Anthrax-An Inside Job

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http://www.fas.org/bwc/news/anthraxreport.htm Analysis of the Source of the Anthrax Attacks 17 JANUARY 2002 Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Federation of American Scientists The Present Situation The FBI has surely known for several months that the anthrax attack was an inside job. A government estimate for the number of scientists involved in the US anthrax program over the last five years is 200 people. According to a former defense scientist the number of defense scientists with hands-on anthrax experience and the necessary access is smaller, under 50. The FBI has received short lists of specific suspects with credible motives from a number of knowledgeable inside sources, and has found or been given clues (beyond those presented below) that could lead to incriminating evidence. By now the FBI must have a good idea of who the perpetrator is. There may be two factors accounting for the lack of public acknowledgement and the paucity of information being released: a fear that embarrassing details might become public, and a need for secrecy in order to acquire sufficient hard evidence to convict the perpetrator. Anthrax Strain All letter samples contain the same strain of anthrax, corresponding to the AMES strain in the Northern Arizona University database (which has been used for identification). The Ames strain possessed by N. Arizona University is referred to herein as the "reference strain." That strain was obtained by LSU from Porton Down (UK) in 1997 (the sample was marked "10-32" meaning no. 10 of 32 samples sent); Porton had gotten it from Fort Detrick. The confusion about different anthrax isolates called "Ames" is no longer relevant to the situation, thanks to recent genetic analyses (see below). Contrary to early speculation, there are no more than about 20 laboratories known to have the Ames strain. The names of 15 of these have been found in the open literature (see Appendix). Of these, probably only about four in the US might possibly have the capability for weaponizing anthrax. Those four include both US military laboratories and a government contractor. Genetic analysis performed at Northern Arizona University on Ames strain samples from Fort Detrick (USAMRIID), Dug way Proving Ground, the UK defense establishment at Porton, Louisiana State University and Northern Arizona University has shown that all of these laboratories possess identical anthrax stocks that match the letter anthrax perfectly (in the limited analyses that have been done). All these stocks were originally derived from Fort Detrick's. USAMRIID acknowledges that it also provided Ames to the Canadian defense establishment at Suffield, the University of New Mexico, and Battelle Memorial Institute (a large contracting organization with laboratories and personnel in many locations including military laboratories). Excluding the three academic institutions, two of which are intimately involved in the investigation, and the two foreign defense laboratories, places the focus on USAMRIID, Dugway and Battelle as the source of the Ames strain for the letters. The complete sequence has been determined for the genomes of both the anthrax used in the Florida attack and the Ames reference strain to which it corresponds. This work was done under government contract by the Institute for Genetic Research, a private non-profit organization. The results have not been made public but they are in government hands and there has been no retraction of the oft-repeated official statement that the letter anthrax matches the Ames reference strain. Analysis of trace contaminants in the letter anthrax has probably been carried out but not reported. The results could indicate whether the anthrax was grown in liquid medium (and what kind of medium), or on petri dishes; the latter would likely rule out large-scale preparation. It has been estimated that the perpetrator used a total of about 10g in the letters. Anthrax Weaponization "Weaponization" is used here to mean preparation of the form of anthrax found in the Daschle letter: fine particles, very narrow size range, treated to eliminate static charge so it won't clump and will float in the air. The weaponization process used was extraordinarily effective. The particles have a narrow size range (1.5-3 microns diameter), typical of the optimal US process The extraordinary concentration (one trillion spores per gram) and purity of the letter anthrax is believed to be characteristic of material made by the optimal US process. The optimal US weaponization process is secret-Bill , its inventor, holds five secret patents on the process and says it involves a combination of chemicals . There is no evidence that any other country possesses the formula. Under the microscope, the letter anthrax appears to be unmilled. Milled anthrax spores are identifiable because they contain debris. The optimal US process does not use milling. The Daschle sample contains a special form of silica used in the US process. It does not contain bentonite (used by the Iraqis). A "coating" on the spores in the letter sample, indicative of the secret US process, has been observed. The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Washington, DC has studied the sample using an energy dispersive X-ray specroscope, which can detect the presence of extremely tiny quantities of chemicals; traces of several chemicals have been found (but not reported, presumably for security reasons). All the letters probably contained the same material. The clumping of the anthrax in the two letters mailed on Sept 18 (to NBC and the NY Post) probably resulted