in this tragic episode. This book fills a gap among the half-dozen key volumes essential for understanding the Vietnam War."-General R. Galvin, Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe"A compelling narrative and a powerful antidote to the self-justifying myth that the Vietnam War was "unwinnable." By 1972, when Creighton Abrams departed from Vietnam, the Viet Cong had been decimated and the North Vietnamese military effectively neutralized. That advantageous position was subsequently squandered in large part through our own actions-for by then too many had developed a vested interest in seeing South Vietnam defeated."- Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense"A BETTER WAR is a revelation, and too often a heartbreaking one."-Rob Cowley, Editor MHQ: Military History Quarterly"In his illuminating narrative of Creighton Abram's war, Sorley has deployed all his talents as historian and storyteller. A BETTER WAR reaffirms the strength of Abram's spirit and vision as well as his undeniable accomplishments in the face of enormous obstacles."-W.E.B. " Sorley has done a great job making sense out of a complex piece of history. I'd classify it "compulsory reading" for anyone who wants to understand the American involvement in Vietnam."-General W. Vessey, U.S. Army (Retired)"[A BETTER WAR] does much to fill an important gap, and does so on the basis of authentic, primary source material. As a result it provides a far truer understanding of the "second half" of the Vietnam War than we have seen before, and brings out with clarity how it was ultimately caused to end in defeat. The author is to be commended for his initiative in opening up the records of the MACV weekly updates, and for a work of unique value with information well beyond anything previously available."-General J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army (Retired) Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted April 26, 2008 Report Share Posted April 26, 2008 WARNING! READING THE FOLLOWING MAY LEAD TO NARCOLEPSY....When I got to school (WSCC) on the first day of 1980, I immediately started looking for ways of making money. It shortly led to an apartment complex in North PDX. I found 14 people living in a one bedroom apartment, with mattresses and belongings (what few were to be found) strewn neatly about. All of these folks, from infants to elders, were Hmong refugees (that would be the "boat people"). In fact, the whole apartment complex were Hmong. With only a few younger members speaking English, no one was working yet. I needed piece workers for a product that I was developing to be sold at wholesale gift shows for the retail market. Skip ahead three years.... I averaged $60K a year of gross income during that time, and a lot of it went to those piece workers. I continued the biz for another two years as I sat waiting for patients to call and discover me. Then I gave the equipment we had been using to the involved Hmong for their own use.These "worry warts" are exceptional. Their culture, which still has no written alphabet, is very traditional. The money each worker/family made was given in part to the elders (yup, all male), then disbursed to families in a pecking order this observer could not fathom. But, with other Hmong working other ways, within just a few more years, every person in that apartment complex had a house of their own, with their families. It worked for all of us.I know that many caught up in our misguided need to fight in Vietnam were victimized. But, I also know many PDX Hmong. Our connection is such that we will embrace one another when running into one another. I'm proud to treat many of these friends and their friends and families as well. Life goes on in present time only. We can learn from our past, take responsibility as needed for mistakes, and forgive one another; then, we can start with clean slates, putting aside all the past. It is our attitude toward one another, unclouded by selfish vested interests or prejudicedeyes, that allows civilization to go forward. Face-to-face, the reality of each person comes forward, overshadowing pre-conceptions, and we discover that we are very much alike after all. But, personal stories aside, the effort to link Vietnam with Iraq is seriously short-sighted, IMHO.I would suggest that the real danger to all of us is in the evolution of warfare, made worse by our now real-time ability to see one another on the planet as never before. Earthlings are learning that the role of the military as armed forces engaging another military of armed forces, with guidelines and agreed upon ways of conduct, is an anachronism. No one can stop an individual, or a small group of people, from committing violence against infrastructure or civilians. A guy with a shoulder launched rocket can drive his pickup out in the desert and shoot holes in the oil pipeline and have as much influence on world gas prices as any powerful broker, for hardly any cost at all. A few well placed explosives at critical junctions in the energy supply lines can disrupt power to whole regions of a nation. Low tech insurgency is the fourth generation of human warfare. The less you know about this, the more dangerous our times are. This devolution is the real future without a serious effort to raise the floor of all of humanity so that the interests of everyone lies in advancing civilization, rather than in tearing down what we have accomplished. In this regard, I would strongly suggest the following link for more information: http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/04/global_guerrill.htmlThat's today's post, but scan the pages for a complete history. Robb is a USAF Special Ops guru. Thanks for hanging in there, if you're still awake. Sears, DCNW PDX On Apr 24, 2008, at 11:42 AM, joe medlin wrote:"the horror of post-America Vietnam. " Enough said. Our prolonged intervention exacerbated the north's atrocities and spurned a more virulent hate for their southern brethren. The fact is that we did NOT win the war and our intervention would mean the end of countless Americans and Vietnamese. The country has certainly been successful in