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THE PHYSICIAN AND THE FEDERAL NARCOTIC LAW

H.J. Anslinger - United States Commissioner of Narcotics.

From: Tulane Law Review, Vol. XX No. 3, March 1946 pp. 309-332

1. Types of Narcotic Drugs Covered.

Narcotic drugs covered by the law are those included within the classification

opium, coca leaves, and any compound, salt, derivative or preparation

thereof.(1) They include, for instance, all of the alkaloids and salts of opium,

whether of the phenanthrene or isoquinoline groups. By an amendment approved

July 1, 1944, to the Federal law, isonipecaine, a synthetic substitute for

morphine, was added to this classification and is therefore subject to the

operation of the Federal narcotic law in the same manner as is morphine for

which it is substituted. Isonipecaine is defined as

1-methyl-4-phenyl-piperidine-4-carboxylic acid ethyl ester, or any salt thereof,

by whatever trade name designated.(2)

2. International Action.

Modern narcotic drug legislation is the result of the efforts of our government

to give full effect to its obligations under the international conventions to

which it is a party.(3) The first of these important international agreements is

known as the International Opium Convention of 1912.(4) Under this convention

the contracting powers assumed the obligation, among others, to enact pharmacy

laws or regulations to limit exclusively to medical and legitimate purposes the

manufacture, sale and use of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts

unless laws or regulations on the subject were already in existence. The

contracting powers were obligated to cooperate with one another to prevent the

use of these drugs for any other purpose.

In 1925 the second international convention on the subject of narcotic drugs was

signed at Geneva on behalf of a number of World Powers, not including the United

States, this agreement being described as the International Opium Convention

adopted by the Second Opium Conference, (League of Nations) signed at Geneva

February 19, 1925.(5) This Convention sought to make more specific the

obligations of the 1912 Convention, notably in the control of international

trade in narcotics, and established a Permanent Central Board with certain

functions in connection with the supply and international movement of narcotic

drugs. Our government did not sign or ratify this convention at the time,

because it did not give effect to the principle, advanced by the United States,

of direct control of production of the source raw material (the opium poppy and

the coca leaf). However, in Article 31 it was provided that the present (1925)

Convention replaces, as between the contracting parties, the provisions of

Chapters I, III and V of the Convention signed at The Hague on January 23, 1912,

which provisions remain in force as between the contracting parties and any

States parties to the said Convention which are not parties to the present

Convention. The United States fully cooperated with the contracting powers which

had ratified the 1925, as well as with those which had merely ratified the 1912,

Convention, in international action looking toward control of the narcotic drug

traffic. Our government, as a matter of fact, had already adopted legislative

measures which gave effect to the provisions of the 1925 Convention, pursuant to

the obligations assumed under the 1912 Convention.

A third international agreement, concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931, was the

Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of

Narcotic Drugs.(6) The ratification by the United States of this Convention was

deposited at Geneva on April 28, 1932, and was proclaimed by the President July

10, 1933. The outstanding feature of this Convention is that it obligates each

High Contracting Party to furnish annual estimates to a Supervisory Body of its

requirements for narcotic drugs, based solely on the medical and scientific

requirements of the country, and limits manufacture of the drugs to the total

requirements thus estimated. The Convention incorporates and therefore in effect

adopts certain provisions of the preceding 1925 Convention. It further obligates

the High Contracting Parties to take all necessary legislative or other measures

in order to give effect within their countries to the provisions of the

Convention. Another important and interesting feature of the Convention is the

imposition of a special obligation upon each of the High Contracting Parties to

create a special administration for the purpose of (a) applying the provisions

of the Convention; (B) regulating, supervising and controlling the trade in the

drugs; and © organizing the campaign against drug addiction, by taking all

useful steps to prevent its development and to suppress the illicit traffic.

3. Federal Narcotic Statutes.

The two principal Federal narcotic statutes are the Act of May 26, 1922, known

as the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, as amended,(7) and the so-called

on Narcotic Law, now incorporated in the Internal Revenue Code.(8) The

Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act authorizes the importation of such

quantities only of opium and coca leaves as the Commissioner of Narcotics shall

find to be necessary to provide for medical and scientific needs. Importation of

any form of narcotic drug, except such limited quantities of crude opium and

coca leaves, is prohibited. Exportation of manufactured drugs and preparations

is permitted under a rigid system of control designed to assure their use for

medical needs only in the country of destination.

The on Narcotic Law as reenacted in the Internal Revenue Code is designed

to direct the manufacture and distribution of narcotic drugs through medical

channels to consumption use for medical purposes only. This statute and the

regulations promulgated thereunder (9) more directly affect the practicing

physician and will be the basis of the following discussion.

4. Registration

(a) Qualification Prerequisite.

A physician who intends to practice medicine and to administer or dispense

narcotic drugs in the course of such practice must apply for registration under

the on Law with the Collector of Internal Revenue of the district in which

he proposes to practice, and must pay the appropriate occupational tax for the

fiscal year applicable. Before being entitled to such registration, however, he

must be lawfully entitled under the laws of the State or Territory or district

wherein he intends to practice, to distribute, dispense, give away or administer

narcotic drugs to patients upon whom he, in the course of his professional

practice, is in attendance.(10) In the case of a medical practitioner, this

requirement usually means that the applicant is a physician who holds an

unrevoked and unrestricted license to practice medicine in the particular State,

Territory or district. To be entitled to registration, however, in the case of

any type of practitioner of the healing art, it must appear that he is entitled

under the State laws to distribute, administer or dispense narcotic drugs to

patients upon whom he, in the course of his professional practice, is in

attendance. " The right to register and pay tax under the Federal statute depends

on the right to dispense under the State laws. " (11)

(B) Inventory Required.

Every person making application for registry or re-registry as a physician

shall, as of December 31st preceding the date of his application, or any date

between December 31st and the date of applying for such registry or re-registry,

prepare under oath or affirmation, in duplicate, an inventory of all narcotic

drugs and preparations on hand at the time of making such inventory. The

inventory shall be prepared on Form 713, copies of which may be obtained from

Collectors of Internal Revenue upon request. The original inventory shall be

forwarded to the Collector with the application for registration, and the

duplicate shall be kept on file by the maker for a period of two years.

© Special Tax Stamp.

Upon approval of the application for registration the Collector of Internal

Revenue will assign a registry number to the applicant and will issue him a

special tax stamp in Class IV as a practitioner. This special tax stamp must be

kept posted conspicuously on the premises covered by the registration, i.e., the

physician's office.

(d) Change of Location of Office.

A physician registrant who changes the location of his, office shall, within

thirty days, execute a new return on Form 678-A, marking it " Revise Registry. "

The return shall set forth the date of change and the new name or address. The

return shall be forwarded with the special tax stamp to the Collector who issued

the stamp for recording the change. If the removal is to another State,

Territory or district, the physician must, of course, be qualified in the new

location to administer, dispense or distribute narcotic drugs to patients, which

usually means, of course, that he must also be licensed to practice medicine in

the new location.

5. Dispensing and Prescribing -- in General.

(a) Direct Dispensing or Administration.

A physician may obtain narcotic drugs for direct dispensing or administration to

patients only on official order forms. He may not obtain narcotic drugs on a

so-called prescription for general office use. Official order forms are

obtainable from the Collector of Internal Revenue in a book of ten originals and

duplicates for ten cents. The form is to be prepared in duplicate and signed by

the physician, the original copy being forwarded to a qualified manufacturer or

wholesaler, and the duplicate retained by the physician for a period of two

years subject to inspection by a duly authorized Federal or State narcotic

officer. The order form may be prepared in typewriting, ink or indelible pencil,

but not by the use of an ordinary lead pencil.

(B) Prescribing.

A physician may issue for a bona fide patient, for medical purposes only, a

prescription for narcotic drugs which may be filled by a qualified retail dealer

(druggist).

6. Prescriptions.

(a) Formal Requirements.

A prescription for narcotic drugs shall be dated as of and signed on the date

when issued and shall bear the full name and address of the patient and the

name, address, and registry number of the practitioner. A physician may sign a

prescription in the same manner as he would sign a check or legal document, as,

for instance, J. H. , H. , or Henry . Prescriptions

should be written with ink or indelible pencil or typewriter; if typewritten,

they shall be signed by the practitioner. The refilling of a prescription for

taxable narcotic drugs is prohibited.

(B) Misuse of Prescription Form as an Order Form,

A physician must not use his prescription form to obtain narcotic drugs for

general office practice. Narcotic drugs desired for general office practice are

obtainable on official order form, as above described, from a qualified

manufacturer or wholesale dealer. An order for narcotic drugs for general office

practice, written on a prescription blank, is not a lawful prescription within

the meaning of the law and can have no effect to validate the sale which is

illegal.

(e) Fictitious Names.

