Why Tora Bora was lost

[Guest guest]

I took a break from reading about the Confederacy's financial problems to read a book about the Battle of Tora Bora as told by one of the Special Operations commanders who was on scene. It is little wonder that Bin Laden managed to escape, even though it was believed to have been a very close run thing. I'm not going to give a review or chapter by chapter thing, but rather an overview.

To start with, the mission was launched with great speed. Green Berets, Delta and CIA were in country within days of 9/11 doing recon and making contacts with the local opposition to the Taliban. A lot of cash began changing hands and a lot of diplomacy went on. Unfortunately, as they would later learn, Afghani diplomacy and culture was very different than Western forms and allies didn't always stay bought, nor did they live up to expectations.

A little geography. Tora Bora was not some single peak but was an area of several square miles and many peaks and countless ridges, cliffs and valleys. All of this was rocky with scattered trees and hard to get around in, sometimes taking hours to cover a mile. Add to this that much of it was around 10,000 feet and this was during winter. The locals couldn't read maps and couldn't point out friendly or enemy positions anyway because they didn't know most of the time. They knew their way around because it was their home, but they couldn't point at a map and say "they are there." Even some of the US forces got the mountains wrong and called wrong coordinates for airstrikes, killing some "friendlies."

Here is some of the insanity they had to operate with.

First off, the Afghan warlords and their troops were supposed to do the ground fighting. Our troops were to call down bombs and such without being seen by the many reporters running around, or making their presence too known because that would diminish the various warlords in their people's eyes and cause political problems. They were also pressured to not get hurt for fear the American people would freak out if Americans got killed over there.

Now, with this in mind, our forces wanted to get in close to do the best job of directing bombs as they could. However, the warlords at first didn't want them getting too close for fear they might get hurt or killed, which would make them, the warlords, look bad and they might lose some of the money they were getting from CIA.

To make things worse, someone way up the command chain was playing a game. By the time the Battle of Tora Bora got started, a ruse was pulled where the Rangers and other overt US forces were withdrawn from the area, being more than 2 hours away by helicopter, which made them not much of a reaction force. Aircraft like attack helicopters and even fixed wing fighters were also pulled back, making them have to fly much further to get into the battle zone.

This left the Special Operations guys to rely on the Afghans for a Quick Reaction Force. This was deemed OK since the Muhj has a reputation for fierce fighters because of the resistance to the Russians. Reality was rather different. Their idea of fighting was to go toward the enemy, exchange a high volume of not well aimed fire at distance and then leave the field for the night. Sometimes they gained some ground, especially with bombs prepping the way, but they would stop to loot any caves or bodies they found and would still leave the captured ground at night, allowing Al Qaida to take it back without a fight.

These local troops were reluctant to seriously carry the fight to Al Qaida in part because of their reputation and the fact that this mountain had been bin Laden's home for 10 years during the Russian Occupation. It was full of caves and bunkers that were professionally prepared by trained engineers and we well stocked with all manner of supplies. Fighting had been going on here for some time but no headway had been gained.

The Americans and their British allies wanted to press the fight all the time. They wanted to take ground and hold it at night and even to continue the attack at night. The locals would have none of that, though a few did come around toward the end of the battle. Once our troops got clearance to push further into the mountains, they really started to hurt Al Qaida. That spurred on the locals somewhat, but not a lot, at least not until it was pretty clear Al Qaida was whipped.

Another big problem was that our local allies weren't all trustworthy. There were many spies in their ranks, some of which were caught and some suspects kept at arm's length. The various leaders spent a lot of time bickering over who would do what, trying to upstage each other and so on. It is also possible that at least one was bribed by bin Laden to allow him to escape.

What is interesting is that as the campaign progressed that our radio intercepts could hear them becoming more and more despondent from the constant bombing, especially once the troops got in close enough to call it down at night. They even heard bin Laden himself go from being confident, to despairing, to calling for the people to arm their women and children to fight, and finally apologizing to his fighters for getting them into this mess and allowing them to surrender. The surrender thing might have been a ploy to buy him time to escape and that broadcast might have been taped earlier then played over their radio network.

The Americans and British wanted to push the offensive hard and smash Al Qaida while it was weak, but they didn't have the forces and the locals weren't game for it.

Additionally:

There were times when the weather was too bad for aircraft to operate. The men on the ground asked for some Rangers to be brought up from the rear and bring mortars with them. Al Qaida had been using mortars to good effect. This was denied by higher ups.

Supply was a real problem since vehicles couldn't get to all places and donkeys could only do so much. Attempts were made using locals as porters, but many would disappear, taking their loads (loot) with them. Again it was requested that some Rangers be brought up to act as porters, but this too was denied.

Helicopters couldn't safely be used because the terrain was so close that finding level ground even as small as a football field was nearly impossible and it would have been nothing for the enemy to shoot from ridgelines to bring down the hovering or landed birds. This did, in fact, happen later in other places.