recent years which is a testament to the unflappable spirit of the people. There certainly was a time period following the war where a mass flight from the country took place. For many this was fear,uncertainty and lack of stability. This is not simply because the U.S withdrew. It is also not correct to believe that upon the American withdraw, the country immediately resumed it's nature of peace, freedom and enterprise. It was an absolutely destitute country. Poor. At least for the people living there who were Vietnamese. It does beg the question of what would have happened without American military troops actively participating in the war. Parallels between Iraq and Vietnam are few. Justification for continuing our reckless and nebulous occupation cannot be found in Vietnam. On the contrary the enemy in Viet was a government and Vietnamese. The enemy in Iraq isn't even Iraqi and actually evolved because of our occupation. Iraq is much less complicated than Vietnam in trying to decide whether to stay or leave. Our history in Vietnam shows that prolonged occupation doesn't necessarily lead to a win, and a win does not necessarily correlate to the future success of the country. History does indicate that Vietnam learned to be a thriving country. Lets hope that with an American withdraw, the Iraqi people will rise to do the same. An Awareness of our history should influence our leaders to not repeat the mistake of continuing a sacrifice of American (and others) lives for a winless endeavor with an uncertain outcome. ph Medlin DCSpine Tree Chiropracticwww.spinetreepdx.com Re: OT: Vietnam revisited Within a few years of the American pullout of Vietnam, my friends started going there on bicycle trips. Within a few more years, they were leading tours of others there on bikes as well. Now, Vietnam is a major tourist attraction, with some of the finest beaches and friendliest people in the world.Vietnam achieved around 8% annual GDP <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product> growth from 1990 to 1997 and continued at around 7% from 2000 to 2005, making it the world's second-fastest growing economy. Simultaneously, foreign investment <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_investment> grew threefold and domestic savings <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savings> quintupled. Vietnam is a relative new-comer to the oil business, but today it is the third-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia with output of 400,000 barrels per day. Vietnam is one of Asia's most open economies: two-way trade is around 160% of GDP, more than twice the ratio for China and over four times India's.[10] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam#cite_note-9> Vietnam was accepted into the WTO <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Organization> on November 7, 2006. Vietnam's chief trading partners include Japan, Australia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia>, ASEAN countries, the U.S. and Western European countries.More at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam#EconomyApparently the domino theory is just a kid's game, and not a strategy for foreign policy. What was the cost of our intervention into Vietnam, in terms of human life?http://members.aol.com/warlibrary/vwc0.htm Sears, DCNW PDX On Apr 21, 2008, at 5:24 PM, Abrahamson wrote:A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnamby SorleyThis book cracked open Soviet military archives now available to learn how close we came to winning the Vietnam war and why we failed to do so.We learned from our mistakes and taught the South how to protect themselves; we then set about bombing the chokepoints of the supply line thus starving the North’s armies. It shows that we had the north on the ropes and could have at least forced a strong and viable truce with the country divided like Korea.Had we done so, South Vietnam may have become a thriving economy and safe haven for Cambodians rather than the horrible killing field it became after the fall of the south. Germaine to the frighteningly similar situation in Iraq where we seem to be fighting a proxy war against a larger enemy.Those who don’t examine history are doomed to repeat it.See below. ( E. Abrahamson, D.C.)Chiropractic physicianLake Oswego Chiropractic Clinic315 Second StreetLake Oswego, OR 97034503-635-6246Website: http://www.lakeoswegochiro.comA Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedies of America's Last Years in VietnamBy: SorleyReviews Amazon.comThere was a moment when the United States had the Vietnam War wrapped up, writes military historian Sorley (biographer of two Vietnam-era U.S. Army generals, Creighton Abrams and Harold ). "The fighting wasn't over, but the war was won," he says in this convention-shaking book. "This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970." South Vietnam was ready to carry on the battle without American ground troops and only logistical and financial support. Sorley says that replacing General Westmoreland with Abrams in 1968 was the key. "The tactics changed within fifteen minutes of Abrams's taking command," remarked one officer. Abrams switched the war aims from destruction to control; he was less interested in counting enemy body bags than in securing South Vietnam's villages.A Better War is unique among histories of the VietnamWar in that it focuses on the second half of the conflict, roughly from Abrams's arrival to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Other volumes, such as Stanley Karnow's Vietnamand Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, tend to give short shrift to this period. Sorley shows how the often-overlooked Abrams strategy nearly succeeded--indeed, Sorley says it did succeed, at least until political leadership in the United States let victory slip away. Sorley cites other problems, too, such as low morale among troops in the field, plus the harmful effects of drug abuse, racial disharmony, and poor discipline. In the end, the mighty willpower of Abrams and diplomatic allies Ellsworth Bunker and Colby was not enough. But, with its strong case that they came pretty