from the letters getting wet in the course of mail processing or delivery, according to Army scientists. This conclusion is strengthened by the similarity of the Florida anthrax (the first to be observed, probably also mailed on Sept 18) to that in the Daschle letter, mailed Oct 9. The letter anthrax is reportedly of higher quality than that made by the US before 1969. Therefore the letter anthrax was probably made more recently, using a process similar to the secret, optimal US process. If the anthrax was weaponized by the perpetrator himself, there may be some differences from anthrax weaponized by the government, depending on the availability of materials to the perpetrator and the conditions of preparation. OTHER CLUES Scientists formerly at USAMRIID say that it would have been easy for a scientist working with anthrax to remove a sample of the Ames strain from the lab. Only a miniscule amount would be needed, and security has been lax. On the other hand, experts believe that it would be extremely difficult to steal 10g of weaponized anthrax from a government lab. Thus, the perpetrator very likely grew and weaponized the letter anthrax himself. There was only one week between Sept 11 and Sept 18, when the first two letters (and probably another letter, never found, to AMI) were postmarked. This suggests that the anthrax was already in hand, and the attack largely planned, before Sept 11. A classified report dated February, 1999 discusses responses to an anthrax attack through the mail. The report, precipitated by a series of false anthrax mailings, was written by , inventor of the US weaponization process, under a CIA contract to SAIC. The report describes what the US military could do and what a terrorist might be able to achieve. According to the NY Times (12 Dec. 01) the report predicted about 2.5g of anthrax per envelope (the Daschle letter contained 2g) and assumed a poorer quality of anthrax than that found in the Daschle letter. If the perpetrator had access to the materials and information necessary for the attack, he must have had security clearance or other means for accessing classified information, and may therefore have seen the report and used it as a model for the attack. An anonymous letter was sent to police, apparently in September, accusing an Egyptian-born American scientist who had been laid off by USAMRIID of being a terrorist. The FBI questioned and released the accused scientist as innocent. Details of the letter have not been released. Could this letter have been sent by the perpetrator (who would likely have known about the USAMRIID lay-offs) to cover his traces? The perpetrator did not aim to kill but to create public fear. The letters warned of anthrax or the need to take antibiotics, making it possible for those who handled the letters to protect themselves; and it is unlikely that the perpetrator would have anticipated that the rough treatment of mail in letter sorters, etc, would force anthrax spores through the pores of the envelopes (which were taped to keep the anthrax inside) and infect postal workers and others. The perpetrator was probably ready before Sept. 11 and simply took advantage of the likelihood that Sept. 11 would throw suspicion on Muslim terrorists. Was the perpetrator trying to push the US toward some retaliatory military action? The perpetrator must have realized in advance that the anthrax attack would result in the strengthening of US defense and response capabilities. This is not likely to have been a goal of anti-American terrorists, who would also be unlikely to warn the victims in advance. Perhaps the perpetrator stood to gain in some way from increased funding and recognition for biodefense programs. Financial beneficiaries would include the BioPort Corp., the source of the US anthrax vaccine, and other potential vaccine contractors. Expert analysts for the FBI believe that the letters were written by a Westerner, not a Middle Easterner or Muslim, although the text was clearly intended to imply the latter. The choice of a variety of media as targets seems to have been cleverly designed to ensure a broad spectrum of publicity about the attacks. The choice of Senators Daschle and Leahy suggests that the perpetrator may lean to the political right and may have some specific grudge against those Senators. The perpetrator successfully covered every personal trace when he prepared and mailed the letters, which suggests that he had forensic training or experience. Even if the perpetrator did not make the anthrax himself, just filling the letters with it was a dangerous operation. The perpetrator therefore must have received the anthrax vaccine recently (it requires a yearly booster shot). The vaccine is in short supply and is not generally accessible, and vaccination records are undoubtedly available. The perpetrator also appears to have special expertise in evading contamination while handling weaponized anthrax. Government Statements, Actions and Chronology On 13 Jan. 02 Homeland Security Director Ridge said "the primary direction of the investigation is turned inward" toward domestic terrorists. On 2 Dec. 01 a law enforcement official close to the federal investigation called the concept of a government insider, or someone in contact with an insider, "the most likely hypothesis…it's definitely reasonable." Another American official was quoted in the same article saying that, in addition to military laboratories, "there are other government and contractor facilities that do classified work with access to dangerous strains, but it's highly likely that the material in the anthrax letters came from a person or persons who really had great expertise. We