When the names of fictitious patients are discovered on narcotic drug

prescriptions filed with a druggist it is usually a clear indication of wilful

catering to drug addiction, whether or not the so-called prescriptions are also

discovered to be forged. Sometimes the physician will insert a fictitious

patient's name, however, because he wishes to conceal from the druggist the fact

that the real patient is consuming drugs, notwithstanding that the real patient

is claimed to have a bona fide medical need therefor. The law does not permit

the use of a fictitious patient's name upon a prescription.

(d) Telephone Orders.

The furnishing of narcotic drugs pursuant to telephone advice of practitioners

is prohibited, whether prescriptions covering such orders are subsequently

received or not, except that in an emergency a druggist may deliver narcotic

drugs through his employee or responsible agent pursuant to a telephone order,

provided the employee or agent is supplied with a properly prepared prescription

before delivery is made, which prescription shall be turned over to the druggist

and filed by him as required by law.

(e) Safeguarding Blanks for Narcotic Drugs.

A physician's prescription blanks should be most carefully safeguarded and never

left where persons who may be drug addicts will have opportunity to take them,

and to prepare and have filled forged narcotic prescriptions. A physician's

official order forms should be likewise safeguarded, and great care should be

exercised by the physician in keeping his stock of narcotic drugs secure from

robbery or pilfering. The medicine case of morphine tablets should never be left

in an unattended automobile.

7. Professional Practice in Prescribing or Dispensing Narcotic Drugs.

(a) Constitutionality of the on Narcotic Law.

The constitutionality of the on Narcotic Law was first challenged before

the United States Supreme Court in 1919 by Dr. C.T. Doremus of Texas. Dr.

Doremus had been indicted under section 2 of the Act (now section 2554 of Title

26 of the United States Code). The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality

of section 2 as having reasonable relation to the raising of revenue, and stated

that the Act " may not be declared unconstitutional because its effect may be to

accomplish another purpose as well as the raising of revenue.(12)

In 1927, the constitutional validity of section 1 of the Act (now section 2553

of Title 26 of the United States Code) was questioned by a defendant, not a

physician, who had been convicted of purchasing narcotic drugs not in or from

the original tax stamped packages. The Supreme Court affirmed the

constitutionality of the challenged section.(13)

In 1928, a defendant who was not a physician again challenged the constitutional

validity of section 2 of the Act, notwithstanding the previous Doremus decision,

and the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutionality of this section.(14)

(B) Professional Practice as Applied to Drug Addiction.

In a leading case decided March 3, 1919, the Supreme Court enunciated an

important principle in connection with the meaning of the words " professional

practice " as used in section 2 of the on Act.(15) In this case Webb was a

practicing physician and Goldbaum a retail druggist in Memphis. It was Webb's

regular custom and practice to prescribe morphine for habitual users upon their

application to him therefor. He furnished these prescriptions not after

consideration of the applicant's individual case and in such quantities and with

such direction as, in his judgment, would tend to cure the habit, or as might be

necessary or helpful in an attempt to break the habit, but with such

consideration and in such quaritities as the applicant desired for the sake of

continuing his accustomed use. Goldbaum was familiar with such practice and

habitually filled such prescriptions. Within a period of eleven months Goldbaum

purchased from wholesalers in Memphis thirty times as much morphine as was

bought by the average retail druggist doing a larger general business, and he

sold narcotic drugs in 6,500 instances. It was also shown that during the same

period Webb had issued and Goldbaum had filled over 4,000 such narcotic

prescriptions, and that a certain user of the drugs had applied to Webb for

morphine and was given at one time ten so-called prescriptions for one gram

each, which prescriptions were filled at one time by Goldbaum although each was

made out in a separate fictitious name. The United States Circuit Court of

Appeals, upon this statement of fact, propounded the following question to the

United States Supreme Court:

" If a practicing and registered physician issues an order for morphine to an

habitual user thereof, the order not being issued by him in the course of

professional treatment in the attempted cure of the habit, but being issued for

the purpose of providing the user with morphine sufficient to keep him

comfortable by maintaining his customary use, is such order a physician's

prescription under exception (B) of section 2 (of the on Act) ? "

To this question the Supreme Court answered, " To call such an order for the use

of morphine a physician's prescription would be so plain a perversion of meaning

that no discussion of the subject is required. That question should be answered

in the negative. "

The Supreme Court emphasized this rule in a later case involving the prescribing

of narcotics by a practitioner for an addict by holding in part as follows:

" Manifestly the phrases 'to a patient' and 'in the course of his professional

practice only' are intended to confine the immunity of a registered physician,

in dispensing the narcotic drugs mentioned in the Act, strictly within the

appropriate bounds of a physician's professional practice, and not to extend it

to include a sale to a dealer or a distribution intended to cater to the

appetite or satisfy the craving of one addicted to the use of the drug. A

'prescription' issued for either of the latter purposes protects neither the

physician who issues it nor the dealer who knowingly accepts and fills it. " (16)

In the Dr. Behrman case (17) decided by the Supreme Court in 1922, the

defendant was charged with unlawfully selling to an addict by means of three

so-called prescriptions, 150 grains of heroin, 360 grains of morphine, and 210

grains of cocaine, with the intent that the addict would use the same by

self-administration in divided doses over a period of several days. The

indictment did not in terms challenge the good faith of the physician and did

not contain the allegation that the prescriptions were not issued in the course

of professional practice only. A demurrer to the indictment was sustained in the

district court and the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The

Supreme Court pointed out that the quantities of narcotics named in the

indictment were charged to have been entrusted to a person known by the

physician to be an addict, without restraint upon him in its administration or

disposition by anything more than his own weakened and perverted will. Such

so-called prescriptions, said the court, could only result in the gratification

of a diseased appetite for these pernicious drugs, or result in an unlawful

parting with them to others, in violation of the Act as heretofore interpreted

in this court, within the principles laid down in the Webb and Jin Fuey Moy

cases. Notwithstanding the omissions in the indictment, therefore, the court

held that the acts charged constituted offenses within the terms and meaning of

the Act, and the judgment of the district court to the contrary was reversed.

© The Linder Case.

The effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dr. C. 0. Linder case(18)

has been misunderstood by some physicians, who evidently regarded the decision

as authority to cater to drug addiction as such notwithstanding previous

decisions of the court which declared this activity not within the course of

professional practice of a physician. Dr. C. 0. Linder was charged with the

unlawful sale to an addict of one tablet of morphine and three tablets of

cocaine for self administration in divided doses over a period of time. Here, as

in the Behrman case, the indictment did not specifically challenge the good

faith of the physician, or negative that the sale was in the course of

professional practice only. The quantity of drugs sold was, of course, far less

than the quantity prescribed by Dr. Behrman. Dr. Linder was convicted but when

his case reached the Supreme Court the judgment of conviction was reversed.

In the course of the opinion there was discussion that direct control of medical

practice in the States is beyond the power of the Federal Government, and that

incidental regulation of such practice by Congress through a taxing act cannot

extend to matters plainly inappropriate and unnecessary to reasonable

enforcement of a revenue measure. But the court had first significantly noted

that the indictment " does not question the doctor's good faith nor the wisdom or

propriety of his action according to medical standards, " and that " it does not

allege that he dispensed the drugs otherwise than to a patient in the course of

his professional practice or for other than medical purposes. " In concluding the

opinion, therefore, the court stated:

" We find no facts alleged in the indictment sufficient to show that petitioner

had done anything falling within definite inhibitions or sufficient materially

to imperil orderly collection of revenue from sale. * * * The unfortunate

condition of the recipient certainly created no reasonable probability that she

would sell or otherwise dispose of the few tablets entrusted to her; and we

cannot say that by so dispensing them the doctor necessarily transcended the

limits of that professional conduct with which Congress never intended to

interfere. "

All that the Linder case holds, therefore, is that in the absence of an

allegation in the indictment negativing good faith and professional practice,

the court cannot supply the omission by holding as a matter of law that the sale

of four tablets of narcotics necessarily transcends the limits of professional

practice. The court could so hold in the Behrman case because the quantities

were so large as to preclude any possibility that they were prescribed

professionally.

It follows, therefore, that where the indictment challenges the good faith and

professional practice of a physician who prescribes or directly sells narcotic

drugs for the purpose of merely gratifying and perpetuating narcotic drug

addiction as such and if convicted of such an offense, the judgment of

conviction will stand and a number of United States Circuit Courts of Appeal

have so held in cases involving convictions of physicians which reached these

intermediate appellate courts after the Linder case was decided, and in which

the Linder decision was urged as exculpating the convicted physician.(19)

(d) The A. W. Boyd Case.

