Re: CDC lab containing deadly virus suffers power outage (again)

[Guest guest]

This is ridiculous. We outsource everything else and then put a most

dangerous lab in a heavily populated area. Is this by design?

Barth

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t> CDC lab containing deadly virus suffers power outage

t> Atlanta Journal Constitution - GA*

t> By ALISON YOUNG

t> The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

t> Published on: 07/12/08

t> http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/dekalb/stories/2008/07/12/cdc_

t> power_outage.html

t> A laboratory building that contains a deadly strain of avian flu and

t> other germs is among four that lost power for more than an hour

t> Friday when a backup generator system failed again at the Centers

t> for Disease Control and Prevention.

t> The outage affected air flow systems in labs that help contain such

t> germs as the H5N1 flu virus, which some experts fear could cause a

t> pandemic. But there were no exposures to infectious agents, and

t> neither workers nor the public were at any risk, said CDC spokesman

t> Tom Skinner.

t> Recent lab Incidents

t> May 18, 2007: Blasting of granite by a CDC construction contractor

t> sent rock flying, shattering two exterior windows in Building 15,

t> including one on a floor 150 feet away from a maximum-containment

t> Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) lab that work with deadly germs such as

t> Ebola. Rocks also damaged windows at Building 17, about 50 feet away

t> from a high-containment Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) lab.

t> May 25, 2007: Nine workers were tested for possible exposure to Q

t> fever, a bioterror agent, after a ventilation system in Building 18

t> malfunctioned and pulled potentially contaminated air into a " clean "

t> corridor. Nobody was infected. Duct tape now seals the Q fever BSL-3

t> lab door in what CDC says is an added precaution until a new door is

t> installed.

t> June 15, 2007: A lightning strike knocked out power for an hour at

t> Building 18; backup generators did not come on. Nearby construction

t> work had damaged a key component of the building's grounding system.

t> Dec. 8, 2007: During a planned evacuation drill of Building 18's

t> labs that was designed to simulate a power outage, emergency lights

t> initially came on but failed after 10 minutes when a technician

t> inadvertently shut off a back-up power system, according to a CDC

t> after-action report obtained by the AJC.

t> Dec. 18, 2007: Building 18 had a real evacuation after its new

t> medical waste incinerator was started for a test and vented smoke

t> into the high-containment lab area. Excessive heat caused the

t> incinerator's bypass stack to tear away from its anchor bolts,

t> internal records show.

t> Friday: A bird caused a Georgia Power transformer to fail, knocking

t> out power to part of the CDC campus for about 1 hour 15 minutes.

t> Then CDC's backup generators failed to keep power on at four

t> buildings: the infectious disease lab Building 17, and offices in

t> Buildings 1, 3 and 20.

t> The outage is the latest in a string of mechanical and construction

t> incidents at labs on the agency's Clifton Road campus †" many in

t> new buildings that are part of a $1 billion construction plan.

t> Last summer, an hour-long power outage at a different CDC lab tower,

t> called Building 18, resulted in a congressional hearing. The

t> Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress,

t> is still examining safety at CDC's high-containment laboratories and

t> concerns raised years ago by agency engineers that CDC's backup

t> power system was likely to fail.

t> " It's important for people to understand that even though we lose

t> power to these facilities from time to time, worker safety and the

t> public's safety is not in jeopardy because multiple, redundant

t> systems are in place, separate from those that rely on power, "

t> Skinner said Saturday.

t> Around 5:40 p.m. Friday, a Georgia Power transformer failed, cutting

t> off electricity to part of the CDC campus. CDC's backup generators

t> initially came on, Skinner said. But then the system detected some

t> sort of power anomaly and shut itself off, cutting off backup power

t> to three buildings, he said.

t> The buildings affected were:

t> • Building 17, a newer infectious disease research lab building,

t> where scientists work with rabies, HIV, influenza and tuberculosis,

t> including extensively drug-resistant strains. The building has

t> Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) labs, which need electricity to maintain

t> negative airflow. This key safeguard helps contain germs by making

t> sure air is always being drawn into the lab and through special HEPA

t> filters before leaving the building. When power is lost, the lab has

t> neutral air that neither flows in or out.

t> • Building 20, a newer office building that also houses the

t> agency's fitness center.

t> • Building 1 and Building 3, antiquated attached office buildings

t> from about 1959.

t> Information about whether any labs were in use at the time of the

t> outage was not immediately available Saturday, Skinner said.

t> " This happened late in the day and there were not many employees

t> still in the buildings, " Skinner said. " Those in the buildings

t> evacuated without incident. "

t> The power was out for about 1 hour 15 minutes, Skinner said, and was

t> restored when Georgia Power fixed the transformer problem.

t> A bird caused the blown Georgia Power transformer, said power

t> company spokesman Jeff .

t> CDC officials did not attempt to override and restart the agency's

t> backup generators because they didn't know what the anomaly was that

t> shut them down, Skinner said.

t> Skinner also said there was no power disruption at Building 18, the

t> $214 million Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory that suffered

t> the hour-long outage last summer.

t> The AJC reported last summer that government construction engineers

t> had warned since 2001 that CDC's planned design for its centralized

t> backup power generation system would not keep crucial lab systems

t> from failing in an outage.

t> " I've been saying this for over three years now, but having the

t> generators in this configuration gives us no protection whatsoever

t> from many types of failures, " CDC mechanical engineer nie West

t> wrote in an August 2003 e-mail to agency officials, one of several

t> reviewed by the AJC.

t> CDC officials have said that despite West's concerns, the consensus

t> of experts was that a centralized generator farm was better than

t> having individual units at buildings.

t> Skinner emphasized that the CDC has many other physical barriers to

t> contain germs that don't require electricity. They include safety

t> cabinets and layers of rooms, filters and corridors between the

t> germs and the outdoors.

t> " I think people need to know we're talking about an enormous campus

t> with complex systems, and we're never going to be able to fully

t> eliminate power outages, " Skinner said. " That's impossible. The key

t> for us is to minimize the duration of the outage. "

t> To reach staff writer Alison Young, call 404-526-7372.