haven't seen any other artifacts that point us elsewhere." Secret or questionable biodefense projects tend to be given to the CIA, DOE or other agencies and contractors instead of to DOD, in order to maintain deniability (for example, only DOD programs have been reported by the US in the annual information exchange about biodefense activities, under the Biological Weapons Convention). Many contractor scientists work in government labs. A CIA spokesman says that CIA scientists work with other government agencies and contractors on the biodefense program. Chronology: Analytical data on the anthrax in the letters became available to investigators in late October, 2001. The FBI then began questioning former government scientists. On 31 Oct. it was reported that the US rejected a UN resolution offered by France to condemn the anthrax attack, on the grounds that it could have been domestic terrorism. On 9 Nov. the FBI released a profile of the perpetrator as a lone, male domestic terrorist, obviously one with a scientific background and laboratory experience who could handle hazardous materials. In early Dec. the FBI said it was investigating government and contractor labs possessing the Ames strain, and individuals who had access to them. On 16 Dec. the FBI said it was focusing on a contractor that worked with the CIA. At about the same time the FBI said it was interested in non-military individuals who had received the anthrax vaccine. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said on 19 Nov. that "We don't know…at the moment, in a way that we could make public, where the anthrax attacks came from." Senate Majority Leader Daschle, recipient of one of the anthrax letters and in frequent contact with investigators, said on 8 Dec. that the perpetrator was probably someone with a military background. Ari Fleischer, the White House spokesman, said on 17 Dec. that it is increasingly "looking like it was a domestic source." After a series of uncontrolled statements to the media, relevant experts have been asked to keep quiet and, in some cases, appear to have been asked to "correct" former statements. Possible Portrait of the Anthrax Perpetrator Insider in US biodefense, doctoral degree in a relevant branch of biology Middle-aged American Experienced and skilled in working with hazardous pathogens, including anthrax, and avoiding contamination Works for a CIA contractor in Washington, DC area Has up-to-date vaccination with anthrax vaccine Has clearance for access to classified information Worked in USAMRIID laboratory in the past, in some capacity, and has access now Knows Bill and has probably learned a thing or two about weaponization from him, informally Has had training or experience in covering evidence May have had an UNSCOM connection Has had a dispute with a government agency Has a private location where the materials for the attack were accumulated and prepared Worked on the letters alone or with peripheral encouragement and assistance Fits FBI profile Has the necessary expertise, access and a past history indicating appropriate capabilities and temperament Has been questioned by FBI Comments A recent report by the Congressional General Accounting Office, as well as many recent statements by military and non-governmental experts in the BW field, holds that terrorists are unlikely to be able to mount a major biological attack without substantial assistance from a government sponsor. The recent anthrax attack was a minor one but nonetheless we now see that it was made possible by a sophisticated government program. It is reassuring to know that it was not perpetrated by a lone terrorist without state support. It is not reassuring, however, to discover that secret US programs may have been the source of that support, and that security is so dangerously lax in military or defense contractor laboratories. US government insistence on pursuing and maintaining the secrecy of elaborate biological threat assessment activities is undermining the prohibitions of the Biological Weapons Convention and encouraging biological weapons proliferation in other countries, which in turn may support bioterrorist attacks on the American public. Future deterrence, and the peace of mind of the American people, require that the perpetrator must be publicly identified and brought to justice without delay. APPENDIX LABORATORIES THAT HAVE WORKED WITH THE AMES STRAIN OF ANTHRAX (Information obtained from open sources) USAMRID # + Dugway Proving Ground (Utah) # * + Naval Research Medical Center and associated military labs (MD) # Battelle Memorial Institute (Ohio; plus laboratories in many other locations) # * + Duke University Medical School, Clinical Microbiology Lab (NC) VA Medical Center, Durham (NC) USDA laboratory and Iowa State College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames (Iowa) LSU College of Veterinary Medicine * + Northern Arizona State University (Arizona) * + Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute (IL) University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center, Albuquerque (NM) * + Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment, Porton Down (UK) * + CAMR, Porton (UK) * Defense Research Establishment, Suffield (CA) * + BioPort Corp (MI) In addition, CDC, NIH, Los Alamos and a few others may have the Ames strain; the Institute for Genomic Research (MD) says they have the Ames DNA but not the bacteria. # indicates laboratories in the US that are estimated to be more likely than the others to have weaponization capabilities * Obtained through a FOIA request by the Washington Post (article Nov 30, 01) + indicates acknowledged recipients of the Ames strain from USAMRIID