One year after its decision in the Linder case, the Supreme Court rendered its

decision in the case of Dr. A. W. Boyd(20), in which the physician had been

convicted on six counts of an indictment charging unlawful sales by means of

prescriptions issued.not in good faith and not in the course of his professional

practice. These prescriptions were issued for from 30 to 48 grains each to two

named drug addicts. It was established that the physician purchased and

distributed over 15,000 grains of morphine during a period from May lst to

September 30th, and that he issued prescriptions on much the same scale during

that period. The court pointed out that the disputed question was whether the

defendant'issued the prescriptions in good faith in the course of his

professional practice. The Government's evidence tended strongly to show that

the prescriptions were for quantities many times in excess of what, according to

any fair medical standards, reasonably could be put into the possession of

confirmed addicts, even when treating them for the addiction or endeavoring to

relieve them from suffering incident to it. Much of the defendant's evidence

tended to show that he issued the prescriptions in good faith in the course of

professionally treating the recipients for their addiction and endeavoring to

relieve them from its incidents, but the court noted that some of the evidence

submitted in behalf of the defendant was pronouncedly corroborative of that for

the Government. The court, in sustaining the judgment of conviction, quoted with

implied approval the charge to the jury which had been made at the request of

the defendant's counsel, as follows:

" I am requested to say to you, gentlemen, that in determining whether or not the

defendant in prescribing morphine to his patients was honestly seeking to cure

them of the morphine habit while applying his curative remedies, it is not

necessary for the jury to believe that the defendant's treatment would cure the

morphine habit, but it is sufficient if defendant honestly believed his remedy

was a cure for this disease.

" I instruct you that if this is true, regardless of whether the course of

treatment given by this defendant is a cure, the question is, was he honestly

and in good faith in the course of his professional practice and in an effort to

cure disease issuing these prescriptions .

This charge certainly was as fair as the defendant could have wished, but the

jury, under all the evidence submitted, could hardly have done otherwise than

convict.

(e) The Young Case.(21)

Dr. Young had been convicted on eight counts of an indictment charging

sales of quantities of certain conditionally exempt narcotic preparations(22)

without having kept a record of the sales. Actually the total quantities of

these narcotic preparations sold by the physician were large but unfortunately,

from the standpoint of a proper presentation of the merits of the case, the

indictment did not question the good faith or professional propriety of the

unlawful sales charged. When this case reached the Supreme Court, it was

necessarily considered on the theory that the physician dispensed or

administered preparations to patients whom he personally attended, and the

question of whether the dispensing or administration was in the course of

professional practice was not before the court. Thus considered, the court

reversed the judgment of conviction holding that physicians administering the

preparations to patients whom they personally attended were not required to keep

records of the preparations so administered.

(f) The Professional Practice Rule in Intermediate Appellate Courts.

Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in the A. W. Boyd case, the

several circuit courts of appeals have applied the principle enunciated in that

case in rendering decisions appealed to them by physicians who have been

convicted under the on Narcotic Law.(23) In the DuVall case the Circuit

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit quoted with approval the following

instruction to the jury which applies and interprets the principle:

" If the prescriptions were issued in good faith and according to fair medical

standards, in the curing of disease, and not merely to satisfy the cravings of

the said persons for such drugs, then they may be said to have been issued in

the course of the defendant's professional practice only; but if the

prescriptions were not issued in good faith, but were issued to enable such

person to obtain morphine sulphate to satisfy his appetite and cravings for such

drugs only, and not in the treatment of his patient, then the issuance of such

prescriptions would not be in good faith nor in the course of the defendant's

professional practice as a physician, and the sale and dispensing upon such

prescriptions would not be lawful. "

8. Ambulatory Treatment for Drug Addiction.

(a) Legal and Medical Views.

The ambulatory treatment for the cure of drug addiction has always been

disapproved by the United States Bureau of Narcotics because its observation and

experience have shown that the object of the treatment is practically never

achieved. The average drug addict who purports to undergo this treatment will

invariably seek other sources of supply as his dosage is reduced. It will be

recalled that the Supreme Court in the Behrman(24) case called attention to the

danger of entrusting quantities of narcotic drugs to a known addict " without

restraint upon him in its administration or disposition by anything more than

his own weakened and perverted will. " The Supreme Court in the Behrman case at

least impliedly disapproved the procedure which is applied in pursuing the

so-called ambulatory treatment for the cure of drug addiction, and in 1924 in a

case involving the conviction of Dr. Addison D. Hobart(25) the Circuit Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit construed the Behrman decision as condemning the

ambulatory treatment as unlawful, as follows:

" The case of United States v. Behrman, 258 U. S. 280, destroys the theory of the

defense upon the present trial. Since that decision, there is no possibility

that conduct such as Hobart admitted, could be lawful. The patient was not under

restraint. Hobart furnished to him at frequent intervals and for

self-administration, large quantities of morphine, though in quantities

diminishing from one time to another; but the patient was at liberty to apply to

other doctors and get as many other similar prescriptions as he could. In the

case cited, the Supreme Court declared that this conduct by a physician was ipso

facto violation of the law * * *. "

Scientific medical opinion appears to be in harmony with the opinion of the

court that disapproved the ambulatory treatment for cure of drug addiction. In

1924, the Reference Committee on Legislation and Public Relations recommended

that the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association approve

Recommendation No. 8 of the Committee on Narcotic Drugs of the Council on Health

and Public Instruction.(26) The report of the Reference Committee was adopted as

presented. Recommendation No. 8 of the Report of the Committee on Narcotic Drugs

of the Council on Health and Public Instruction submitted by the Council to the

House of Delegates at the Boston session, 1921, is as follows:

" 8. Your committee desires to place on record its firm conviction that any

method of treatment for narcotic drug addiction, whether private,

institutioiial, official or governmental, which permits the addicted person to

dose himself with the habit-forming narcotic drugs placed in his hands for

self-administration, is an unsatisfactory treatment of addiction, begets

deception, extends the abuse of habit-forming narcotic drugs, and causes an

increase in crime. Therefore, your committee recommends that the American

Medical Association urge both federal and state governments to exert their full

powers and authority to put an end to all manner of such so-called ambulatory

methods of treatment of narcotic drug addiction, whether practiced by the

private physician or by the so-called 'narcotic clinic' dispensary.

" In the opinion of your committee, the only proper and scientific method of

treating narcotic drug addiction is under such conditions of control of both the

addict and the drug, that any administration of a habit-forming narcotic drug

must be by, or under the direct personal authority of the physician, with no

chance of any distribution of the drug of addiction to others, or opportunity

for the same person to procure any of the drug from any source other than from

the physician directly responsible for the addict's treatment. "

(B) Recognized (Institutional) Treatment.

The most practicable plan of applying the only proper and scientific method of

treating narcotic drug addiction under the conditions laid down by the Committee

on Narcotic Drugs of the Council on Health and Public Instruction, is to

establish an institution properly staffed and equipped for the purpose.. By the

Act of Congress approved January 19, 1929,(27) provision was made for, and there

were later constructed and put into operation, two institutions located at

Lexington, Kentucky and Fort Worth, Texas, respectively, for the treatment and

rehabilitation of narcotic drug addicts, under the supervision of the United

States Public Health Service. The facilities of these two institutions,

available primarily for prisoner-addicts, are also made available for voluntary

applicants, even if they are unable to pay a nominal sum representing part of

the cost of the treatment. A large number of drug addicts, including some

physicians, have received treatment and rehabilitation in these institutions.

9. Federal Investigative Procedure.

(a) Primary Purpose.

The primary purpose of Federal investigative procedure, as far as the physician

is concerned, is to prevent diversion of narcotic drugs from medical channels to

abusive use. Thus it becomes necessary to investigate, and to resort to legal

procedure to penalize that physician who wilfully prescribes or directly sells

narcotic drugs merely for the gratification and perpetuation of narcotic drug

addiction.

(B) Prerequisite to Investigation of a Physician.

No investigation of a criminal violation on the part of a physician is permitted

to be made by an officer of the Bureau of Narcotics unless such investigation is

based on well-founded suspicion, strong circumstances, or trustworthy and

reliable information that such violation is being committed. Furthermore, no

field officer of the Bureau of Narcotics is permitted to initiate any such

investigation as above described except upon written instructions from his

superior officer, the District Supervisor of the District.

(e) Rule Established by Federal Courts.

A defense quite frequently sought to be interposed by a physician indicted for

unlawful sales of narcotic drugs is that he was illegally entrapped by the

officers into committing the offenses charged against him. The United States

Circuit Courts of Appeals have consistently rejected such claims on the part of

defendant physicians, holding in effect that it does not constitute illegal

entrapment for the officer to afford an opportunity for the physician to sell

narcotic drugs if the sale was the defendant's free voluntary act.(28) The rule

which was applied by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth

Circuit in the case of W. V. v. United States is even more liberal than

the procedure outlined by the Bureau limiting its field officers in making

investigations of violations on the part of physicians. The Circuit Court of

Appeals in the W. V. case quoted with approval the following charge to the

jury in that case:

" It is no enticement to ask a physician to write an illegal prescription, if you

suspect that he might do it, and you want to find out if he does it, nor to ask

a druggist to sell narcotics illicitly, because both of them know better, and if

they are going to obey the law, why they won't do that in response to any form

of petition or inducement, and it is perfectly within the rights of

investigating officers to determine, by means that have been here disclosed,

whether a party, or parties, are engaged in violation of the law, and if they

are, to take steps accordingly, so that I wish to disabuse your minds of all

this confusion that this, in itself, was such an unwarrantable offense on the

part of Federal officers that it relieves this offense charged, if you find any

offense was committed, of its character as such offense. "

10. Uniform State Narcotic Law.

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws after several

years' study completed in 1932 the final draft of a Uniform Drug Act which it

thereupon recommended for enactment in all the States. This Act has been

adopted, in some cases with a few changes, by 42 States, by Congress for the

District of Columbia, and by the Territories of Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.