close to win! ning, A Better War is sure to spark controversy. -- J. The New York Times Book Review, Record...a comprehensive and long-overdue examination of the immediate post-Tet offensive years .... [sorley is a] first-rate historian.From Booklist , May 15, 1999The debate continues. Was the Vietnam War "lost" because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA official, leans toward the latter explanation. Sorley points out the considerable successes in prosecuting the ground war and "nation building" in the hamlets and cities. The triumvirate responsible for those successes was General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and the director of the pacification program, Colby. Sorley convincingly portrays them as both dedicated and wise, and he passionately argues that, given time and support, they could have achieved America's goal of a viable, non-Communist South Vie! tnam. Unfortunately, Sorley gives short shrift to counter arguments. Still, his points are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument. Jay FreemanCopyright© 1999, American Library Association. All rights reserved Jay Freeman, Booklist, 5/15/99the debate continues. Was the Vietnam War "lost" because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost due because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the Field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA Official, leans toward the latter explanation...His pints are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument.From Kirkus ReviewsA fawning paean to General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and former CIA chief Colby and their stewardship of the Vietnam Warfrom 1968 to 1975. The stab-in-the-back theory is alive and well in Sorleys (Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, 1992, etc.) heavily footnoted but biased and flawed analysis of the post-1968 Vietnam War. Sorley's heroes are Abrams, Bunker, Colby, and others who worked to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese. His villains are those he claims subverted that effort: Congress (especially Ted Kennedy), the antiwar movement (especially Jane Fonda), and the American media. In making this weak argument, Sorley lionizes virtually every action taken by his heroes and demonizes the actions of those he considers villains. His sections on Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media are brief, facile, and one-si! ded. His analyses of Abrams, Bunker, et al., are long, worshipful, and one-sided. Sorley contends that by late 1970 the Americans and South Vietnamese had won thewar, a victory snatched away by a defeatist Congress and abetted by the antiwar movement and the media, particularly Walter Cronkite. In focusing on the war's last eight years, Sorley sets out to right a wrong: Most of thebetter-known treatments of the Vietnam War, he says, as a whole have given relatively little consideration to these later years. But he sabotages his own argument by providing almost no background on the war, even though the US became involved in the area in 1950. He assesses the post-1968 period virtually in a vacuum. And what came before had a great deal to do with how thewar was prosecuted afterward, including the actions of those in Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media. A partisan, wholly! unconvincing attempt to explain the Communist victo ry in Vietnam. (16 pages b & w photos, not seen; 5 maps) -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. Book DescriptionWith exclusive access to highly classified material, an award-winning historian illuminates the Vietnam War. Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing on authoritative materials not previously available, including thousands of hours of tape-recorded allied councils of war, award-winning military historian Sorley has given us what has long been needed-an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these important years. Among his findings is that the war was being won on the ground even as it was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress. The story is a great human drama of purposeful and principled service in the face of an agonizing succession of lost opportunities, told with uncommon understanding and compass! ion. Sorley documents the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and-at least for a time-results between the early and the later war. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War is sure to stimulate controversy as it sheds brilliant new light on the war in Vietnam.SynopsisAn award-winning historian and former Army commander and CIA official illustrates the dramatic successes and final tragedy of the Vietnam War. 28 pages of photos. 7 maps.From the AuthorHow A Better War Came to Be Written: When General Creighton W. Abrams returned in 1972 to become Army Chief of Staff, he brought with him certain highly classified materials relating to his service in Vietnam. Then when, in the autumn of 1974, Abrams died while still in office, his successor, General Frederick C. Weyand, ordered that these materials be sequestered, with both their existence and location treated as classified information. Eventually, however, I learned of these materials from sources in the Army hierarchy who were friendly to my work. With the invaluable help of the Army's Chief of Military History, I was granted access to the "Abrams Special Collection" by the Army Chief of Staff (coincidentally the only Armor officer other than General Abrams to have held that post). After certain other agencies sharing a security interest in the materials concurred, I comme! nced research in these holdings. Thus began what turned out to be a year-long endeavor. The collection was housed in a secure facility at Carlisle Barracks, some two hours from where I resided. Beginning in May 1994 I departed home at 5:30 a.m. each Monday morning, getting to Carlisle Barracks by the time the vault opened for the day's business. There I typically spent a ten-hour day working with the materials until the vault closed in late afternoon. In the evenings I used the fine library of the U.S. Army