Re: Help expose the truth about the tobacco industry. The term sick building syndro

May 12, 2009

Thanks for posting that...who'd a thunk that their evil deeds would come back

and bite them?

>

> Sick Building Syndrome

> From SourceWatch

> Jump to: navigation, search

>

> http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Sick_Building_Syndrome

>

> This article is part of the Tobacco portal on Sourcewatch, sponsored by the

American Legacy Foundation. Help expose the truth about the tobacco industry.

>

> The term " sick building syndrome " (SBS) is used to describe situations in

which occupants of buildings experience acute illness and discomfort that appear

to be linked to time spent in a building, but no specific illness or cause can

be identified. Symptoms are said to include headache; eye, nose, or throat

irritation; dry cough; dry or itchy skin; dizziness and nausea; difficulty in

concentrating; fatigue, and sensitivity to odors. The exact cause of the

symptoms is not discoverable, but sufferers report relief soon after leaving the

building.[1]

>

> Contents [hide]

> 1 Controversy

> 2 Tobacco industry documents

> 3 Sourcewatch resources

> 4 External resources

> 5 References

>

> [edit]Controversy

> " Sick Building Syndrome " came to the attention of the public largely through

the highly organized and funded efforts of the tobacco industry, who promoted

the notion of " Sick Building Syndrome " to deflect attention from secondhand

smoke as a point-source pollutant linked to health complaints and discomfort of

occupants in offices and factories.

>

> Tobacco companies maintained that secondhand smoke, also known as

Environmental Tobacco Smoke or ETS, plays a minor role in " sick-building

syndrome, " and that instead ETS served merely as an indicator of larger problems

present within the building. The industry, through paid surrogate third-party

air quality companies like ACVA Atlantic and Healthy Buildings International,

pointed to chemical agents, like radon and bioaerosols in the indoor

environment, as the main causes associated with complaints of illness among

workers. The industry used " Sick Building Syndrome " thus to deflect the focus on

tobacco smoke as a primary indoor pollutant and to point out that any attempt to

address the discomfort of building occupants by banning smoking was " misdirected

and inadequate. " [2]

>

> [edit]Tobacco industry documents

> A 1985 memo from Stuntz (a Tobacco Institute Vice President) discusses

presentations and testimony given by industry air quality consultant Gray

on at public hearings about ventilation. on owned ACVA Atlantic,

the environmental engineering firm the Tobacco Institute hired to analyze the

air quality in buildings. on testified at public hearings for smoking

restrictions that the presence of tobacco smoke, rather being a problem in and

of itself, was only an indicator of larger ventilation problems. A handwritten

note on the memo states, " This really does help us broaden the issue beyond

tobacco smoke. " [3]

> Reginald B. , an employee of Healthy Buildings International (HBI), an

environmental consulting company used by the Tobacco Institute starting in 1986

to encourage businesses not to ban smoking but to look for other causes of air

pollution, gave courtroom testimony in which he told how the industry applied

the notion of " Sick Building Syndrome " to deflect attention from secondhand

smoke. Gray on, owner of HBI, frequently used the term " Sick Building

Syndrome, " and with the tobacco industry's assistance and funding, widely

promoted this " syndrome " throughout the United States to deflect attention from

tobacco smoke as a point source of indoor air pollution as cause of illness for

people inhabiting buildings.

> Reginald worked for HBI in 1986, when the company first started

associating with the Tobacco Institute. He noted that HBI experienced a vast

increase in workload after that time, hiring and training many more workers to

inspect buildings all over the world. described the ground rules that

were laid down for sampling air in all of the buildings inspected for the

Tobacco Institute:

>

> Mr. [] Binnie [Vice President of HBI] had a number of instructions and

ground rules for us to follow that applied to all of the buildings we inspected,

private and public: (1) when taking air samples for nicotine tests, we were

instructed to take air samples in lobbies and other easily accessible areas

where the circulation was best, thus reducing the readings; (2) if asked, always

recommend to clients that any air pollution problem could be solved by better

ventilation; (3) banning or restricting tobacco use or smoking was never to be

recommended; and, (4) every inspection report was to be reviewed and undergo

final editing by either Mr. Binnie or Mr. on before it was sent out.

> stated that the results of his reports were altered after he submitted

them to his superiors:

>

> Q. Were your reports ever edited or changed after you submitted your reports

to Mr. Binnie or Mr. on?

> A. It is my understanding that the reports were always edited by Mr. Binnie or

Mr. on.

> Q. How do you know that your reports were changed after you submitted them to

Mr. Binnie or Mr. on?

> A. On many occasions involving inspections of both public and private

buildings, I would later see the inspection reports in the main files and note

that Mr. Binnie or Mr. on had changed the data and the conclusions. For

example, when I had recommended a restriction or banning of smoking, Mr. Binnie

would edit it out of the final inspection report. It was also a standard

practice for Mr. Binnie to reduce the actual results of two significant tests

that were done on buildings: (1) the test for airborne particle count ( " APC " );

and (2) the test for weighing airborne particles ( " WAP " )...