The States of California and Pennsylvania, which have not adopted the Uniform

State Narcotic Law, nevertheless have in effect other State narcotic legislation

which the Bureau of Narcotics considers of comparable effectiveness. The States

of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Kansas, and Washington have not adopted the

Uniform State Narcotic Law but have in effect State narcotic legislation which

the Bureau of Narcotics does not consider comparable in effectiveness to the

Uniform Law.

The Uniform State Narcotic law provides a comprehensive plan for intrastate

control of the narcotic drug traffic, and is designed generally to restrict

narcotic drugs to medical channels from the manufacturer or distributor within

the State to the consumer for bona fide medical purposes. The Act differs from

the Federal law in some respects. For instance, it requires manufacturers of and

wholesale dealers in narcotic drugs to obtain a license from the appropriate

State agency and prescribes certain qualifications for these licensees, and it

directly and specifically penalizes the forgery or alteration of a narcotic

prescription. In so far as the professional use of narcotic drugs is concerned,

however, the statutory standard is practically the same as that provided by

theFederal narcotic law. Thus, under the Uniform Act, a physician in good faith

and in the course of his professional practice only is permitted to prescribe,

administer and dispense narcotic drugs, or may cause the same to be administered

by a nurse or interne under his direction and supervision.

11. ation with the States.

Under section 8 of the Act of June 14, 1930(29) the Secretary of the Treasury is

directed to cooperate with the several States in the suppression of the abuse of

narcotic drugs in their respective jurisdictions and to this end he is

authorized (1) to cooperate in the drafting of such legislation as may be needed

and (2) to arrange for the exchange of information concerning the use and abuse

of narcotic drugs in said States and for cooperation in the institution and

prosecution of cases in the courts of the United States and before licensing

boards and courts of the several States. The Secretary of the Treasury has

authorized the Commissioner of Narcotics to furnish to State Licensing Boards

such information in the possession of the Bureau of Narcotics as the

Commissioner may deem appropriate to the enforcement of any State law or

regulation or municipal ordinance relating to the granting, withholding,

suspension, or revocation of State licenses or permits.(30) The Commissioner is

also authorized to direct the attendance, as a witness, in hearings held by such

boards or agencies, of any officer, agent, or employee of the Bureau of

Narcotics, and the production of pertinent records or copies thereof. Pursuant

to this authority, the Commissioner reports to the several State Medical

Licensing Boards a statement of the facts in the cases of practitioners

convicted of offenses against the narcotic laws or who are shown to be narcotic

drug addicts. If the State Licensing Board decides to institute action under its

Medical Practice Act looking toward suspension or revocation of the

practitioner's license and desires the attendance of the Federal investigating

officer as a witness at the hearing, the Commissioner arranges the attendance of

such officer at the hearing and the production of such pertinent records as may

be necessary.

12. Conclusion.

Dr. Fishbein in his introductions(31) to a series of articles printed in

the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1931 on the Indispensable Use

of Narcotic Drugs has presented to the medical profession some excellent

suggestions dealing with the general professional use of narcotic drugs. If all

physicians would accept and conscientiously follow these suggestions, which are

quoted below, irregularities in prescribing and dispensing narcotic drugs by

physicians would be reduced to a minimum.

" The problem of narcotic addiction merits the attention of physicians for many

reasons. The control by statute of the prescribing of alcohol, and the definite

limitations of the amount prescribed, indicates that the medical profession must

do everything possible to minimize the prescribing of narcotics in order to make

unnecessary further restrictive measures. Physicians should give more serious

consideration to the materia medica, pharmacology and therapeutics of narcotics.

" Physicians may, by the exercise of more thought in practicing, do much to avoid

censure in relation to narcotic addiction. They may substitute, whenever

possible, non-habit-forming drugs in the place of morphine or other opium

alkaloids. When narcotics are indispensable, however, as shown in this series of

articles, no more should be administered than is necessary to achieve the

desired end. Patients requiring daily administration should be seen often by the

doctor and the amount of drugs ordered or supplied should not exceed that

required by the patient until seen again. Independence of administration on the

part of nurses should be strictly limited to prescription and any change in

treatment should be in writing. "

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

*NOTES*

[As printed, this note appeared on the first page (p309) of the article]

This is an article from the National Symposium. series dealing with " Scientific

Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine " (2nd series). The Symposium contains

fifty or more studies prepared by legal and medical scholars on problems of

joint interest to the two professions. The papers will be published in the pages

of participating legal and medical journals during the spring and summer of

1946. The intent of the effort is to muster up legal and scientific learning

relevant to various type problems which need illumination from both sources for

their proper solution. The scientific writers have undetaken, under editorial

direction, to prepare their studies in a basic style comprehensible to lawyers,

without, however, any sacrifice of scientific authority.

The new Symposium is a continuation of the first series, published by leading

law reviews and medical journals in the spring of 1943. As before, the general

editor of the Symposium is Hubert Winston , A. B., M. B. A., LL. B., M. D.

(at the time of the first Symposium, Professor was Research Associate on

the faculties of Harvard Law School and Harvard Medical School), who holds an

appointment, under the Distinguished Professorship fund of the University of

Illinois, as Professor of Legal Medicine affiliated with the College of Law and

with the College of Medicine. Readers interested in procuring a master index

containing citations to the studies published in both the first and second

series of " Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, " may do so by

remitting cost price (20c) in coin or stamps to Professor , College of Law,

University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois; he expects that copies so reserved

will be ready for mailing between May 15 and June 1, 1946.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

*FOOTNOTES*

[As printed, footnotes appeared at the bottom of each page]

(1)Act of December 17, 1914, c. 1, * 1, 38 Stat. at L 785 as amended by Act of

February 26, 1926, c. 27, *703, 44 Stat. at L. 97, 2 6 U. S. C. * 2550.

(2) Act of July 1, 1944, c. 377, * 7, 58 Stat. at L. 721,- 26 U. S. C. A. * 3228

(e).

(3) Foreign Relations of the United States (1914) 931.

(4)38 Stat. at L. 1912, 1930.

(5)81 League of Nations Treafy Series (No. 1845) 319.

(6) 48 Stat. at L. 1543.

(7)Act of May 26, 1922, c. 202, 42 Stat. at L. 596, 21 U. S. C. A. ** 171-185.

(8)Act of February 10, 1939, c. 2, **2550-2565, 3220-3228, 53 Stat. at L. 269,

382, 26 U. S. C. A. **2550-2565, 3220-3228.

(9)26 Code of Federal Regulations (1939) **151.1-151.205, pp. 1158-1205; 26 Code

of Federal Regulations Cum. Supp. (1944) **151.4-151.185, pp. 7158-7162.

(10) Act of February 10, 1939, c. 2, *3220(d), 53 Stat. at L 382, 26 U.S.C.A.

*3220(d).

(11) v. Larson, 104 F. (2d) 728 (C. C. A. 5th 1939) ; Burke v. Kansas State

Osteopathic Association, Inc., 111 F. (2d) 250 (C. C. A. 10th 1940) ; Georgia

Ass'n of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. , 112 F. (2d) 52 (C.

C. A. 5th 1940); Kavanagh v. Fowler, 146 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 6th 1945) ; Waldo

v. Poe, 14 F. (2d) 749P (D. C. Wash. 1926); Bruer v. Woodworth, 22 F. (2d) 577

(D. C. Mich. 1927).

(12) United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214, 63 L. Ed. 493

(1919).

(13) Alston v. United States, 274 U. S. 289, 47 Sup. Ct. 634, 71 Ed. 1052

(1927).

(14) Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332, 48 Sup. Ct. 388, 72 L. Ed. 400

(1928).

(15) Webb v. United States, 249 U. S. 96, 39 Sup. Ct. 217, 63 L. Ed. 497 (1919).

(16) Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U. S. 189, 41 Sup. Ct. 98, 65 L. Ed. 214

(1920).

(17) United States v. Behrman, 258 U. S. 280, 42 Sup Ct. 303, 66 L. Ed.619

(1922).

(18) Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5, 45 Sup. Ct. 446, 69 L. Ed. 819

(1926).

(19)Boehm v. United States, 21 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 8th 1927); Nelms v. United

States, 22 F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 9th 1927); Freeman v. United States, 86 F. (2d)

243 (C. C. A. 5th 1936); Hawldas v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 551 (C. C. A. 5th

19-97).