WarCollege, also located at Carlisle Barracks. My home away from home for each week was a modest but friendly motel frequented primarily by drivers of eighteen-wheeler trucking rigs. Friday evenings I would, after the day's work, make my way back home. This routine continued for an entire year of weekdays, interrupted only by holidays and other occasions on which the vault was not open, and by a on! e-week respite for our family's annual beach outing. The heart of the collection turned out to be 455 tape recordings made at Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, during the four years General Abrams was in command. Of the old reel-to-reel variety, these tapes ran two to six hours in length, and I used up or wore out three ancient machines in the process of screening them all. Keeping these machines limping along or finding successors when they finally collapsed was no small part of the process. In the final weeks the last machine was kept going only through use of a wooden jig, inserted to hold the worn-out play lever in place. Listening to these tapes and making handwritten single-spaced notes that eventually ran to nearly 3,200 pages was a laborious and time-consuming process, but also a fascinating one, for I never knew what the next tape would reveal. What emerged was a portrait of a senior commander and his closest associates-something like Napoleon and his marshals-working together to prosecute a complex and challenging military campaign in an equally complex and difficult political context. The interchanges were candid, spirited, often funny, and included not only what were called the Weekly Intelligence Estimate Updates-Saturday morning sessions held at MACV Headquarters-but also many sessions conducted for such visitors as the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and consultant Sir . In May 1995, almost exactly a year after I began, my screening of these materials was complete. It took most of another year to get the notes through the mandatory declassification review process by the Army, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Even so I needed the absolutely invaluable assistance of three senior officers who are also v! alued and long-time friends to reach a favorable outcome.< BR> Once the cleared notes had been returned to me, it took over two months of more or less non-stop work to enter them-nearly 835,000 words in all-in a computer. Many other public records and private recollections yielded valuable research material. Over the past decade and a half I have interviewed about 500 people, many of them repeatedly, for this book and the two preceding biographies of Generals Creighton Abrams and Harold K. , some of them repeatedly, and worked my way through the papers of both men. Now, however, I was privileged to be the first researcher ever granted access to the fascinating, authentic, and extensive collection of materials on these tapes. Each day brought something new, and in the aggregate the story that emerged provided many new insights and much significant evidence concerning conduct of the war during the later years by Abrams, Bunker and Colby. It was a treasure trov! e indeed, so much so that it is my intention to publish an extensive volume of excerpts from the notes I compiled, thereby making available to other researchers the most interesting and historically significant portions of this rich historical record.The publisher, Harcourt Brace & Company , April 21, 1999 Praise for Sorley's A BETTER WAR"The story of how Creighton Abrams moved toward hisbetter war is one that must be told if ever we are to understand what happened to us as a nation in those tragic years. It will be a long time indeed before anyone tells that story better than it is set forth by Sorley in this magnificent book." -General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army (Retired)"The research supporting A BETTER WAR is the best I have seen on the conflict in Vietnam, [and] Sorley's insight and analysis far surpass other books about the war. He makes clear that, had we stayed the course, a different story would have evolved, but the brutal fact is that at the critical point we abandoned our ally."-General Bruce A. Palmer, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired)"A masterful treatment of military realities and court intrigue; of strategic competence and political betrayal. Carefully researched and exactingly detailed, there are revelations on every page." - M. Del Vecchio"Bob Sorley, working with newly discovered documentation, has illuminated in this fine book the historically neglected final four years of the Vietnam conflict. In the process he has found a number of surprises, and he's done a great service to history and to all those who fought in this tragic episode. This book fills a gap among the half-dozen key volumes essential for understanding the Vietnam War."-General R. Galvin, Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe"A compelling narrative and a powerful antidote to the self-justifying myth that the Vietnam War was "unwinnable." By 1972, when Creighton Abrams departed from Vietnam, the Viet Cong had been decimated and the North Vietnamese military effectively neutralized. That advantageous position was subsequently squandered in large part through our own actions-for by then too many had developed a vested interest in seeing South Vietnam defeated."- Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense"A BETTER WAR is a revelation, and too often a heartbreaking one."-Rob Cowley, Editor MHQ: Military History Quarterly"In his illuminating narrative of Creighton Abram's war, Sorley has deployed all his talents as historian and storyteller. A BETTER WAR reaffirms the strength of Abram's spirit and vision as well as his undeniable accomplishments in the face of enormous obstacles."-W.E.B. " Sorley has done a great job making sense out of a complex piece of history. I'd classify it "compulsory reading" for anyone who wants to understand the American involvement in Vietnam."