One of the biggest problems was that the Afghanistan/Pakistan border ran along some of the highest ridges. US troops like Rangers or Green Berets could have been used to block the passes from the Pakistani side, but the US Government decided for political reasons to trust the Pakis to do that. As you can guess, the ground forces were furious about this and surely this is how bin Laden managed to get away.

These were just some of the problems encountered. It isn't easy to condense a 300 page book down to a manageable post.

Suffice it to say though that the mission was to kill bin Laden and find proof, A picture, DNA in the form of blood or body parts. This was never found and it later turned out that bin Laden got away anyway. The only good thing was that he had said he would fight to the end and that his "fortress" could not be taken, but he was run off in a few days. Because of that he lost a good bit of his credibility.

Lastly, is a report about bin Laden's voice over the radio. It was described as "beautiful, soothing, and peaceful," like he was giving sermons. Sound familiar? Just another smooth talking, charismatic bad guy hustling the faithful.

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[Guest guest]

" These were just some of the problems encountered. It isn't easy to

condense a 300 page book down to a manageable post. "

You've done a really good job of doing so though :-)

>

> I took a break from reading about the Confederacy's financial

problems to

> read a book about the Battle of Tora Bora as told by one of the

Special

> Operations commanders who was on scene. It is little wonder that

Bin Laden managed

> to escape, even though it was believed to have been a very close

run thing.

> I'm not going to give a review or chapter by chapter thing, but

rather an

> overview.

>

> To start with, the mission was launched with great speed. Green

Berets,

> Delta and CIA were in country within days of 9/11 doing recon and

making contacts

> with the local opposition to the Taliban. A lot of cash began

changing hands

> and a lot of diplomacy went on. Unfortunately, as they would later

learn,

> Afghani diplomacy and culture was very different than Western forms

and allies

> didn't always stay bought, nor did they live up to expectations.

>

> A little geography. Tora Bora was not some single peak but was an

area of

> several square miles and many peaks and countless ridges, cliffs

and valleys.

> All of this was rocky with scattered trees and hard to get around

in, sometimes

> taking hours to cover a mile. Add to this that much of it was

around 10,000

> feet and this was during winter. The locals couldn't read maps and

couldn't

> point out friendly or enemy positions anyway because they didn't

know most of

> the time. They knew their way around because it was their home,

but they

> couldn't point at a map and say " they are there. " Even some of the

US forces got

> the mountains wrong and called wrong coordinates for airstrikes,

killing some

> " friendlies. "

>

> Here is some of the insanity they had to operate with.

>

> First off, the Afghan warlords and their troops were supposed to do

the

> ground fighting. Our troops were to call down bombs and such

without being seen

> by the many reporters running around, or making their presence too

known

> because that would diminish the various warlords in their people's

eyes and cause

> political problems. They were also pressured to not get hurt for

fear the

> American people would freak out if Americans got killed over there.

>

> Now, with this in mind, our forces wanted to get in close to do the

best job

> of directing bombs as they could. However, the warlords at first

didn't want

> them getting too close for fear they might get hurt or killed,

which would

> make them, the warlords, look bad and they might lose some of the

money they

> were getting from CIA.

>

> To make things worse, someone way up the command chain was playing

a game.

> By the time the Battle of Tora Bora got started, a ruse was pulled

where the

> Rangers and other overt US forces were withdrawn from the area,

being more than

> 2 hours away by helicopter, which made them not much of a reaction

force.

> Aircraft like attack helicopters and even fixed wing fighters were

also pulled

> back, making them have to fly much further to get into the battle

zone.

>

> This left the Special Operations guys to rely on the Afghans for a

Quick

> Reaction Force. This was deemed OK since the Muhj has a reputation

for fierce

> fighters because of the resistance to the Russians. Reality was

rather

> different. Their idea of fighting was to go toward the enemy,

exchange a high volume

> of not well aimed fire at distance and then leave the field for

the night.

> Sometimes they gained some ground, especially with bombs prepping

the way, but

> they would stop to loot any caves or bodies they found and would

still leave

> the captured ground at night, allowing Al Qaida to take it back

without a

> fight.

>

> These local troops were reluctant to seriously carry the fight to

Al Qaida

> in part because of their reputation and the fact that this mountain

had been

> bin Laden's home for 10 years during the Russian Occupation. It

was full of

> caves and bunkers that were professionally prepared by trained

engineers and we

> well stocked with all manner of supplies. Fighting had been going

on here for

> some time but no headway had been gained.

>

> The Americans and their British allies wanted to press the fight

all the

> time. They wanted to take ground and hold it at night and even to

continue the

> attack at night. The locals would have none of that, though a few

did come

> around toward the end of the battle. Once our troops got clearance

to push

> further into the mountains, they really started to hurt Al Qaida.

