Governing the 'Dark Side of Science'

[Guest guest]

Governing the 'Dark Side of Science'

As bioterrorism grows, questions arise over how to guard against research

misuse

By Eugene Russo

Recent bioterrorist attacks may not only influence the content of future

research studies, but the way those studies are reviewed, monitored, and

published. On Dec. 6, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious

Diseases announced several new initiatives intended to encourage basic

research in bioterrorism-related areas. The initiatives, which expand on old

programs and introduce new ones, will not be funded by " new " money, but

rather via a reallocation of the $81.6 million in NIAID bioterrorism research

funding allocated for FY2002 prior to the Sept. 11 attacks.Among the top

priorities, according to NIAID's director of the division of microbiology and

infectious diseases, Carole Heilman: an improved anthrax vaccine, an

alternative smallpox vaccine, alternative smallpox drugs, and new

standardized animal models for evaluating such approaches. The initiatives (

<A HREF= " http://www.niaid.nih.gov/dmid/bioterrorism " >

www.niaid.nih.gov/dmid/bioterrorism</A>) also call for a " rapid response "

grant program that accelerates the review of funding applications, cut down

from a maximum of 10 to five months. " We clearly have accelerated, on our

part, the review and the reward, " says Heilman. " We also have tried to

streamline the amount of paperwork necessary for the investigators. "

Even as bioterrorism research accelerates, it creates unique research

practice dilemmas. A bill introduced last November by senators Dianne

Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) seeks to establish strict new

certification requirements for labs dealing with a list of designated

bioterrorist agents. Speaking in December at a session on bioterrorism

research at the American Society for Cell Biology meeting, Tara O'Toole,

director of the s Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies,

cautioned that the bill, though well intentioned, may not only unnecessarily

intrude on bioterrorism research but also fail to be effective. For example,

genetic alterations to any of the agents listed could make them " exempt " from

the regulations. Also discussed at the ASCB session: the extent to which

researchers should investigate how to circumvent their own research on

stymieing bioterrorist agents, and whether these and other bioterrorism

studies—which may be dangerous if they fell into the wrong hands—should be

subject to censorship rather than freely published in journals.

Heilman notes that " freedom of information versus security " issues are

frequently discussed at NIAID, but that no censorship mechanism is in place.

The National Academy of Sciences plans to hold a series of public meetings on

this topic starting this month. " You guys and your colleagues, " O'Toole told

an ASCB session filled with mostly scientists, " have got to get engaged on

how we're going to govern the dark side of science. "

Eugene Russo (<A HREF= " mailto:erusso@... " >

erusso@...</A>) is a contributing editor.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

<A HREF= " http:// " >

http://www.the-scientist.com/yr2002/jan/russo_p21_020121.html</A>