(20)Boyd v. United States, 271 U. S. 104, 46 Sup. Ct. 442, 70 L. Ed. 857 (1926).

(21)Young V. United States, 315 U. S. 257, 62 Sup. Ct. 510, 86 L. Ed. 834

(1942).

(22)Act of February 10, 1939, c. 2, *2551 (a), 53 Stat. at L. 270, 26 U. S. C.

*2551 (a).

(23)DuVall v. United States, 82 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 9th 1936); United States

v. Lindenfield, 142 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 2d 1944); United States v. Aladallah,

149 F. (2d) 219 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).

(24)Supra note 17.

(25)Hobart v. United States, 299 Fed. 784 (C. C. A. 6th 1924).

(26)82 Jour. Am. Med. Assn. 1967 (1924).

(27)Act of January 19, 1929, c. 82, 45 Stat. at L. 1085-1089, Act of June 23,

1936, c. 725, * 1, 49 Stat. at L. 1840, Act of March 28, 1938, c. 55, * 1, 52

Stat. at L. 134, 21 U. S. C. A. **221-237.

(28) v. United States, 284 Fed. 673 (C. C. A. 8th 1923) ; Ratigan v. United

States, 88 F. (2d) 919 (C. C. A. 9th 1937); v. United States, 143 F.

(2d) 953 (C. C. A. 10th 1944) United States v. Abdallah, supra note 23; cf.

Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128 (C. C. A. 4th 1924).

(29)Act of June 14, 1930, c. 488, *8, 46 Stat. at L. 58,, 21 U. S. C. A. *198.

(30)2l Code of Federal Regulations (1939) **201.8-201.12, pp. 1063-1064

(31)96 Jour. Am. Med. Assn. 856 (1931).

I hope this finds you and yours well

Mark E. Armstrong

casca@...

www.top5plus5.com

PAI NW Rep

ICQ #59196115

Mark, If you have this answer on 5plus 5 I'll buy you

a steak!

Is there a limit in the number of pills a physician can write a

prescription for a particular narcotic drug at one given time? In

other words, is there a limit in the quantity of a narcotic that can

be despensed at one time? FDA red flags or basic pharmacopea

standards of practice.

Just curious really but I would much prefer getting enough pain med

to last a month or so; and I will spring for the steak but I cant

grill worth a hoot!

Hope you and the family are doing well.

Warmly

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest guest

Okay .....you owe me a steak......lol...as a matter of fact...you bring

the steak over and I will supply the lobster and I will even marinade the steak

and cook it for us.....hope you are well...the link on the bottom is the link to

the page where I found the info...so as you can see..it is up to the Dr to

decide how much to prescribe...hope that helps...talk to you soon...please let

me know if there is anything else I can do to help. I hope this finds you and

yours well......Mark

THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved opioids, stimulants, and

sedative hypnotics as safe and effective for medical use and commercial

marketing under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1962. This act does

not restrict a physician's prescribing either to labeled indications or to

recommended doses. This policy is clearly stated in the foreword to the

Physician's Desk Reference (1993). Once a product has been approved under the

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for marketing, a physician may prescribe it

for uses, in treatment regimens, or in patient populations that are not included

in the approved labeling (Federal Register 1983). Appropriate medical practice

and patient interest require that physicians be free to administer drugs

according to their best knowledge and judgment (Federal Register 1975).

http://www.medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy/publicat/94appcs.htm

I hope this finds you and yours well

Mark E. Armstrong

casca@...

www.top5plus5.com

PAI NW Rep

ICQ #59196115

Mark, If you have this answer on 5plus 5 I'll buy you

a steak!

Is there a limit in the number of pills a physician can write a

prescription for a particular narcotic drug at one given time? In

other words, is there a limit in the quantity of a narcotic that can

be despensed at one time? FDA red flags or basic pharmacopea

standards of practice.

Just curious really but I would much prefer getting enough pain med

to last a month or so; and I will spring for the steak but I cant

grill worth a hoot!

Hope you and the family are doing well.

Warmly

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest guest

This is the complete article.....talk to you soon.....Mark

Controlled Substances, Medical Practice, and the Law

E. Joranson, M.S.S.W.

Gilson, M.S.

The development of drug control policy in the United States has been

characterized by vacillation between tolerance and intolerance toward drugs

(Musto 1987). Today's war on drugs is distinguished by intense media coverage of

drug-related crime, new antidrug laws, and efforts to educate schoolchildren and

the public to " just say no " to drugs. The message is clear: Drugs are dangerous

and must be avoided. The United States continues to have significant drug abuse

problems that must be addressed, but we should be careful not to reject the

medical benefits of drugs or restrict the ability of physicians to care for

patients.

Antidrug efforts are directed not only at the illegal controlled substances such

as marijuana, heroin, and cocaine, but also at the legal controlled substances

that have important medical uses: the opioids (narcotics), stimulants, and

sedative hypnotics. These efforts involve media campaigns against perceived

overprescribing (Safer and Krager 1992), vigorous enforcement efforts against

suspect prescribers (Benton 1993; Hill 1989; McIntosh 1991a, 1991b; Nowak 1992),

regulations to increase restrictions on prescribing (Weintraub et al. 1991), and

federal proposals to monitor all prescribing to patients of all controlled

substances (Stark 1990).

When controlled substances are used for medical purposes, they can provide great

improvements in the quality of life for millions of people with debilitating

diseases and conditions, including pain, severe anxiety, narcolepsy, and

epilepsy. However, when diverted from the legitimate distribution system, the

nonmedical use of controlled substances can lead to serious public health

problems. For example, there are a small percentage of practitioners who abuse

their privilege to prescribe and are a source of drugs for addicts and the

illicit market. Consequently, it is in the public interest to protect the

medical uses of controlled substances while at the same time preventing their

diversion and abuse. Public policy should recognize the dual effect of

controlled substances on public health to obtain the broadest medical benefit

while reducing the risks of diversion and abuse.

There is troubling evidence that some controlled substances laws and regulations

and their enforcement interfere with medical practice and patient care. In this

chapter we explore whether controlled substances laws and regulations achieve an

appropriate balance between controlling abuse and protecting medical use. The

primary focus is on the opioids (narcotics) that are used in the somatic

treatment of pain, in particular pain due to cancer.

Tragically, cancer pain is often undertreated. Several factors impede pain

management, including inadequate preparation of health care professionals, the

low priority given to pain management, and the effects of antidrug policies.

Although most, if not all, cancer pain can be relieved (Foley 1985; Takeda

1987), it is estimated that one-half to three-quarters of cancer patients with

pain are inadequately treated and that nearly 25% die with severe unrelieved

pain (Daut and Cleeland 1982). The mainstay of cancer pain management is opioid

therapy (World Health Organization 1986). Efforts to improve pain management and

eradicate misuse and abuse of prescription controlled substances take place in a

medical and regulatory environment characterized by misinformation about

opioids. Misinformation about opioids and exaggerated fears of addiction are

prevalent among the professions and medical regulators and are partly

responsible for the undertreatment of pain (Ferrell et al. 1992; Jaffe 1989;

Jasinski 1989; Joranson et al. 1992; 1986).

The Framework of Controlled Substances Policy

Three tiers of law establish the policy framework that governs the medical use

and diversion of controlled substances: 1) international treaties, 2) federal

laws and regulations, and 3) state laws and regulations. As will be seen,

international and federal laws clearly recognize the principle that a balance

should be maintained between controlling drug abuse and ensuring that controlled

substances are available for medical use. However, most state laws do not

achieve this balance and, in some instances, interfere with medical practice.

International Treaties, Drug Control, and Medical Use

Treaties provide the basic legal framework for controlling international and

domestic production and distribution of drugs that have been determined to have

an abuse liability. The principal treaties recognize that many controlled

substances are indispensable to public health and that their availability for

legitimate medical and scientific purposes must be ensured. These treaties are

the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (United Nations 1977b), and the

Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971 (United Nations 1977a). In becoming

a party to a treaty, a government agrees to ensure the availability of

controlled substances for medical purposes. Most, but not all, of the

governments of the world have acceded to these treaties (International Narcotics

Control Board 1991).

The International Narcotics Control Board, the United Nations agency responsible

for monitoring governments' compliance with the treaties, has reported that

opioids are not sufficiently available for legitimate medical purposes

throughout the world and that this is due in part to antidrug abuse laws and

regulations that unduly restrict the availability of opioids for medical use

(International Narcotics Control Board 1989).

A World Health Organization expert committee has also expressed concern that the

fear of drug abuse has curtailed appropriate medical use of opioids,

particularly for the treatment of cancer pain (World Health Organization 1990);

laws are so strict in some countries that physicians cannot prescribe morphine

for cancer pain. The expert committee commented on " multiple copy prescription

programs " that are used in several countries as well as in several states in the

United States.

The extent to which these programmes restrict or inhibit the prescribing of

opioids to patients who need them should be questioned.... Health care workers

may be reluctant to prescribe, stock or dispense opioids if they feel that there

is a possibility of their professional licenses being suspended or revoked by

the governing authority in cases where large quantifies of opioids are provided

to an individual, even though the medical need for such drugs can be proved.