-General W. Vessey, U.S. Army (Retired)"[A BETTER WAR] does much to fill an important gap, and does so on the basis of authentic, primary source material. As a result it provides a far truer understanding of the "second half" of the Vietnam War than we have seen before, and brings out with clarity how it was ultimately caused to end in defeat. The author is to be commended for his initiative in opening up the records of the MACV weekly updates, and for a work of unique value with information well beyond anything previously available."-General J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army (Retired) Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted April 29, 2008 Report Share Posted April 29, 2008 Violence is not history's only lesson, friend. Sears, DCNW PDX On Apr 28, 2008, at 10:46 AM, Abrahamson wrote: For some people, history began this morning. ( E. Abrahamson, D.C.) Chiropractic physician Lake Oswego Chiropractic Clinic 315 Second Street Lake Oswego, OR 97034 503-635-6246 Website: http://www.lakeoswegochiro.com From: Sears <dm.bones@...> Date: Sat, 26 Apr 2008 11:28:30 -0700 joe medlin <spinetree@...> Cc: Abrahamson <drscott@...>, ChiroListServe Chiropractors <Oregondcs > Subject: Re: OT: Vietnam revisited WARNING! READING THE FOLLOWING MAY LEAD TO NARCOLEPSY.... When I got to school (WSCC) on the first day of 1980, I immediately started looking for ways of making money. It shortly led to an apartment complex in North PDX. I found 14 people living in a one bedroom apartment, with mattresses and belongings (what few were to be found) strewn neatly about. All of these folks, from infants to elders, were Hmong refugees (that would be the "boat people"). In fact, the whole apartment complex were Hmong. With only a few younger members speaking English, no one was working yet. I needed piece workers for a product that I was developing to be sold at wholesale gift shows for the retail market. Skip ahead three years.... I averaged $60K a year of gross income during that time, and a lot of it went to those piece workers. I continued the biz for another two years as I sat waiting for patients to call and discover me. Then I gave the equipment we had been using to the involved Hmong for their own use. These "worry warts" are exceptional. Their culture, which still has no written alphabet, is very traditional. The money each worker/family made was given in part to the elders (yup, all male), then disbursed to families in a pecking order this observer could not fathom. But, with other Hmong working other ways, within just a few more years, every person in that apartment complex had a house of their own, with their families. It worked for all of us. I know that many caught up in our misguided need to fight in Vietnam were victimized. But, I also know many PDX Hmong. Our connection is such that we will embrace one another when running into one another. I'm proud to treat many of these friends and their friends and families as well. Life goes on in present time only. We can learn from our past, take responsibility as needed for mistakes, and forgive one another; then, we can start with clean slates, putting aside all the past. It is our attitude toward one another, unclouded by selfish vested interests or prejudiced eyes, that allows civilization to go forward. Face-to-face, the reality of each person comes forward, overshadowing pre-conceptions, and we discover that we are very much alike after all. But, personal stories aside, the effort to link Vietnam with Iraq is seriously short-sighted, IMHO. I would suggest that the real danger to all of us is in the evolution of warfare, made worse by our now real-time ability to see one another on the planet as never before. Earthlings are learning that the role of the military as armed forces engaging another military of armed forces, with guidelines and agreed upon ways of conduct, is an anachronism. No one can stop an individual, or a small group of people, from committing violence against infrastructure or civilians. A guy with a shoulder launched rocket can drive his pickup out in the desert and shoot holes in the oil pipeline and have as much influence on world gas prices as any powerful broker, for hardly any cost at all. A few well placed explosives at critical junctions in the energy supply lines can disrupt power to whole regions of a nation. Low tech insurgency is the fourth generation of human warfare. The less you know about this, the more dangerous our times are. This devolution is the real future without a serious effort to raise the floor of all of humanity so that the interests of everyone lies in advancing civilization, rather than in tearing down what we have accomplished. In this regard, I would strongly suggest the following link for more information: http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/04/global_guerrill.html That's today's post, but scan the pages for a complete history. Robb is a USAF Special Ops guru. Thanks for hanging in there, if you're still awake. Sears, DC NW PDX On Apr 24, 2008, at 11:42 AM, joe medlin wrote: "the horror of post-America Vietnam. " Enough said. Our prolonged intervention exacerbated the north's atrocities and spurned a more virulent hate for their southern brethren. The fact is that we did NOT win the war and our intervention would mean the end of countless Americans and Vietnamese. The country has certainly been successful in recent years which is a testament to the unflappable spirit of the people. There certainly was a time period following the war where a mass flight from the country took place. For many this was fear,uncertainty and lack of stability. This is not simply because the U.S withdrew. It is also not correct to believe that upon the American withdraw, the country immediately resumed it's nature of peace, freedom and enterprise. It was an absolutely destitute country. Poor. At least for the people living there who were Vietnamese. It does beg the question of what would have happened without American military troops actively participating in the war. Parallels between Iraq and Vietnam are few. Justification for continuing our reckless and nebulous occupation cannot be found in Vietnam. On the contrary the enemy in Viet was a government and Vietnamese. The enemy