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CDC lab containing deadly virus suffers power outage (again)

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CDC lab containing deadly virus suffers power outage

Atlanta Journal Constitution - GA*

By ALISON YOUNG

The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

Published on: 07/12/08

http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/dekalb/stories/2008/07/12/cdc_

power_outage.html

A laboratory building that contains a deadly strain of avian flu and

other germs is among four that lost power for more than an hour

Friday when a backup generator system failed again at the Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention.

The outage affected air flow systems in labs that help contain such

germs as the H5N1 flu virus, which some experts fear could cause a

pandemic. But there were no exposures to infectious agents, and

neither workers nor the public were at any risk, said CDC spokesman

Tom Skinner.

Recent lab Incidents

May 18, 2007: Blasting of granite by a CDC construction contractor

sent rock flying, shattering two exterior windows in Building 15,

including one on a floor 150 feet away from a maximum-containment

Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) lab that work with deadly germs such as

Ebola. Rocks also damaged windows at Building 17, about 50 feet away

from a high-containment Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) lab.

May 25, 2007: Nine workers were tested for possible exposure to Q

fever, a bioterror agent, after a ventilation system in Building 18

malfunctioned and pulled potentially contaminated air into a " clean "

corridor. Nobody was infected. Duct tape now seals the Q fever BSL-3

lab door in what CDC says is an added precaution until a new door is

installed.

June 15, 2007: A lightning strike knocked out power for an hour at

Building 18; backup generators did not come on. Nearby construction

work had damaged a key component of the building's grounding system.

Dec. 8, 2007: During a planned evacuation drill of Building 18's

labs that was designed to simulate a power outage, emergency lights

initially came on but failed after 10 minutes when a technician

inadvertently shut off a back-up power system, according to a CDC

after-action report obtained by the AJC.

Dec. 18, 2007: Building 18 had a real evacuation after its new

medical waste incinerator was started for a test and vented smoke

into the high-containment lab area. Excessive heat caused the

incinerator's bypass stack to tear away from its anchor bolts,

internal records show.

Friday: A bird caused a Georgia Power transformer to fail, knocking

out power to part of the CDC campus for about 1 hour 15 minutes.

Then CDC's backup generators failed to keep power on at four

buildings: the infectious disease lab Building 17, and offices in

Buildings 1, 3 and 20.

The outage is the latest in a string of mechanical and construction

incidents at labs on the agency's Clifton Road campus †" many in

new buildings that are part of a $1 billion construction plan.

Last summer, an hour-long power outage at a different CDC lab tower,

called Building 18, resulted in a congressional hearing. The

Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress,

is still examining safety at CDC's high-containment laboratories and

concerns raised years ago by agency engineers that CDC's backup

power system was likely to fail.

" It's important for people to understand that even though we lose

power to these facilities from time to time, worker safety and the

public's safety is not in jeopardy because multiple, redundant

systems are in place, separate from those that rely on power, "

Skinner said Saturday.

Around 5:40 p.m. Friday, a Georgia Power transformer failed, cutting

off electricity to part of the CDC campus. CDC's backup generators

initially came on, Skinner said. But then the system detected some

sort of power anomaly and shut itself off, cutting off backup power

to three buildings, he said.

The buildings affected were:

• Building 17, a newer infectious disease research lab building,

where scientists work with rabies, HIV, influenza and tuberculosis,

including extensively drug-resistant strains. The building has

Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) labs, which need electricity to maintain

negative airflow. This key safeguard helps contain germs by making

sure air is always being drawn into the lab and through special HEPA

filters before leaving the building. When power is lost, the lab has

neutral air that neither flows in or out.

• Building 20, a newer office building that also houses the

agency's fitness center.

• Building 1 and Building 3, antiquated attached office buildings

from about 1959.

Information about whether any labs were in use at the time of the

outage was not immediately available Saturday, Skinner said.

" This happened late in the day and there were not many employees

still in the buildings, " Skinner said. " Those in the buildings

evacuated without incident. "

The power was out for about 1 hour 15 minutes, Skinner said, and was

restored when Georgia Power fixed the transformer problem.

A bird caused the blown Georgia Power transformer, said power

company spokesman Jeff .

CDC officials did not attempt to override and restart the agency's

backup generators because they didn't know what the anomaly was that

shut them down, Skinner said.

Skinner also said there was no power disruption at Building 18, the

$214 million Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory that suffered

the hour-long outage last summer.

The AJC reported last summer that government construction engineers

had warned since 2001 that CDC's planned design for its centralized

backup power generation system would not keep crucial lab systems

from failing in an outage.

" I've been saying this for over three years now, but having the

generators in this configuration gives us no protection whatsoever

from many types of failures, " CDC mechanical engineer nie West

wrote in an August 2003 e-mail to agency officials, one of several

reviewed by the AJC.

CDC officials have said that despite West's concerns, the consensus

of experts was that a centralized generator farm was better than

having individual units at buildings.

Skinner emphasized that the CDC has many other physical barriers to

contain germs that don't require electricity. They include safety

cabinets and layers of rooms, filters and corridors between the

germs and the outdoors.

" I think people need to know we're talking about an enormous campus

with complex systems, and we're never going to be able to fully

eliminate power outages, " Skinner said. " That's impossible. The key

for us is to minimize the duration of the outage. "

To reach staff writer Alison Young, call 404-526-7372.

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