(World Health Organization 1990, p. 39)

Thus, although the purpose of the international treaties is to ensure

availability of drugs for medical use, restrictive laws in some countries limit

the use of opioids for the treatment of pain. To what extent do laws and

regulations in the United States maintain a balance between the control of drug

abuse and the appropriate medical use of opioid analgesics or other controlled

substances?

Federal Law and Medical Practice

THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved opioids, stimulants, and

sedative hypnotics as safe and effective for medical use and commercial

marketing under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1962. This act does

not restrict a physician's prescribing either to labeled indications or to

recommended doses. This policy is clearly stated in the foreword to the

Physician's Desk Reference (1993). Once a product has been approved under the

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for marketing, a physician may prescribe it

for uses, in treatment regimens, or in patient populations that are not included

in the approved labeling (Federal Register 1983). Appropriate medical practice

and patient interest require that physicians be free to administer drugs

according to their best knowledge and judgment (Federal Register 1975).

New uses for drugs are often discovered, reported in medical journals and at

medical meetings, and subsequently may be widely used by the medical

profession.... When physicians go beyond the directions given in the package

insert it does not mean they are acting illegally or unethically, and Congress

does not intend to empower the FDA to interfere with medical practice by

limiting the ability of physicians to prescribe according to their best

judgment. (United States v. Evers 1981)

In addition, the federal courts have supported the principle that the FDA does

not regulate medical practice (United States v. Evers 1981). It is generally

recognized that the states, not the federal government, regulate the practice of

medicine and that federal law generally defers to state law in areas where there

is not a direct conflict (see amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic

Act 1962).

THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT

Opioids, stimulants, and sedative hypnotics are additionally subject to

controlled substances laws because of their abuse liability. The federal

Controlled Substances Act (CSA) (1970) parallels the international treaties, by

regulating production and distribution and prohibiting nonmedical use of

controlled substances, while clearly recognizing their medical value to public

health. The CSA states that " many of the drugs included within this title have a

useful and legitimate medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health

and general welfare of the American people " (p. 834).

Controlled substances are placed in five schedules. Drugs with no accepted

medical use are placed in Schedule I and are available only for scientific

research. Drugs that have been approved for medical use are placed in Schedules

II-V according to potential for abuse, with drugs having the highest potential

for abuse assigned to Schedule II. Although prescriptions for certain controlled

substances must be in writing, and refills are limited, the fact that a drug has

been approved for medical use does not change when it becomes a controlled

substance.

Today's medical and psychiatric practitioners are probably more familiar with

legal restrictions over controlled substances prescribing than they are with the

legal provisions that were included in the CSA to ensure that drug law

enforcement does not interfere with medical practice. For many years prior to

the adoption of the CSA in 1970, narcotic prescribing was marked by controversy

between drug law enforcers and physicians (Musto 1987). This controversy reached

its pinnacle in 1970 during congressional consideration of the new Controlled

Substances Act. Congress was considering legislation drafted by the Bureau of

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the Department of Justice. The bill proposed

that the Department of Justice and an advisory committee appointed by the

attorney general would be solely responsible for making the scientific and

medical findings necessary to place a drug under the control of the CSA

(Committee on Ways and Means 1970). There was deep concern in the scientific and

medical community when it was learned that this bill would give law enforcement

complete authority over scientific and medical decisions (Committee on Ways and

Means 1970). Following testimony from numerous physicians, the American Medical

Association, and the American Psychiatric Association, Congress adopted a

different bill that placed the responsibility for medical and scientific

determinations in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the

Department of Health and Human Services) and specified that its determinations

were binding on drug control decisions made by the attorney general (Controlled

Substances Act 1970). Other provisions of law and legislative history make it

clear that the CSA is not intended to interfere either with medical practice or

the availability of these drugs for patient care (Joranson 1990a; United States

House of Representatives 1970).

The availability of controlled substances for medical purposes is ensured.

In an effort to control diversion from excessive manufacture of drugs, the CSA

gives the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) authority to set production

quotas for a number of opioids, stimulants, and sedative hypnotics. Quotas must

accommodate all legitimate medical and scientific needs (Controlled Substances

Act 1970). In one instance, however, the DEA tried to stop diversion of

methylphenidate at the retail level by setting a very low production quota. This

action led to an official statement of the principle of " undisputed proposition

of drug availability " :

The CSA requirement for a determination of legitimate medical need is based on

the undisputed proposition that patients and pharmacies should be able to obtain

sufficient quantities of methylphenidate, or of any Schedule II drug, to fill

prescriptions. A therapeutic drug should be available to patients when they need

it.... The harshest impact of actual and threatened shortages falls on the

patients who must take methylphenidate, not on the manufacturers to whom the

quotas directly apply. Actual drug shortages, or even threatened ones, can

seriously interfere with patients' lives and those of their families. (Federal

Register 1988, pp. 50593-50594; italics added)

In addition to recalculating the quotas for methylphenidate, the DEA has

expressed willingness to grant additional quotas for opioids to respond to

improvements in the treatment of cancer pain (Max 1989).

Medical practice is not regulated by the CSA. The states, not the federal

government, have the authority to regulate medical practice. This authority is

based on the police power in state constitutions and underlies the medical

practice acts that are designed to protect the public health and safety (Parmet

1989). The CSA was not intended to supersede the authority of the Federal Food,

Drug, and Cosmetic Act (United States House of Representatives 1970) and

provides no authority for the DEA to regulate medical decisions such as the

indications for which a drug may be prescribed and the amount or the duration of

therapy.

However, the DEA promulgated a regulation in 1986 that could negatively affect

medical practice in the care of cancer patients. The regulation placed the new

synthetic tetrahydrocannabinol product (THC) into Schedule II following its

approval for medical use by the FDA (Federal Register 1986). Because of the

drug's chemical relation to marijuana, the regulation stated that physicians who

choose to prescribe the drug for other than the specifically labeled use (for

the treatment of cancer chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting that is

unresponsive to other modalities) may subject themselves to investigation for

possible violation of the CSA. The DEA argued that the policy was necessary to

comply with United States treaty obligations governing marijuana and THC under

the Convention on Psychotropic Drugs. Many medical organizations objected to

this interference in medical decisions and in FDA policy that allows off-label

prescribing. Any rationale for the DEA policy disappeared when THC's

international classification was changed to reflect its medical use, but the

regulation has not been repealed.

Further, the Pharmacist's Manual (United States Department of Justice 1986)

lists indications " which may indicate that a purported prescription order was

not issued for a legitimate medical purpose in the course of the physician's

professional practice " (p. 31), including " Does the purported prescription order

contain an indication other than one found in the package insert? " (p. 32).

The DEA's enforcement authority is intended to be concentrated on those

practitioners who engage in unlawful use of controlled substances outside of

medical practice. Indeed, it is unlawful for a practitioner to prescribe a

controlled substance except in the course of professional practice. The phrase

in the course of professional practice defines the boundaries of practitioner

investigations and prosecutions for the DEA.

It matters not that such acts might constitute terrible medicine or

malpractice. They may reflect the grossest form of medical misconduct or

negligence. They are nevertheless legal. On the other hand, any act of

prescribing, dispensing or distributing of a controlled substance other than in

the course of the registrant's professional practice is an illegal distribution

of that controlled substance, subject to the same penalties as if the drug were

sold by the lowest pusher on the street. (Stone 1983, p. 23)

The intent of the CSA to avoid interference with medical practice was reaffirmed

in 1978 when Congress enacted a law to satisfy United States obligations under

the Convention on Psychotropic Substances. In so doing, Congress determined that

control of psychotropic substances (e.g., tetrahydrocannabinol, benzodiazepines)

in the United States should be accomplished within the framework of the CSA to

ensure that their availability " for useful and legitimate medical and scientific

purposes will not be unduly restricted " (Controlled Substances Act 1970, p.

836). Further, the law stated that nothing in the treaties was to " interfere

with ethical medical practice in this country as determined by the secretary of

Health and Human Services on the basis of a consensus of the American medical

and scientific community " (p. 836).

Treatment of addiction is distinguished from treatment of intractable pain. It

is essential to differentiate between prescribing opioids for intractable pain

and prescribing them for addiction. When Congress adopted the new CSA, it also

settled a long controversy between drug law enforcement and health officials

about the lengths a physician could go in prescribing opioids to narcotic

addicts (United States House of Representatives 1970). Congress decided that

prescribing opioids for narcotic addiction was outside of professional practice

and, therefore, unlawful under the CSA, unless the physician was specifically

registered in the Narcotic Treatment Program to use methadone to maintain or

detoxify narcotic addicts. Consequently, the definition of addict becomes

critically important, particularly in view of long-standing problems in defining

terms associated with drug abuse phenomena. The CSA defines addict as a person

who " habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals,

health, safety, or who is so far addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to

have lost power of self-control with reference to his addiction " (Controlled

Substances Act 1970, p. 836).