in Iraq isn't even Iraqi and actually evolved because of our occupation. Iraq is much less complicated than Vietnam in trying to decide whether to stay or leave. Our history in Vietnam shows that prolonged occupation doesn't necessarily lead to a win, and a win does not necessarily correlate to the future success of the country. History does indicate that Vietnam learned to be a thriving country. Lets hope that with an American withdraw, the Iraqi people will rise to do the same. An Awareness of our history should influence our leaders to not repeat the mistake of continuing a sacrifice of American (and others) lives for a winless endeavor with an uncertain outcome. ph Medlin DC Spine Tree Chiropractic www.spinetreepdx.com <http://www.spinetreepdx.com> Re: OT: Vietnam revisited Within a few years of the American pullout of Vietnam, my friends started going there on bicycle trips. Within a few more years, they were leading tours of others there on bikes as well. Now, Vietnam is a major tourist attraction, with some of the finest beaches and friendliest people in the world. Vietnam achieved around 8% annual GDP <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_domestic_product> growth from 1990 to 1997 and continued at around 7% from 2000 to 2005, making it the world's second-fastest growing economy. Simultaneously, foreign investment <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_investment> grew threefold and domestic savings <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savings> quintupled. Vietnam is a relative new-comer to the oil business, but today it is the third-largest oil producer in Southeast Asia with output of 400,000 barrels per day. Vietnam is one of Asia's most open economies: two-way trade is around 160% of GDP, more than twice the ratio for China and over four times India's.[10] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam#cite_note-9> Vietnam was accepted into the WTO <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Organization> on November 7, 2006. Vietnam's chief trading partners include Japan, Australia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia>, ASEAN countries, the U.S. and Western European countries. More at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam#Economy Apparently the domino theory is just a kid's game, and not a strategy for foreign policy. What was the cost of our intervention into Vietnam, in terms of human life? http://members.aol.com/warlibrary/vwc0.htm Sears, DC NW PDX On Apr 21, 2008, at 5:24 PM, Abrahamson wrote: A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam by Sorley This book cracked open Soviet military archives now available to learn how close we came to winning the Vietnam war and why we failed to do so. We learned from our mistakes and taught the South how to protect themselves; we then set about bombing the chokepoints of the supply line thus starving the North’s armies. It shows that we had the north on the ropes and could have at least forced a strong and viable truce with the country divided like Korea. Had we done so, South Vietnam may have become a thriving economy and safe haven for Cambodians rather than the horrible killing field it became after the fall of the south. Germaine to the frighteningly similar situation in Iraq where we seem to be fighting a proxy war against a larger enemy. Those who don’t examine history are doomed to repeat it. See below. ( E. Abrahamson, D.C.) Chiropractic physician Lake Oswego Chiropractic Clinic 315 Second Street Lake Oswego, OR 97034 503-635-6246 Website: http://www.lakeoswegochiro.com A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedies of America's Last Years in Vietnam By: Sorley Reviews Amazon.com There was a moment when the United States had the Vietnam War wrapped up, writes military historian Sorley (biographer of two Vietnam-era U.S. Army generals, Creighton Abrams and Harold ). "The fighting wasn't over, but the war was won," he says in this convention-shaking book. "This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970." South Vietnam was ready to carry on the battle without American ground troops and only logistical and financial support. Sorley says that replacing General Westmoreland with Abrams in 1968 was the key. "The tactics changed within fifteen minutes of Abrams's taking command," remarked one officer. Abrams switched the war aims from destruction to control; he was less interested in counting enemy body bags than in securing South Vietnam's villages. A Better War is unique among histories of the VietnamWar in that it focuses on the second half of the conflict, roughly from Abrams's arrival to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Other volumes, such as Stanley Karnow's Vietnamand Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, tend to give short shrift to this period. Sorley shows how the often-overlooked Abrams strategy nearly succeeded--indeed, Sorley says it did succeed, at least until political leadership in the United States let victory slip away. Sorley cites other problems, too, such as low morale among troops in the field, plus the harmful effects of drug abuse, racial disharmony, and poor discipline. In the end, the mighty willpower of Abrams and diplomatic allies Ellsworth Bunker and Colby was not enough. But, with its strong case that they came pretty close to win! ning, A Better War is sure to spark controversy. -- J. The New York Times Book Review, Record ...a comprehensive and long-overdue examination of the immediate post-Tet offensive years .... [sorley is a] first-rate historian. From Booklist , May 15, 1999 The debate continues. Was the Vietnam War "lost" because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA official, leans toward the latter explanation. Sorley points out the considerable successes in prosecuting the ground war and "nation building" in the hamlets and cities. The triumvirate responsible for those successes was General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and the director of the pacification program, Colby. Sorley convincingly portrays them as both dedicated and wise, and he passionately argues that, given