That spurred on

> the locals somewhat, but not a lot, at least not until it was

pretty clear Al

> Qaida was whipped.

>

> Another big problem was that our local allies weren't all

trustworthy. There

> were many spies in their ranks, some of which were caught and some

suspects

> kept at arm's length. The various leaders spent a lot of time

bickering over

> who would do what, trying to upstage each other and so on. It is

also

> possible that at least one was bribed by bin Laden to allow him to

escape.

>

> What is interesting is that as the campaign progressed that our

radio

> intercepts could hear them becoming more and more despondent from

the constant

> bombing, especially once the troops got in close enough to call it

down at night.

> They even heard bin Laden himself go from being confident, to

despairing, to

> calling for the people to arm their women and children to fight,

and finally

> apologizing to his fighters for getting them into this mess and

allowing them

> to surrender. The surrender thing might have been a ploy to buy

him time to

> escape and that broadcast might have been taped earlier then

played over

> their radio network.

>

> The Americans and British wanted to push the offensive hard and

smash Al

> Qaida while it was weak, but they didn't have the forces and the

locals weren't

> game for it.

>

> Additionally:

>

> There were times when the weather was too bad for aircraft to

operate. The

> men on the ground asked for some Rangers to be brought up from the

rear and

> bring mortars with them. Al Qaida had been using mortars to good

effect. This

> was denied by higher ups.

>

> Supply was a real problem since vehicles couldn't get to all places

and

> donkeys could only do so much. Attempts were made using locals as

porters, but

> many would disappear, taking their loads (loot) with them. Again it

was

> requested that some Rangers be brought up to act as porters, but

this too was

> denied.

>

> Helicopters couldn't safely be used because the terrain was so

close that

> finding level ground even as small as a football field was nearly

impossible and

> it would have been nothing for the enemy to shoot from ridgelines

to bring

> down the hovering or landed birds. This did, in fact, happen later

in other

> places.

>

> One of the biggest problems was that the Afghanistan/Pakistan

border ran

> along some of the highest ridges. US troops like Rangers or Green

Berets could

> have been used to block the passes from the Pakistani side, but the

US

> Government decided for political reasons to trust the Pakis to do

that. As you can

> guess, the ground forces were furious about this and surely this is

how bin

> Laden managed to get away.

>

> These were just some of the problems encountered. It isn't easy to

condense

> a 300 page book down to a manageable post.

>

> Suffice it to say though that the mission was to kill bin Laden and

find

> proof, A picture, DNA in the form of blood or body parts. This was

never found

> and it later turned out that bin Laden got away anyway. The only

good thing was

> that he had said he would fight to the end and that his " fortress "

could not

> be taken, but he was run off in a few days. Because of that he

lost a good

> bit of his credibility.

>

> Lastly, is a report about bin Laden's voice over the radio. It was

described

> as " beautiful, soothing, and peaceful, " like he was giving

sermons. Sound

> familiar? Just another smooth talking, charismatic bad guy hustling

the

> faithful.

>

>

>

> **************New MapQuest Local shows what's happening at your

destination.

> Dining, Movies, Events, News & more. Try it out

> (http://local.mapquest.com/?ncid=emlcntnew00000002)

>

[Guest guest]

" It was an interesting book, but it really makes you wonder what goes

through the minds of the senior generals and the politicians. "

It is hard to imagine, but I can imagine that for some it would be

extremely frustrating. Too much red tape, too much bureaucracy.

>

> Thanks . It was an interesting book, but it really makes you

wonder

> what goes through the minds of the senior generals and the

politicians.

>

> Shortly after the battle, the regular army started to take over

with all of

> its silly regulations and much tougher rules of engagement. Other

silly rules

> included things like not setting ambushes to take out bad guys

trying to

> place roadside bombs and mines. Troops still had to patrol, even

at night, and

> they knew the roads were being mined, at times 5 or 6 or more

places on one

> stretch of road, but they couldn't be proactive and stop these

people from doing

> it nor could they chase them back to their bases. Many troops were

lost

> because of these silly rules.

>

> Just the same in Iraq, our enemies learned our rules of engagement

and used

> them against us. They could do things like send an unarmed man out

to spot for

> the shooters, to direct their fire onto target, but we couldn't

shoot the

> guy because he was unarmed. That did change for brief periods

though, but never

> for long. That's just one example of how they use our rules

against us.

>

> I put a lot of the blame on the media being all around. The media

is very

> quick to jump on a story about civilian losses, but they don't

report how the

> terrorists would attack from civilian homes while holding the

family hostage,

> knowing that if the US used bombs, that some of the women and

children would

> die and that would make a big media story and hurt us. However, in

Afghanistan

> and somewhat in Iraq, the people are catching on and are running

away now

> when the bad guys come calling and more people are coming forward

to give

> information on them. This would have happened a lot sooner if not

for the press

> playing its games.

>

>