The CSA definition of addict is imprecise and does not parallel the definition

of drug dependence of the World Health Organization (1969) or the DSM-IV

(American Psychiatric Association 1994). The definition does not distinguish an

addict from a patient who is simply physically dependent on an opioid for pain

management. However, controlled substances regulations promulgated by the DEA

make it clear that a physician who prescribes opioids to treat intractable pain

over an extended period is considered to be acting within the professional

practice of medicine.

This section is not intended to impose any limitation on a physician or

authorized hospital staff to ... administer or dispense (including prescribe)

narcotic drugs to persons with intractable pain in which no relief or cure is

possible or none has been found after reasonable efforts. (Code of Federal

Regulations, Title 21 Part 1306.07 [c], April 1988)

State Laws and Prescribing of Controlled Substances

Like federal law, state controlled substances laws prohibit nonmedical use of

controlled substances. Unlike federal law, most state controlled substances

laws, although they permit prescribing, do not explicitly recognize either the

public health benefits of controlled substances or the need to balance their

control by ensuring availability for medical purposes. In fact, some state laws

and regulations that have been enacted to deal with drug abuse and diversion

clearly interfere with medical practice and patient care.

Today's state controlled substances laws are based on a 1970 model law called

the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA). The purpose of the 1970 UCSA was

to repeal a plethora of antidrug laws that individual states had adopted since

the turn of the century and replace them with a single unified framework to

achieve consistency in national drug control policy (National Conference of

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1970). But instead of establishing a

federal-like balance of power between law enforcement and medical science, the

UCSA only mentioned in a prefatory note that states could consider establishing

an advisory committee to the regulatory agency, an alternative that was rejected

by the Congress. The UCSA did not mention the importance of ensuring the

availability of controlled substances. A definition of addict was also not

included, leaving the states without a uniform definition, such as had been

developed by the World Health Organization (1969). The UCSA, like the CSA, did

not regulate medical decisions such as the quantity of a drug that may be

prescribed at one time.

Although the UCSA was adopted in some form in most states, a number of states

did not repeal old laws. In addition, some states have adopted new laws and

regulations that restrict prescribing and dispensing of FDA-approved drugs. For

example, South Carolina's controlled substances law prohibits the prescribing of

any controlled substance for a use other than approved by the FDA, and the use

of methadone as an analgesic is restricted to patients in hospitals (South

Carolina Health Code 1984). A review of state-controlled substances law reveals

additional examples of nonuniform provisions that interfere with the use of

controlled substances in medical practice (Joranson 1990a). The following are

several examples:

PAIN PATIENTS MAY BE CONFUSED WITH ADDICTS

It should be recalled that federal law, which is applicable in every state,

defines addict as an individual who is a danger to society, whose need for

opioids can be legally provided for only by specially registered narcotic

treatment programs, and for whom a physician may not prescribe opioids unless

for pain. A number of state definitions allow confusion of an addict with a pain

patient who is only physically dependent on an opioid (Joranson 1990a). However,

physical dependence is a common physiologic consequence of using opioids to

treat chronic pain and should not be confused with addiction (American Pain

Society 1992). For example, the New York State Controlled Substances Act defines

addict as " a person who habitually uses a narcotic drug and who by reason of

such use is dependent thereon " (New York State Controlled Substances Act, Sect

3302. 1, p. 467). A companion provision states that controlled substances may

not be prescribed for an addict, unless he or she is a " bona fide patient

suffering from an incurable and fatal disease such as cancer or advanced

tuberculosis " (New York State Controlled Substances Act, Sect 3351 , p. 524).

Some states require physicians to report to the government those patients who

have been treated longer than several months with a Schedule II controlled

substance. New York requires these people to be reported on a special state form

as addicts (Joranson 1990a). These laws are similar to one in California that

was enacted many years ago, apparently as an alternative to " the removal of

abusable Schedule II drugs from the commercial market " (Tennant 1981, p. 193).

The law required physicians to report habitues to the state's Bureau of Narcotic

Enforcement. Before repeal, the largest single category of habitues to opioids

that had been reported were individuals with diagnoses of cancer (Joranson

1990a).

THE QUANTITY PRESCRIBED MAY BE LIMITED TO LESS THAN MEDICALLY INDICATED

Although federal law does not limit the amount that can be prescribed, a number

of states have restricted the number of dosage units that can be dispensed to as

little as 100 dosage units or a 5-day supply (Joranson 1990a) (see Table 8-1).

Since it is not uncommon for a cancer patient to take 30-50 pills a day for pain

management, prescriptions must be dated every 2 or 3 days. Restricting the

prescription amount to less than the medical needs of the patient can result in

greater expense to obtain more frequent prescriptions as well as additional

dispensing fees. Unfortunately, pain management may also be affected. One

Indiana physician has a number of cancer pain patients who need large quantities

of opioids and whose insurance plan requires the use of a mail-order pharmacy in

New Jersey (which limits dispensing to 120 dosage units per prescription). This

physician, whose prescriptions are mailed to New Jersey every few days, reports

that his patients ration their medication because of delays in delivery

(Joranson 1990a). As a result, these patients experience pain that could be

relieved if they had a predictable and sufficient supply of medication.

In Wisconsin, the Controlled Substances Board found that the " 120 dosage units

or a 34-day supply whichever is less " rule was confusing and unnecessarily

limited prescribing of controlled substances, especially in the treatment of

cancer pain. Further, the rule was not useful in preventing diversion (Joranson

and Bachman 1988). In cooperation with the Pharmacy Examining Board, the rule

was amended in 1991 to delete the 120 dosage unit restriction.

Limitations on the number of dosage units for controlled substance prescriptions

are not confined to laws and regulations. Mail-order pharmacy members of the

American Managed Care Pharmacy Association have guidelines that specify that

dispensing of Schedule II controlled substances must be limited to the amount

necessary to meet the legitimate medical needs of the patient.

The dispensing of Schedule II substances should be limited to a 30 day supply,

or 120 dosage units, whichever is less.... These maximum quantity limitations

enable the patient to obtain a reasonable quantity of controlled substances to

assist in an established medical regimen. (American Managed Care Pharmacy

Association, undated, p. 3)

American Managed Care Pharmacy Association materials state that these guidelines

are consistent with the policies of the DEA, although as stated previously,

neither federal law nor the DEA regulations limit the quantity of a Schedule II

prescription. Nevertheless, the DEA wrote to the American Managed Care Pharmacy

Association in 1990: " The DEA commends the efforts your members have made to the

implementation of the Guidelines. The Office of Diversion Control is pleased to

offer our continued support of your Association " (American Managed Care Pharmacy

Association, undated, p. 3).

Table 8-1. Examples of state restrictions for Schedule II controlled substances

State Restriction

Missouri 30-day supply (may be increased up to 6 months if medical reason

is described on prescription)

New Hampshire 34-day supply or 100 dosage units, whichever is less (C-III

also) (up to 60-day supply for amphetamine or methylphenidate if for ADD or

narcolepsy)

New Jersey 30-day supply or 120 dosage forms, whichever is less

New York 30-day supply for C-II (triplicate) (except up to 3 months if for

relief of pain in patients 65 years of age or over and suffering from diseases

known to be chronic and incurable; minimal brain dysfunction in patients not

more than 16 years of age; convulsive disorders, narcolepsy, or panic

disorders). Same if for written Rx for C-III, IV, and V; if an oral Rx for C-III

or V, up to a 5-day supply; if an oral Rx for C-IV, up to 30 days or 100 dosage

units, whichever is less

Rhode Island 100 dosage units per prescription; no more than 100 dosage

units may be dispensed at one time (C-II, III, IV)

South Carolina 30-day supply or 120 dosage units, whichever is less

Utah 1-month supply

Wisconsin 34-day supply (except up to a 90-day supply for C-III or IV

anticonvulsant substance)

PRESCRIPTION MONITORING PROGRAMS INTERFERE WITH MEDICAL PRACTICE

Multiple copy prescription programs (MCPPs), or " triplicate " prescription

programs, began in the United States with the New York program in 1913 (see

Table 8-2). These programs are established to curtail diversion of Schedule II

drugs " without adversely affecting the supply of medication to the legitimate

user " (United States Department of Justice 1987, p. 4). MCPPs typically require

physicians and pharmacists to use a special multipart government prescription

form so that prescribing and dispensing of certain drugs to patients can be

monitored by a designated state regulatory or enforcement agency. MCPPs differ

from state to state. For example, the New York law provides that prescriptions

for all drugs subject to the triplicate program must be written and are not

refillable; these are controls that are reserved for Schedule II drugs under the

CSA and UCSA. The result is that Schedule II prescription controls were imposed

on the benzodiazepines (Schedule IV) when New York added these drugs to the

triplicate prescription program in 1989.