time and support, they could have achieved America's goal of a viable, non-Communist South Vie! tnam. Unfortunately, Sorley gives short shrift to counter arguments. Still, his points are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument. Jay Freeman Copyright© 1999, American Library Association. All rights reserved Jay Freeman, Booklist, 5/15/99 the debate continues. Was the Vietnam War "lost" because of a failed national policy that refused to recognize Vietnamese Communism as a legitimate nationalist movement, or was it lost due because of the spinelessness and meddling of Washington politicians who undermined brave Americans and South Vietnamese in the Field? Sorley, a West Pointer and former CIA Official, leans toward the latter explanation...His pints are well supported by reliance on newly available source material, and he makes a strong contribution to our unending national argument. From Kirkus Reviews A fawning paean to General Creighton Abrams, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and former CIA chief Colby and their stewardship of the Vietnam Warfrom 1968 to 1975. The stab-in-the-back theory is alive and well in Sorleys (Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times, 1992, etc.) heavily footnoted but biased and flawed analysis of the post-1968 Vietnam War. Sorley's heroes are Abrams, Bunker, Colby, and others who worked to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese. His villains are those he claims subverted that effort: Congress (especially Ted Kennedy), the antiwar movement (especially Jane Fonda), and the American media. In making this weak argument, Sorley lionizes virtually every action taken by his heroes and demonizes the actions of those he considers villains. His sections on Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media are brief, facile, and one-si! ded. His analyses of Abrams, Bunker, et al., are long, worshipful, and one-sided. Sorley contends that by late 1970 the Americans and South Vietnamese had won thewar, a victory snatched away by a defeatist Congress and abetted by the antiwar movement and the media, particularly Walter Cronkite. In focusing on the war's last eight years, Sorley sets out to right a wrong: Most of thebetter-known treatments of the Vietnam War, he says, as a whole have given relatively little consideration to these later years. But he sabotages his own argument by providing almost no background on the war, even though the US became involved in the area in 1950. He assesses the post-1968 period virtually in a vacuum. And what came before had a great deal to do with how thewar was prosecuted afterward, including the actions of those in Congress, the antiwar movement, and the media. A partisan, wholly! unconvincing attempt to explain the Communist victo ry in Vietnam. (16 pages b & w photos, not seen; 5 maps) -- Copyright ©1999, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. Book Description With exclusive access to highly classified material, an award-winning historian illuminates the Vietnam War. Neglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing on authoritative materials not previously available, including thousands of hours of tape-recorded allied councils of war, award-winning military historian Sorley has given us what has long been needed-an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these important years. Among his findings is that the war was being won on the ground even as it was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress. The story is a great human drama of purposeful and principled service in the face of an agonizing succession of lost opportunities, told with uncommon understanding and compass! ion. Sorley documents the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and-at least for a time-results between the early and the later war. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War is sure to stimulate controversy as it sheds brilliant new light on the war in Vietnam. Synopsis An award-winning historian and former Army commander and CIA official illustrates the dramatic successes and final tragedy of the Vietnam War. 28 pages of photos. 7 maps. From the Author How A Better War Came to Be Written: When General Creighton W. Abrams returned in 1972 to become Army Chief of Staff, he brought with him certain highly classified materials relating to his service in Vietnam. Then when, in the autumn of 1974, Abrams died while still in office, his successor, General Frederick C. Weyand, ordered that these materials be sequestered, with both their existence and location treated as classified information. Eventually, however, I learned of these materials from sources in the Army hierarchy who were friendly to my work. With the invaluable help of the Army's Chief of Military History, I was granted access to the "Abrams Special Collection" by the Army Chief of Staff (coincidentally the only Armor officer other than General Abrams to have held that post). After certain other agencies sharing a security interest in the materials concurred, I comme! nced research in these holdings. Thus began what turned out to be a year-long endeavor. The collection was housed in a secure facility at Carlisle Barracks, some two hours from where I resided. Beginning in May 1994 I departed home at 5:30 a.m. each Monday morning, getting to Carlisle Barracks by the time the vault opened for the day's business. There I typically spent a ten-hour day working with the materials until the vault closed in late afternoon. In the evenings I used the fine library of the U.S. Army WarCollege, also located at Carlisle Barracks. My home away from home for each week was a modest but friendly motel frequented primarily by drivers of eighteen-wheeler trucking rigs. Friday evenings I would, after the day's work, make my way back home. This routine continued for an entire year of weekdays, interrupted only by holidays and other occasions on which the vault was not open, and by a on! e-week respite for our family's annual beach outing. The heart of the collection turned out to be 455 tape recordings made at Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, during