> Q. Are the results of these tests important?

> A. Yes. These two tests are critical for providing accurate information about

airborne particles in the final inspection reports for buildings.

> Q. To your knowledge, did clients ever learn that the results of these tests

were reduced?

> A. No. The clients, both public and private buildings owners and tenants, were

never advised of the alteration of the data.

> testified that the Tobacco Institute and its members sent HBI

employees all over the world to perform building inspections, and that money was

no object:

>

> ...we stayed in the most exclusive and expensive hotels and were told we could

have anything and everything we needed. We were provided drivers that took us to

each city and took care of all of our personal needs... On weekends, we were

allowed to go anywhere we wanted at the expense of Philip . For example,

one weekend they took some of us, myself included, to the St. Moritz Resort

where we all went skiing; other team members went to Venice and Florence, Italy,

for the weekend ... I personally turned in, for my group's two weeks in

Scandinavia, approximately $12,500 of expenses for hotels, meals, and

miscellaneous purchases. Money was never an issue when working for the Tobacco

Institute or its members ... [4]

> [edit]Sourcewatch resources

> Healthy Buildings International

> ACVA Atlantic

> Binnie

> Jeff Seckler (former HBI employee and whistleblower)

> Tobacco industry public relations strategies: Broadening the issue

> Tobacco industry public relations strategies: Changing the focus

> Philip ' Whitecoat Project

> Philip ' Project Brass

> Tobacco Institute's Hospital Strategy Plan

> Ogilvy & Mather:Tobacco industry ties

> A Public Relations Proposal for ACVA Atlantic, Inc.

> ARIA

> [edit]External resources

> Search the Documents Archives of the Tobacco Industry

> Legacy Tobacco Documents Library:

>

> [edit]References

> ª U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Indoor Air Facts No. 4 (revised) Sick

Building Syndrome, Indoor Air Quality. Accessed April 30, 2009

> ª Philip ETS, Indoor Smoking and Indoor Air Quality: Planning for the

1990s Draft; report. April 22, 1992. Philip Bates No.

2023371119-2023371157

> ª Stuntz S., Tobacco Institute. Ventilation Testimony Memorandum. July 5,

1985. Bates No. TIDN0013592. Esp. see note in marginalia.

> ª United States Department of Justice Testimony of Reginald B. Civil

Action No. 99-CV-02496 (GK). Undated, but recorded in trial in 2004

>

May 12, 2009

This is another explanation of why some of those experts who were helping the

tobacco industry deny the health effects of tobacco have been helping the

insurance industry deny the health effects of toxic mold. The first reason is

the money. They get paid lots of money.

________________________________

From: tigerpaw2c <tigerpaw2c@...>

Sent: Monday, May 11, 2009 5:35:18 PM

Subject: [] Help expose the truth about the tobacco industry. The

term " sick building syndro

Sick Building Syndrome

From SourceWatch

Jump to: navigation, search

http://www.sourcewa tch.org/index. php?title= Sick_Building_ Syndrome

This article is part of the Tobacco portal on Sourcewatch, sponsored by the

American Legacy Foundation. Help expose the truth about the tobacco industry.

The term " sick building syndrome " (SBS) is used to describe situations in which

occupants of buildings experience acute illness and discomfort that appear to be

linked to time spent in a building, but no specific illness or cause can be

identified. Symptoms are said to include headache; eye, nose, or throat

irritation; dry cough; dry or itchy skin; dizziness and nausea; difficulty in

concentrating; fatigue, and sensitivity to odors. The exact cause of the

symptoms is not discoverable, but sufferers report relief soon after leaving the

building.[1]

Contents [hide]

1 Controversy

2 Tobacco industry documents

3 Sourcewatch resources

4 External resources

5 References

[edit]Controversy

" Sick Building Syndrome " came to the attention of the public largely through the

highly organized and funded efforts of the tobacco industry, who promoted the

notion of " Sick Building Syndrome " to deflect attention from secondhand smoke as

a point-source pollutant linked to health complaints and discomfort of occupants

in offices and factories.

Tobacco companies maintained that secondhand smoke, also known as Environmental

Tobacco Smoke or ETS, plays a minor role in " sick-building syndrome, " and that

instead ETS served merely as an indicator of larger problems present within the

building. The industry, through paid surrogate third-party air quality companies

like ACVA Atlantic and Healthy Buildings International, pointed to chemical

agents, like radon and bioaerosols in the indoor environment, as the main causes

associated with complaints of illness among workers. The industry used " Sick

Building Syndrome " thus to deflect the focus on tobacco smoke as a primary

indoor pollutant and to point out that any attempt to address the discomfort of

building occupants by banning smoking was " misdirected and inadequate. " [2]

[edit]Tobacco industry documents

A 1985 memo from Stuntz (a Tobacco Institute Vice President) discusses