The DEA reports that implementation of MCPPs results in prescription decreases

of 50% or more in the period following implementation, reduction in the state's

per capita consumption of the substances, and significant reduction in physician

requests for triplicate forms in successive years. Administrators of MCPPs

insist that these programs do not compromise the quality of medical care;

indeed, they claim that medical practice has been improved because practitioners

tend to examine more closely their reasons for prescribing and often choose a

less potent analgesic or a smaller quantity (United States Department of justice

1987). The DEA strongly supports implementation of legislation to adopt these

programs in all states (United States Department of Justice 1987, 1990).

Table 8-2. Multiple copy prescription programs Year State

1913-1915; 1972 New York

1940 California

1943 Hawaii (duplicate)

1961 Illinois

1967 Idaho

1978 Rhode Island (duplicate)

1982 Texas

1989 Michigan

1989 Indiana

The Risk of Regulatory Scrutiny

Researchers, clinicians, and policy specialists have expressed concern that

strict prescription monitoring can interfere with appropriate prescribing and

limit patient care (Angarola and Wray 1989; Foley 1989; Hill 1989; Joranson

1990a; Max 1990; Portenoy 1990). Indeed, researchers have reported that an MCPP

hampered the prescribing of Schedule II opioids for terminally ill patients with

chronic pain (Berina et al. 1985). The substitution of weaker opioids in lower

schedules for more potent opioids was encouraged by an MCPP (Sigler et al.

1984). Furthermore, factors such as " excessive regulation " and " reluctance to

prescribe " were identified as significantly greater barriers to pain management

by physicians who treat cancer patients in states with MCPPs than by physicians

in states without these programs (Von Roenn et al. 1993). Of the physician

members of the American Pain Society who responded to a survey, 40% agreed that

their prescribing of opioids for chronic nonmalignant pain was influenced by

legal concerns (D. C. Turk, personal communication to D. E. Joranson, December

1992; Turk and Brody 1992). A pilot study found that more than one-half of

physicians surveyed reported that they would reduce the dose or quantity, reduce

the number of refills, or choose a drug in a lower schedule because of concern

about regulatory scrutiny (Weissman et al. 1991).

Although documented, these concerns are not necessarily recognized as valid by

regulatory agencies:

Nothing in the multiple copy program limits or restricts medical judgement as

to which drug or amount to prescribe. They must simply write the prescription on

a different form.... Physicians do not abandon their professional training,

oath, and duty to their patients because a prescription for a specific drug

requires a state-issued prescription blank.... The concern about MCPPs

interfering in the management of pain is frequently raised in reference to,

specifically, cancer pain. The word cancer evokes an emotional, fearful response

in most people, and this fear and emotion have been exploited by MCPP

opponents.... The management of pain is not influenced by MCPPs, rather, it is a

function of physician education. (United States Department of Justice 1990, pp.

40-42)

To explore further whether there is valid cause for physicians to perceive risk

associated with investigation by regulatory agencies, we studied a sample of the

members of state medical examining boards throughout the United States (Joranson

et al. 1992). State medical boards administer medical practice laws and have the

duty to protect the public health from substandard, incompetent, and unlawful

practices. These boards determine what constitutes unprofessional conduct and

have the authority to grant, suspend, deny, limit, or revoke a license to

practice medicine.

A total of 627 medical board members were surveyed in 1991 with the cooperation

of the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States. We obtained a

49% response rate. The mean age of the respondents was 55, and they had received

their medical degrees between 1926 and 1987; the median year was 1961. The

physician board members were asked to rank the opioid analgesics they would and

would not recommend for management of moderate to severe cancer pain. These

regulator-physicians tended to prefer drugs like aspirin and acetaminophen alone

or in combination with codeine instead of the potent opioids like morphine and

hydromorphone that are preferred for moderate to severe pain. This may be an

example of the customary prescribing patterns that have been discussed by

(1986) in his treatise on " opiophobia. " Further, most of the board members

indicated that " addiction " includes physical dependence. Only 10% chose

psychological dependence alone.

Board members were also asked to give their opinion on the legality of

prescribing opioids for more than several months to chronic pain patients with

and without cancer. Only 75% of medical board members were confident that

prescribing opioids for chronic cancer pain was both legal and acceptable

medical practice; 14% felt it was legal but would discourage it; and 5% believed

the practice to be illegal. If the patient's chronic pain was from a

nonmalignant source, only 12% were confident that the practice was both legal

and medically acceptable; 47% would discourage it; and nearly 33% would

investigate the practice as illegal. If the patient had a history of drug abuse,

the perception that prescribing opioids was illegal greatly increased. The fact

that 80% of the medical board members stated that their medical board was the

agency most likely to investigate improper prescribing of controlled substances

in their state underscores the significance of these data.

Overall, the survey suggested that medical board members lack knowledge about

the use of opioids and other controlled substances to manage pain. To varying

degrees they would also discourage or investigate the prescribing of opioid

analgesics for intractable pain, particularly if the patient does not have

cancer but especially if the patient had a history of drug abuse. It is

important to recognize that the presenting problem in each scenario was pain,

not addiction. There was also confusion about the definition of addiction.

Addiction is not established by the presence of physical dependence or

tolerance, but rather by psychological dependence (American Pain Society 1992).

Given these results, it is not hard to understand why physicians might avoid

extended opioid prescribing for a patient with pain. In fact, concerns have been

expressed about vigorous investigations of physicians for what was considered to

be appropriate prescribing of opioids for pain (Benton 1993; Hill 1989; McIntosh

1991a, 1991b; Nowak 1992).

Conclusions and Future Directions

If it is in the public interest that drugs meet rigorous standards of

effectiveness and safety, it should be of equal interest to public health that

drug laws and regulations be held to the same standards (Woods 1990). In fact,

efforts are emerging to examine controlled substances policy as it relates to

the prescribing of opioids for pain and to take appropriate action (Joranson

1990a). The Federation of State Medical Boards and the American Pain Society

have sponsored educational symposia for medical regulators, and some medical

boards are issuing new prescribing policies in the area of pain management

(Joranson et al. 1992). The DEA has issued a statement that controlled

substances should be prescribed when there is a legitimate medical need (United

States Department of Justice 1990). Ultimately, if state and federal agencies

have reasonable policies that are communicated to physicians, it may be possible

to reach the ideal circumstance in which physicians will not view as a threat

inquiries from these agencies about their prescribing.

A revised UCSA was given to the states in 1990 in an effort to help bring state

controlled substances laws up to date with many new drug control provisions in

the federal CSA and to improve the balance between drug control and medical use

of controlled substances (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State

Laws 1990). The 1990 UCSA 1) gives modest recognition to the medical value of

controlled substances-alternative language has been suggested to emphasize this

key principle (Joranson 1990b); 2) urges states to ensure that their definition

of terms does not allow patients who are physically dependent on opioids for the

treatment of pain to be confused with addicts; 3) clarifies that opioid

treatment of intractable pain is part of medical practice and thus outside the

scope of controlled substances violations; and 4) establishes a model

interagency diversion control program to coordinate the use of existing

information, authority, and resources to identify and prosecute individuals who

are responsible for diverting controlled substances to illicit uses. The

progress to balance state-controlled substances laws could be facilitated if

professional organizations were to take an interest in adoption of the 1990 UCSA

in their respective state legislatures.

As we pass through another cycle of intense concern about drugs, we must take

care not to discard medical and scientific knowledge nor to ignore or stigmatize

those among us, especially those with chronic illnesses, who benefit from the

essential medical uses of controlled substances. Controlled substances are

essential to the quality of life of millions of patients. A balanced drug policy

should provide ample authority to address diversion problems without interfering

in the use of controlled substances in the medical care of patients. Drug laws

have a dual purpose; achieving both ends must be emphasized, for only in this

way will the greatest health benefit be realized.

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I hope this finds you and yours well

Mark E. Armstrong

casca@...

www.top5plus5.com

PAI NW Rep

ICQ #59196115

Mark, If you have this answer on 5plus 5 I'll buy you

a steak!

Is there a limit in the number of pills a physician can write a

prescription for a particular narcotic drug at one given time? In

other words, is there a limit in the quantity of a narcotic that can

be despensed at one time? FDA red flags or basic pharmacopea

standards of practice.

Just curious really but I would much prefer getting enough pain med

to last a month or so; and I will spring for the steak but I cant

grill worth a hoot!

Hope you and the family are doing well.

Warmly

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Guest guest

In Canada I don't think the dr really controls it, but I do know the

insurance co limits me to one months supply

in Oshawa

Mark, If you have this answer on 5plus 5 I'll buy

you a steak!

Is there a limit in the number of pills a physician can write a

prescription for a particular narcotic drug at one given time? In

other words, is there a limit in the quantity of a narcotic that can

be despensed at one time? FDA red flags or basic pharmacopea

standards of practice.

Just curious really but I would much prefer getting enough pain med

to last a month or so; and I will spring for the steak but I cant

grill worth a hoot!

Hope you and the family are doing well.

Warmly

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