the four years General Abrams was in command. Of the old reel-to-reel variety, these tapes ran two to six hours in length, and I used up or wore out three ancient machines in the process of screening them all. Keeping these machines limping along or finding successors when they finally collapsed was no small part of the process. In the final weeks the last machine was kept going only through use of a wooden jig, inserted to hold the worn-out play lever in place. Listening to these tapes and making handwritten single-spaced notes that eventually ran to nearly 3,200 pages was a laborious and time-consuming process, but also a fascinating one, for I never knew what the next tape would reveal. What emerged was a portrait of a senior commander and his closest associates-something like Napoleon and his marshals-working together to prosecute a complex and challenging military campaign in an equally complex and difficult political context. The interchanges were candid, spirited, often funny, and included not only what were called the Weekly Intelligence Estimate Updates-Saturday morning sessions held at MACV Headquarters-but also many sessions conducted for such visitors as the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and consultant Sir . In May 1995, almost exactly a year after I began, my screening of these materials was complete. It took most of another year to get the notes through the mandatory declassification review process by the Army, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Even so I needed the absolutely invaluable assistance of three senior officers who are also v! alued and long-time friends to reach a favorable outcome.< BR> Once the cleared notes had been returned to me, it took over two months of more or less non-stop work to enter them-nearly 835,000 words in all-in a computer. Many other public records and private recollections yielded valuable research material. Over the past decade and a half I have interviewed about 500 people, many of them repeatedly, for this book and the two preceding biographies of Generals Creighton Abrams and Harold K. , some of them repeatedly, and worked my way through the papers of both men. Now, however, I was privileged to be the first researcher ever granted access to the fascinating, authentic, and extensive collection of materials on these tapes. Each day brought something new, and in the aggregate the story that emerged provided many new insights and much significant evidence concerning conduct of the war during the later years by Abrams, Bunker and Colby. It was a treasure trov! e indeed, so much so that it is my intention to publish an extensive volume of excerpts from the notes I compiled, thereby making available to other researchers the most interesting and historically significant portions of this rich historical record. The publisher, Harcourt Brace & Company , April 21, 1999 Praise for Sorley's A BETTER WAR "The story of how Creighton Abrams moved toward hisbetter war is one that must be told if ever we are to understand what happened to us as a nation in those tragic years. It will be a long time indeed before anyone tells that story better than it is set forth by Sorley in this magnificent book." -General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army (Retired) "The research supporting A BETTER WAR is the best I have seen on the conflict in Vietnam, [and] Sorley's insight and analysis far surpass other books about the war. He makes clear that, had we stayed the course, a different story would have evolved, but the brutal fact is that at the critical point we abandoned our ally."-General Bruce A. Palmer, Jr., U.S. Army (Retired) "A masterful treatment of military realities and court intrigue; of strategic competence and political betrayal. Carefully researched and exactingly detailed, there are revelations on every page." - M. Del Vecchio "Bob Sorley, working with newly discovered documentation, has illuminated in this fine book the historically neglected final four years of the Vietnam conflict. In the process he has found a number of surprises, and he's done a great service to history and to all those who fought in this tragic episode. This book fills a gap among the half-dozen key volumes essential for understanding the Vietnam War."-General R. Galvin, Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe "A compelling narrative and a powerful antidote to the self-justifying myth that the Vietnam War was "unwinnable." By 1972, when Creighton Abrams departed from Vietnam, the Viet Cong had been decimated and the North Vietnamese military effectively neutralized. That advantageous position was subsequently squandered in large part through our own actions-for by then too many had developed a vested interest in seeing South Vietnam defeated."- Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense "A BETTER WAR is a revelation, and too often a heartbreaking one."-Rob Cowley, Editor MHQ: Military History Quarterly "In his illuminating narrative of Creighton Abram's war, Sorley has deployed all his talents as historian and storyteller. A BETTER WAR reaffirms the strength of Abram's spirit and vision as well as his undeniable accomplishments in the face of enormous obstacles."-W.E.B. " Sorley has done a great job making sense out of a complex piece of history. I'd classify it "compulsory reading" for anyone who wants to understand the American involvement in Vietnam."-General W. Vessey, U.S. Army (Retired) "[A BETTER WAR] does much to fill an important gap, and does so on the basis of authentic, primary source material. As a result it provides a far truer understanding of the "second half" of the Vietnam War than we have seen before, and brings out with clarity how it was ultimately caused to end in defeat. The author is to be commended for his initiative in opening up the records of the MACV weekly updates, and for a work of unique value with information well beyond anything previously available."-General J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army (Retired) Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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